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Editor’s Introduction
MARO: Mass Atrocity Response Operations;
A Military Planning Handbook:
Selling the Mission and/or Protecting
Human Rights?
As we enter our sixth year of publication, the editors are very pleased to welcome
readers to the sixth volume of Genocide Studies and Prevention. We have been very
fortunate over the past five years to present a wide array of material related to the
prevention and understanding of genocide and mass atrocities. This volume continues
that tradition as it presents a symposium of invited commentaries on MARO: Mass
Atrocity Response Operations; A Military Planning Handbook.
MARO grew out of the United States military Quadrennial Defense Review which
contained a statement noting that the military needed to focus on ‘‘preventing
human suffering due to mass atrocities or large-scale natural disasters abroad.’’ 1
The Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and the
US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute collaborated in writing
MARO.
MARO is the second recent attempt by the United States or related organizations to design policies to prevent genocide and protect civilian populations. Like its
predecessor, Madeleine Albright and William Cohen’s Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers,2 MARO consists of what I would call semi-official US
government documents. I say semi-official because these documents are actually
sponsored and published by universities or other organizations. They are not official
policy pronouncements in the sense that they are only recommendations and have
not been incorporated into the decision-making apparatus of the government or the
military. In common with virtually all such exercises, including Blueprint, MARO
suffers from an excess of bureaucratic jargon, acronyms, diagrams that look as
though they were designed by sixth graders after playing video games, and referents
that often bear little or no relationship to reality—the reality, in this case, of
genocide and mass atrocities. They also often ignore or rewrite history, or perhaps
create their own version of history that suits their policy recommendations. All of
these and many more specific critical and analytic views are expressed by the
authors of the commentaries in this issue.
The immediate background of MARO is, most likely, the failure to stop the
massive human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the
1990s. Embarrassed and determined to justify United Sates policy that allowed
those atrocities to occur virtually unimpeded, Albright and Cohen’s Blueprint was
published and followed by the present MARO. The United States had apparently
been in denial about the role it played in allowing those atrocities to occur and had
retreated from any idea that it would be engaged in protecting human rights as
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attention turned to terrorism after September 11, 2001. In March 2007 the US Army
War College sponsored a conference titled The National Security Implications of
Climate Change, and attention began to shift to the possible importance it held for
military operations and how it would affect human rights around the globe. As the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began to slowly recede from public consciousness,
the military saw the importance of a new mission in the new environment. This is
described as ‘‘selling a mission’’ 3 by Gwynne Dyer in his daring new book, Climate
Wars: the Fight for Survival as the World Overheats. As he puts it,
The next mission of the U.S. armed forces is going to be the long struggle to maintain
stability as climate change continually undermines it. The ‘‘war on terror’’ has more
or less had its day and, besides, climate change is a real, full-spectrum challenge that
may require everything, from Special Forces to aircraft carriers. So it’s time to jolt the
rank and file of the officer corps out of their complacency, re-orient them towards the
new threat and get them moving.4

Of course, this also guarantees continued funding for the military, for those corporations that depend on military funding, and for the congressional districts that contain such installations. It means that when the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq
end, the military will have a new mission. It is the answer to the debate started by
Eisenhower’s military-industrial complex speech and the answer to the questions
which have been raised since the end of the Cold War.
In fact, as the Cold War faded into historical anachronism in the 1990s it became
clear that the ‘‘mission’’ was ambiguous and not as clear as it had been. What would
replace the Cold War? The ‘‘war on drugs’’ was not only inadequate but it was a war
that was defeated by the demand for drugs in the US. Until September 11, 2001,
there was no adequate factor to sell the mission, to mobilize the fear of the public,
and to unite the country behind the military and the new mission. Climate change
and the protection of human rights are perfect. Not only do they serve the purpose
but they also form a response to a very real threat—a threat, incidentally, that the
liberal, humanitarian left has been supporting before the military arrived to pick
up the thread that has been woven over the years since the atrocities in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s.
This is where MARO fits and it is hard to criticize the now apparent good intentions behind the new mission. As the authors of MARO argue,
The Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) Project seeks to enable the United
States and the international community to stop genocide and mass atrocity as part
of a broader integrated strategy by explaining key relevant military concepts and
planning considerations. The MARO Project is based on the insight that the failure
to act in the face of mass killings of civilians is not simply a function of political will
or legal authority; the failure also reflects a lack of thinking about how military forces
might respond. States and regional and international organizations must better
understand and prepare for the unique operational and moral challenges that
military forces would face in a MARO.5

Accordingly, the Project states that it
addresses the concrete and practical challenges of using military forces to halt ongoing mass atrocities through a MARO. The Project has developed operational concepts,
a tailored planning guide, tabletop exercises, and other tools for military institutions
and political actors. While military force will not always be required to halt mass
atrocity, the MARO Project helps make credible, effective options more likely and it
better prepares intervening forces in the event that they are directed to act. In this
respect, the Project can help shift the policy debate from ‘‘whether’’ to ‘‘how’’ to
intervene to stop widespread violence against civilians. (5)
2
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And it all sounds very honorable. The US military is now devoted to humanitarian
intervention and to the protection of civilian populations if the MARO project is ever
adopted and instituted as an official policy response. Several of our commentators
note that this is highly unlikely and they explain their reasoning in detail. For now,
I simply wish to note that the report begins with faulty premises. Yes, it is true that
the ‘‘failure to act in the face of mass killings of civilians is not simply a function of
political will or legal authority,’’ but it is an oversimplification to argue, as MARO
does, that ‘‘the failure also reflects a lack of thinking about how military forces
might respond.’’ In fact, the United Sates military was reluctant to act in the cases
of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The so-called Powell Doctrine, which was
a response to the Vietnam Syndrome coupled with the disaster in Somalia in 1993,
argued that any response must include a massive infusion of US force along with
an exit strategy. Throughout the course of the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia,
the US military and its political allies in the Clinton administration argued against
intervention on the basis that the long standing ethnic and religious hostilities
responsible for the ongoing slaughters were an intractable force that was not
amenable to military solution. Similar arguments were made about any possible
intervention in Rwanda. The real lesson here is not that there was no military thinking but that there were political reasons why the United States did not wish to
intervene and the forces supporting intervention were not politically influential.
Neither Bosnia nor Rwanda had sufficient oil reserves to justify action similar to
that taken in the Persian Gulf, and there was little or no equivalent to the movement to publicize the atrocities in Darfur and to pressure the government to take
action. Even in 2010 with a strong Save Darfur movement supported by students,
movies stars, NGOs, and others, the atrocities continued, and there exist reasons
why the United Sates does not support intervention and cannot intervene. In fact,
in spite of those newer forces there remains a reluctance to intervene as well as
powerful political forces militating against any action. Lack of planning, as MARO
claims, is not the primary factor, or even a major factor at that, in this reluctance.
The authors of MARO also argue that ‘‘The Project has developed operational
concepts, a tailored planning guide, tabletop exercises, and other tools for military
institutions and political actors’’ (5–6). ‘‘In this respect,’’ the authors continue, ‘‘the
Project can help shift the policy debate from ‘whether’ to ‘how’ to intervene to stop
widespread violence against civilians’’ (6). The problem is that answering the
‘‘whether’’ to intervene question must come before any discussion of ‘‘how’’ to
intervene. Here, once again, political factors play a major role. If, however, it is
determined that intervention will take place, it does not seem logical to lay out a
one-size-fits-all plan since every case is different. The Pentagon has done this to its
detriment repeatedly. After World War II planning for war on the European plains
did not lead to the successful prosecution of wars in Korea or Vietnam. In fact, the
opposite was the case as US strategy was self-defeating and was further undermined
by the lack of understanding of the cultural and political situation of both of
those conflicts. Therefore, body counts as the measure of success in Vietnam led
to atrocities being committed by US troops as any Vietnamese was counted as an
enemy casualty, and the policy of free-fire zones led to the mass killing of civilians.
Much more important is an in-depth understanding of each situation so that
planning may be pursued to develop a successful strategy to meet each exigency.
As an attempt to respond to these factors, MARO intends to overcome the
reluctance to intervene and to instead advocate that it is in the national interest of
a nation such as the United States to protect human rights. MARO notes:
3
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Some argue that it is unlikely that, despite advocacy and education to the contrary,
the United States will ever decide that it is within its national strategic interest to
launch an intervention to stop a mass atrocity, and therefore that planning for this
eventuality is not a priority. Such a position is not only ahistorical; it represents an
abdication of responsibility to prepare for contingencies. (14)

Contingencies must indeed be anticipated, but what is ahistorical is to interpret past
US foreign policy as intervening to protect human rights. In fact, the United States
has not identified intervention to stop mass atrocities as part of its strategic interest.
To be sure, that does not mean planning should not occur, but it does mean that
undertaking such intervention would be a new and unusual step for the United
States. The MARO authors note this to some extent:
A Mass Atrocity Response Operation (MARO) describes a contingency operation to
halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed
groups against non-combatants. The term MARO is not yet enshrined in military
doctrine—but it should be. The United States does not currently recognize mass
atrocities as a unique operational challenge, and there is no operational concept or
doctrine that might help commanders understand the dynamics and demands of
responding to mass atrocities. (17)

To rectify this, MARO argues that while the United States is not fully prepared
to intervene effectively in a mass atrocity situation, past military operations provide
guidelines and MARO will be familiar because it will include many traditional
operations:
This is true almost across the operational spectrum: convoy escort, direct fires, and
detainee operations are features of both peacekeeping and war. More broadly, a
MARO involves a dynamic mix of offense, defense, and stability operations. Many
familiar operational concepts, such as no-fly zones, protected enclaves, or separation
of forces, may be elements of a MARO operational plan. (24)

In short, MARO differs from more traditional military operations only in the fact
that it intends to stop atrocities and help protect civilian populations. MARO next
attempts to incorporate the US experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom as a case
study, noting, ‘‘Consider the US experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which
the context changed from major combat operations to counterinsurgency. Although
many of the tasks and concepts remained the same, US forces were inadequately
prepared to carry them out’’ (24). Of course, this is the case and it is no different, as
I argued above, from the experience in Vietnam or Afghanistan. What was lacking
was not a MARO plan but knowledge of the culture, politics, social structure, the
entire underpinnings and history—in fact—of those experiencing US military intervention. Consequently, Iraq is a particularly poor choice; US operations in Iraq were
not originally sanctioned as multilateral and the United States is at fault for not
being prepared to engage counterinsurgency operations. After years of counterinsurgency experience in places such as Vietnam, not to mention the former Soviet
Union’s experience in Afghanistan, the US military’s lack of preparation for this is,
indeed, a sad comment on the military.
Finally, it is important to ask whether an operation plan outlining what should
be done is necessary. Does this explain the inability to be flexible and to adapt
to new circumstances? If so, the US military will always be at a disadvantage
to guerrilla groups which adapt quickly to their changing circumstances. To its
credit, MARO incorporates this into its analysis, noting, ‘‘Indeed, the asymmetry
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between a rushed genocide and a graduated response has important—and somewhat
contradictory—implications for intervention. The asymmetry works against those
who want to stop mass atrocities,’’ and a successful model of military intervention
must take that into account (29). This is important to note, and yet doing so does
not mean that a written plan will adequately prepare a military force to respond in
such fashion.
The authors of MARO are not unaware of the most telling criticisms that may be
made of their operational handbook; nor are they ignorant of the history of genocide
and human rights atrocities. To their credit, they attempt to anticipate most of
the comments to be found in the following analyses. Yet, they faced a massive and
perhaps insoluble task in trying to present a military plan that would anticipate
the contingencies of inherently unstable and quickly changing circumstances. The
authors are aware of this issue and, consequently, argue for the necessity of education as well as the necessity of ‘‘developing doctrine, leader orientation, conducting
routine planning exercises, and developing common national and coalition concepts,
vocabulary, and expectations. Any multinational execution of this type of mission
will require a high degree of coordinated political and military effort’’ (30). Acquiring
the necessary training for such a mission is a complicated process and requires
some highly specialized forms of training including the acquisition of the language,
culture, or context within which operations may need to take place. The level of
difficulty that is involved in the process becomes evident when one notes that this
type of training—which includes ongoing historical, cultural, and linguistic education
of a highly complicated nature for most of the regions of the world—prepares for a
mission that intends to anticipate the possibility of atrocities.
As MARO trudges to its conclusion, it rushes to include a discussion of very
complicated factors to be taken into consideration such as the importance of NGOs,
the moral dilemmas that might be confronted, the aftermath of such atrocities, and
the responsibility to help with the recovery and reconstruction processes. For this
reason, although MARO contains errors of omission and commission, it is a valiant
attempt to redefine the mission of the US military to incorporate a consciousness of
the necessity of protecting human rights. Whether it is selling a new mission in
order to preserve the defense establishment or it is motivated by a genuine desire
to protect civilian populations, the least that can be said about it is that MARO
opened a discussion and gave rise to a level of consciousness that until now appeared
to be beyond the pale of discussion. For many more specific and interesting criticisms
and analyses of both the positive and negative implications of the project as well
as for practical considerations of the issues related to the implementation of the
recommendations that MARO advances, I encourage you to read the following
commentaries very carefully.
Since the commentaries cover a wide range of topics from diverse perspectives it
would be difficult to summarize them. I have divided and organized them into two
categories: scholarly perspectives from outside of the United States and scholarly
perspectives from within the United States—a method that offers some interesting
alternative views. The commentaries can also be divided in terms of the theoretical
or practical perspective that they adopt.
The editors of Genocide Studies and Prevention hope that these various views
will contribute to the ongoing attempt to protect human rights and prevent atrocities.
The second part of this issue consists of an article and a research note. The
article by Marko Attila Hoare—a reader at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences,
Kingston University—is a case study of the international courts and genocide in
5
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Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hoare notes that two international courts, the United Nations
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), established that genocide occurred in Srebrenica in
1995. Additional courts have concurred and yet, as Hoare notes, ‘‘there has been
minimal international punishment in Bosnia.’’ 6 This article attempts to explain and
analyze why ‘‘international justice has underachieved regarding the mass murder
in Bosnia by examining the structural weaknesses, political pressures, and errors of
judgment that have hampered the international court.’’ 7
The research note by Antonis Klapsis, adjunct lecturer in the Department of
Political Science and International Relations, University of Peloponnese, brings
attention to one of the lesser known mass atrocities that has taken place in the
twentieth century. Klapsis provides an in-depth analysis of the measures undertaken
by the US government to aid the Greek refugees escaping the atrocities in Asia
Minor from 1922 to 1923. This analysis is not only important as a description of
how humanitarian aid can be offered but, as I noted above, it also fills in another
chapter of the history of a lesser known genocide.
In conclusion, as we begin our sixth year of publication, we, the editors of
Genocide Studies and Prevention, intend to maintain our ongoing commitment to do
everything that we can to help our readers understand the causes of genocide and to
continue to help end what is increasingly accepted as one of the most egregious
crimes against humanity.
Herb Hirsch
GSP Co-editor
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The MARO Handbook: New Possibilities
or the Same Old Militarism?
Henry C. Theriault
Department of Philosophy, Worcester State University

In recent years some human rights scholars, journalists, activists, and policy makers
have advocated the use of military intervention against violent mass human rights
violations by governments or other perpetrators in societies with governments that
are unable or unwilling to prevent the violence.1 This push is a response to the
failures of outside powers that appeared militarily capable of intervening in, for
instance, the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s. While many such advocates also recognize the importance of long-term prevention efforts and non-military
options, they argue that there will be cases in which prevention efforts will fail
and violent mass human rights violations against vulnerable groups will become a
serious threat, if they do not actually take place. In such instances, military intervention from the outside is the legitimate last resort.2
The Carr Center for Human Rights Policy of Harvard University’s Kennedy
School and the United States Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
offer the 2010 Mass Atrocity Response Operations; A Military Planning Handbook.
The handbook was intended not only as a step toward the broader recognition of
the purported need for military intervention but also as a crucial step toward the
concrete capacity to intervene successfully. Designed for the United States military,
the authors indicate that, with suitable adjustments, the handbook could be used by
other forces as well. The report is meant to guide higher level decision makers and
field commanders who might be required to run a mass atrocity response operation
(MARO) through the planning process of the intervention and to guide adjustments
as the intervention unfolds on the ground.
There are two general questions against which the handbook can be evaluated.
First, assuming that military intervention in the kinds of situations discussed in
MARO is morally right, does the manual fulfill its goal of providing useful guidance
for accomplishing a successful intervention—that is, an intervention that saves some
or all of the victims from violence and ensures long-term safety for them and stability
for the area that they inhabit? The second question is more complex: given the concrete realities of the US military and the impacts of military intervention, is military
intervention itself justified and, if so, under what conditions? At first glance, this
second question would seem to carry us beyond the scope of the handbook, which is
concerned with what should be done once the decision to intervene has been made.
But, as will become clear below, given the concrete specifics and history of the US
military and the ways in which it has been used, the issue of how to intervene is
inseparable from the question of whether it is morally right to intervene, even if in
MARO the latter is disregarded. What is more, the authors of MARO—Sarah Sewall,
Dwight Raymond, and Sally Chin—hope that this unofficial guide, as the handbook
Henry C. Theriault, ‘‘The MARO Handbook: New Possibilities or the Same Old Militarism?,’’
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is presented, will be adopted officially by the US military. Such adoption is predicated on the acceptance of MAROs as acceptable military missions, and thus the
Handbook implicitly advocates for this acceptance, if its internal content assumes
that acceptance.
Both questions generate the evaluative points made in the present consideration
of the handbook.

Steps Forward
The authors and consultants that contributed to MARO deserve credit for recognizing the significant differences between a standard operation in which US military
forces would form one party in a two-party conflict and a MARO in which US forces
would be outside actors coming into a situation of one-sided mass violence. Clearly it
is one thing to seek to defeat or contain an enemy force and quite another to seek to
protect a non-combatant group against one or possibly more military and/or paramilitary force(s). One strength of the handbook is that it details the various actors that
can possibly be present in or potentially relevant to any MARO situation, including a
set of perpetrators that might or might not be a part of the government of the area
in which the atrocities are taking place or expected to take place—a set consisting of,
in some cases, more than one perpetrator group; victims or potential victims that
might have their own agendas beyond survival and other basic human rights; a
host government that might be supporting the atrocities, unwilling or unable to alter
the situation, or supportive of intervention; other states that might be supportive of
(to the point of sending troops in) or opposed to an intervention; international actors
such as the United Nations and African Union; non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) that are already operating in the affected area, doing, for instance, relief
work; NGOs that are not yet involved but that might have a role in post-intervention
recovery; the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; and non-military
components of the US government, such as the State Department. The often differing and even conflicting goals, motives, and methods of different parties, even those
supporting intervention, make a MARO much more complicated than a standard
military operation in a war.3 The report emphasizes such things as the risk that
victims, once the intervention succeeds, might engage in retribution against the perpetrators, in which case MARO forces ‘‘then become a shield’’ for the former victims
as they carry out retribution (27).
Another laudable point of analysis is the recognition that, although there are
some indicators that are sometimes useful in this regard, there is no recipe for predicting which contexts will generate mass atrocity situations (30–31). For this and
other reasons, MAROs will often escalate rapidly and not allow for optimum force
assemblage, while a quick response will sometimes be necessary to have a meaningful impact in stopping the killings of members of the targeted group(s) (33). The
handbook significantly points out that the threat of prosecution or other accountability
must be ‘‘real and understood’’ in order for the gathering of evidence and public
exposure to have a real deterrent effect (35)—a point that the Rwanda and Bosnia
cases illustrate all too well despite the fact that some perpetrators were ultimately
prosecuted in those cases.4
Without explicitly identifying the sources of the lessons, the handbook appears to
reflect certain lessons learned from earlier mass atrocity situations, including some
interventions. The authors rightfully point out that intervention can introduce factors
into a local situation that might exacerbate rather than mitigate the human rights
problem. For instance, they understand that ‘‘if not controlled, humanitarian assistance supplies during and after an intervention may be at risk for appropriation by
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criminals, military forces, or other armed groups and fuel black market activities’’
(53). This is well illustrated in Michael Maren’s account of humanitarian intervention in Somalia in The Road to Hell.5 The authors of MARO also recognize that
hate speech and other types of ‘‘inflammatory information’’ can be key factors in
supporting or driving human rights violations, and they call on MARO planners to
monitor and possibly stop such speech as a method of prevention or intervention
(55). This is presumably informed by the role of propaganda hate radio in the
Rwanda Genocide and the debates about this hate speech that took place in US
military and policy circles.6
The handbook also includes some good critical points that support the concrete
planning and execution of MAROs. In discussing each of the seven forms that the
actual military format of a MARO might take, the authors raise interesting objections regarding the third, which calls for the imposition of a militarily defended
buffer zone to separate victims from perpetrators. This approach might be considered
an obvious way of protecting a victim group, but the authors highlight several of its
shortcomings: this approach does not help transform the society in which human
rights violations either are or are on the verge of taking place, it will not necessarily
protect people who are behind the lines of the buffer zone from violence that
might be pursued by others behind those same lines, and it can have an unintended
permanent political effect beyond the protection of the victim group by producing
a permanent political border (77). Similarly, the authors critically engage another
approach, which consists of setting up internally displaced person (IDP) camps to
gather potential victims for easier protection. They point out that this approach
might actually reward the perpetrators’ aggression if, for instance, in the case of
attempted ethnic cleansing, the IDP camps become long-term homes because the
victims will have been removed from the territory over which the perpetrators wish
complete hegemony (78). At various points, the handbook recognizes a crucial issue:
the threat or the beginning of an intervention might actually trigger the beginning
of violent mass human rights violations or accelerate their execution. Because perpetrators might see that the window for action is closing and become convinced that
intervention will prevent them from having any future opportunities to attack their
targets, they might decide to begin or accelerate the violence when they might not
have done so under other circumstances.
The handbook also includes recognition of some of the subtleties of MARO situations. For instance, the writers point out that the government in a MARO area might
not have control over the population and so other forces could drive atrocities (109).
It is much more difficult to intervene in this kind of situation than in a case in which
there is an explicitly defined and identifiable perpetrator group with clear mechanisms
of power and military organization and operation.

Missteps
While, as the previous section indicates, the handbook does potentially advance an
understanding of MARO situations and responses, there is also a range of problems
with the MARO Handbook. Some of the inadequacies of the project are not fundamental and could be addressed if the handbook were to be revised in the future.
Some of MARO’s shortcomings, however, are functions of deeper problems with
the MARO concept itself, military intervention, and the historically revealed but
uncorrected tendencies of the US military in its relationships with civilian populations. Addressing these will require more than the revision of the report; it will
require changes in approaches to international relations and the role of power and
9
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violence in them as well as changes to some features of the culture of the US
military. Nonetheless, revisions to the handbook that address these deeper issues
can help spur these changes while their absence from the handbook in its present
form reinforces the problems at stake.
Although some of the problems will inhibit the success of MAROs, not all of
the problems will do so. Increases in capacity and commitment are sometimes
assumed to automatically be positive moves forward. But even the ways in which
the handbook increases the capacity and commitment to carry out MAROs might
not constitute genuine improvements in the level of respect for human rights in the
world. Moving the agenda of military intervention forward is not necessarily productive, especially if the handbook does not address the problematic relationship of the
military basis of MAROs to human rights.

Issue 1: Reliance on the Report of the Genocide Prevention Task Force
MARO’s authors frequently cite with approval the 2008 report issued by the selfdesignated ‘‘Genocide Prevention Task Force,’’ which was chaired by Madeleine
Albright and William Cohen.7 For instance, page 66 of MARO reproduces an extensive table directly from the Albright-Cohen Report. While the authors are certainly
free to use material from the Albright-Cohen Report, there is no critical evaluation
of what is appropriated or justification for its appropriation. This is, of course, a
minimal requirement for any work claiming intellectual legitimacy. In the case of
the Albright-Cohen Report this is especially important because the report has
received detailed criticism from various angles. A special issue of Genocide Studies
and Prevention featured commentaries on the report, a number of which made
substantive, well-grounded criticisms of key aspects of it, including its approach to
US military intervention.8 While this is not the appropriate place to rehearse those
criticisms, the fact that MARO’s authors miss the opportunity to address them and
thereby improve thinking on military intervention means that key shortcomings of
the Albright-Cohen Report are imported directly into MARO.

Issue 2: Is There an Editor in the House?
Any reader used to decent journalistic, technical, business, or academic texts will
doubtless be struck by the acronym-infused, jargonistic, cumbersome writing of the
MARO Handbook. While the claim might have been made that a specialized military
audience would be used to such writing and comfortable with it, MARO’s authors
repeatedly express their desire to make the report accessible to a general audience.
For instance, in discussing the genesis of the report, they explain, ‘‘We streamlined
the entire process, stripping it of many detailed elements that would be essential
but familiar to military planners while making the language and process easier for
civilian actors to understand and apply’’ (135). Even as they stress this, the authors
cannot resist using unnecessary acronyms: ‘‘Planners also sought to translate the
JOPES process into concepts and terms that would be more easily understood by
the US interagency community as well as NGOs and the general public’’ (133).
‘‘JOPES’’ is an acronym introduced just on page 133 with no role previously in the
report and used only three times in total in the report. The sentence in which it
is introduced manifests a typical use of acronyms: ‘‘This effort was based on the
military’s existing Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) process, but the APF was envisioned to provide guidance to a GCC on how to develop a
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Commander’s Estimate and Operation Plan’’ (133). Perhaps it is enough to say that
the acronym key runs for three full pages (141–43).
The jargon problem, while not as sustained as the acronym addiction, reaches
levels of absurdity at points. For instance, in place of, presumably, ‘‘helicopter’’ we
have ‘‘rotary-wing asset’’ (125, 127) and in place of, presumably, ‘‘communication’’
we have ‘‘two-way information’’ (70). We also find out that these ‘‘rotary-wing assets’’
can be employed from ‘‘amphibious decks’’ (127). The meaning here would seem to be
either aircraft carriers or helipads on other types of naval vessels, unless it means
some type of pontoon-supported floating helipads offshore. Regardless, not only is
the term ‘‘amphibious’’ jargon but it also seems to be incorrect unless these are
ships with helipads that actually come on land in addition to floating in water.
Other non-standard and obscure uses of English include ‘‘socializing’’ as in ‘‘[t]he
process of socializing the MARO Project among various military, government, and
non-governmental communities’’ (101). Quite simply, it is unclear what this means—
does it mean talking up the project in informal conversations, getting formal feedback
through group discussions, or something else?
While it is tempting to dismiss such terminological twists as harmless lapses
or at worst as a form of exclusivism that pretends to superiority over non-military
readers, as some points below suggest, these uses of language might better be seen
as evidence of muddled or closed thinking, whereby certain patterns of language
typical in military circles are repeated without clear understanding or critical engagement. The jargon becomes a kind of endless mantra that displaces genuine thinking
and expression.
There are also structural writing issues. For example, how do the different
‘‘approaches’’ to MAROs, that is, methods of actual military interventions (e.g., imposing a buffer zone between perpetrators and victims [70–87]); ‘‘lines of effort,’’
that is, all major functions that are necessary and collectively sufficient to achieve
success (88–95); and MARO phases (95–100) relate to one another? For instance,
how does a variation in military approach require changes in the ‘‘lines of effort’’ to
achieve success for that approach? The report does not explain the interrelationships
among these aspects of planning. An example of where this would appear essential
is the discussion of MARO Phase II, ‘‘Seize the Initiative,’’ which focuses on the
beginning of military operations (on ‘‘D-Day’’ [97]). Will the features of this phase
vary depending on the approach to military operations? Do some features but not
others apply to some but not all approaches?

Issue 3: Abstraction and Pro-Forma Lists
The handbook is supposed to provide a process for planning a MARO that will
include the things that need to be thought out ahead of time and during the implementation of the plan. While clearly some kind of generic template—possibly an
extensive one—could be used as a framework for planning, the handbook limits itself
to generic templates, despite the authors’ claim that in their writing process they
wished to avoid ‘‘any attempt to create a universal or generic plan’’ (133). These
templates are detailed in that they often include lists of all sorts of elements that
might be necessary to a plan as well as many considerations of potential problems
or obstacles that might be relevant. At the same time, the templates remain pro
forma—that is, an abstract list of all sorts of possible issues that seem produced
a priori, without an attempt to engage the real issues that have occurred in real
attempts at humanitarian military intervention, such as in Somalia. While, as stated
above, these experiences might have informed some of the details presented abstractly
11
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in the handbook, by incorporating the details in an abstract manner, there is no
indication of how they relate to actual interventions. In other words, planners are
not shown how these detailed lists of considerations and the extensive templates
for plans relate to concrete, on-the-ground situations. At too many points MARO
becomes merely a sequence of lists following lists following lists, with no analysis,
context, or application to concrete situations that would help in real planning
for real operations (see, for example, 37–39, 51–57, 63–64, 90–95). Items are often
obvious or generic, of the form ‘‘Laundry can consist of socks, underwear, pants,
shirts, towels, etc. Towels might mean bath towels or dish towels or hand towels.
The possibility that ‘pants’ might include shorts should be considered.’’
Discussing the link between planned and real, concrete (as opposed to generic)
situations would have made the handbook much more useful. For instance, while
the ‘‘Draft Strategic Guidance’’ (106–7) could be employed in planning, without a
link to specific situations established through examples, MARO commanders are
left with the entire burden of figuring out how to apply the guidance to real situations without having the benefit of the experiences of others who have tried to do
this kind of thing or any concrete analyses of the links to specific situations. The
hard part of planning is too often left as an exercise for the reader.
A typical example, selected from many possibilities, of where a concrete example
drawn from real experience would have increased the handbook’s value serves to
illustrate this:
MARO plans will normally follow this process, although they may be complicated both
by a lack of specific and timely guidance as well as by high-level participation in the
planning process because of the politically sensitive nature and potential media glare
put on a MARO, particularly with respect to COA development and selection. (42)

Without a concrete example, this says little more than ‘‘things might be complicated
and planning must take this into consideration.’’ Explaining how things might be
complicated using specific examples would be very helpful. Indeed, given that there
have been a number of humanitarian interventions in recent years and that MARO’s
authors seem to consider the military form of the invasions and subsequent occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan to be similar to MAROs, the authors could have discussed how these operations worked and how various aspects of the suggestions for
planning worked or would work relative to each of the different actual situations, all
with the benefit of hindsight. Rather than presenting planners with generic, abstract
situations into which to fit their real situations, Sewall, Raymond, and Chin could
have given planners real situations as reference points to make real decisions about
what would be likely to work and not to work in a given specific MARO situation.
At times MARO reads like a geometry textbook without any illustrations. At least
at some points, students need to look at figures of right triangles to understand
certain properties of right triangles that have previously been presented by abstract
definition.
While the inclusion of concrete illustrations drawn from historical events would
have been a significant improvement, the authors should have gone even further by
testing each of their plan templates, assumptions, various lists, ‘‘approaches,’’ ‘‘lines
of effort,’’ phasing schemes, and so forth against real past operations and MARO
situations. This would have transformed much of the handbook’s content from
generic, seemingly a priori speculation into genuine empirically-based analysis.
A similar limitation is revealed when the authors assert that a ‘‘brief historical
overview’’ of a MARO situation might be helpful for the planning process (43). There
12
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are two issues with this assertion. First, part of the problem relative to MARO
situations is that outsiders, including the US government, rely on ‘‘brief historical
overviews’’ that contain simplifications and ‘‘standard wisdom’’ about a situation,
rather than factual analysis that is nuanced and accurate and has genuine explanatory value. For instance, the Rwandan Genocide was simplistically misrepresented
by US policy makers and journalists as an intractable centuries-old ethnic conflict
rather than the result of a complex set of contemporary forces that culminated in a
well-calculated attempt by the ruling Interahamwe to retain power in the face of an
impending shift to electoral democracy in Rwanda,9 a project that more instrumentalized ‘‘ethnic hatred’’ than was generated by it.10 Second, the authors do not
explain what specifically in a historical overview would be useful and in what ways.
They too should have provided historical overviews of past MARO situations and
discussions of how they could have been used for MARO planning to illustrate their
meaning.
While other elements of the MARO are not always as flawed as its account of the
Rwandan Genocide, the brief historical overview of that case (6) is a good example of
the problems that arise with limited accounts of human rights crises. The authors
present the genocide as having started in 1994 with the breakdown of the peace
accords, without any recognition of the complex political process that led to genocide
as a way to prevent democratization of Rwanda. Shallow and limited ‘‘historical’’
accounts are in some ways worse than no accounts at all, as they provide false information that will mislead MARO planners. The authors could and should have
included examples of the right kind of historical analysis that would support the
success of a MARO, rather than repeat reductive accounts of such events as the
Rwandan Genocide. This problem might have been addressed in part by the contributions of scholars, in addition to that of military leaders, to the research, conceptualization, and writing processes.
It might be argued that this level of specificity (i.e., testing against historical
examples) would have increased the length of the MARO Handbook far beyond
what would be manageable for planners, but at least some specificity could have
been introduced instead of the rather significant amount of repetition in the work.
For instance, the possibility that victims can potentially become perpetrators is
unnecessarily repeated a number of times.
Similarly, we have an abstract assertion, ‘‘Understanding a perpetrator’s motivations is essential for determining how best to counteract,’’ 11 followed by a list of
different possible motivations (45), but we do not have suggestions on how the
specific possible motivations might be addressed with specific courses of action or
how responses would vary based on different perpetrator motivations. Possible motivations are simply listed. Identifying different motives is not enough for planning;
real models for what to do once the motives are identified are necessary. This is
another example of the authors offering extensive lists of considerations without
adequate (or any) guidance on how to relate those lists to real situations and actions.
An additional point relates to an issue that will be treated in greater detail
below. The planning schemes presented in the handbook assume that US military
personnel at various levels in MAROs operate as automatons, simply following
orders and not engaging in any self-directed or divergent activities. Indeed, leaders
and soldiers are treated in the abstract, never actually mentioned or evaluated, as
if they have no history, no problems, or other features. There is no discussion of the
kind of preparation, training, or selection process that might go into putting together
a force that would have the right understanding of and regard for human rights
13
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concerns—not simply military training—to carry out a MARO successfully. While
the authors call for the consideration of all sorts of nuances of the perpetrators,
victims, and other groups, there is absolutely no consideration of similar issues
regarding US forces. As will be discussed in detail below, there is no mention of
potential human right violations by U.S. troops, let alone elements of the planning
process devoted to anticipating and preventing such abuses.

Issue 4: Optimism
While in some circumstances, an optimistic view of a situation might be useful by
motivating actors to attempt to do what they might otherwise not have done and to
have the confidence to push forward despite obstacles, in the planning process of a
military mission optimism can obscure or cause to be discounted or spun facts that
have life-and-death implications. MARO’s authors tend to be realistic (if abstract)
and recognize many obstacles and potential problems arising in any MARO situation. At the same time, there are points where they display naı̈veté. In listing
Flexible Deterrent Options, the authors claim that a show of force can be made
by inviting regional leaders on US naval ship tours with media coverage. The idea
is that this will convey ‘‘an implied deterrent message to perpetrators’’ (122). It
is hard to believe that people considering or even having already initiated mass
violence will suddenly change their course of action by seeing US naval ships up
close. The authors offer no evidence that this type of approach has ever worked. On
the one hand, if the perpetrators are motivated in a way that trumps risk analysis,
then no threat of any level of power will change their minds. On the other hand, if
they are more calculating they are also likely to be sophisticated enough to understand the meaninglessness of such gestures.
Another example occurs on page 90: ‘‘Short-term efforts include dissuading HN
[home nation] leaders, organizations, and populations from conducting mass atrocities, while emphasizing the importance of good governance, human rights, and acting
as a responsible member of the international community.’’ The idea that the drive to
commit human rights violations is such a surface phenomenon that this kind of
response will have any impact at all would appear to be naı̈ve even without reference
to the many historical cases that belie it.
A yet further example can be found in the discussion of PSYOPs (‘‘psychological
operations’’): ‘‘All potential perpetrators are informed that they have the option of
behaving responsibly or suffering the consequences’’ (124). The problem here is not
just that this is unlikely to have any positive effects, but that this suggestion seems
to be based on a simplistic and inaccurate notion of what motivates and produces
violent mass human rights violations.

Issue 5: The Power of Euphemism
Jargon and the excessive use of acronyms are, presumably, innocent writing problems
that can be addressed by good copy editing. Euphemisms are a different issue. While
they likewise cloud meaning, they often function to hide what might be problematic
attitudes or facts and thereby prevent exposure and criticism of them. The handbook
is rife with euphemism, including euphemisms that have long been discredited for
precisely such obscurantism. At the top of the list is a term that has been used to
cover up the intensity and acceptance of what many consider unjustified, unnecessary, and largely preventable civilian killings and other casualties in recent military
actions: ‘‘collateral damage.’’ This term appears on pages 68, 84, 86, 87, and 113, at
which points a thoughtful discussion of the contradiction between civilian casualties
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and a humanitarian intervention would have been appropriate and meaningful.
Indeed, the apparent callousness of the US military regarding ‘‘collateral damage,’’
the apparent undercounting in both Iraq attacks and other cases,12 and other concerns would appear to require such a discussion in the handbook to redirect military
personnel away from callousness and toward a genuine respect for civilian human
rights, which would seem to be requisite to any successful MARO—successful not in
terms of some notion of military dominance but of an actual net gain in the safety of
civilians (all civilians) affected by a MARO.
Another euphemism used with great frequency is ‘‘strategic communication,’’
which appears to be code for ‘‘propaganda,’’ that is, statements that purport to
manipulate the target audience in some way regardless of their truth or falsity. The
term is used on pages 21, 55, 63, 64, 112, 116, 121, 122, and 126, and a whole section
is devoted to it on page 90. This term hides the manipulative and potentially falsifying nature of such communication and renders it an apparently innocent part of
military planning. The acceptability, to MARO’s authors, of false communication
that might even harm Americans comes through on page 69, where they suggest
that ‘‘issuing travel advisories’’ regarding a potential MARO area can be a tool for
putting pressure on the home government. Doing so transforms travel advisories
into a propaganda tool, rather than an informational practice that promotes the
safety of US citizens and residents. As this abuse of travel advisories becomes more
apparent, the main effect will be a ‘‘crying wolf ’’ effect similar to the use of ‘‘terrorist
attack threat levels’’ after September 11.13 Many Americans will come to view all
travel advisories as suspect and in cases in which they should heed them, most obviously in potential MARO areas, they will not take them seriously.14
While the killing of civilians as the by-product of military action aimed at military
domination or victory does not logically contradict those goals (however unnecessary
and culpable it might be), the killing of civilians in order to protect civilians is
clearly contradictory. This contradiction reveals a core problem in the handbook:
military methods that have historically caused the destruction of civilians and violations of their human rights are now claimed to have the opposite goal and effect.
Of course, the authors extend the euphemistic façade to say that such killings
of innocent men, women, and children are due to US forces engaging ‘‘innocents
without being aware of their status or intentions’’ (68). Innocent what? Even here
human beings killed by US forces are not identified as human beings and are denied
their human status. What is more, their deaths are just an honest mistake, not a
foreseeable result of military operations as currently practiced15, in full evidence in
Iraq and Afghanistan, such that the military has not taken seriously even reporting
this16 let alone coming up with better options for approaching operations. The
suggestion of ‘‘precision targeting’’ is clearly another aspect of this problem (66);
the fact that ‘‘precision targeting’’ is not as precise as suggested17 and often results
in civilian deaths is not even acknowledged in the handbook, let alone treated
thoughtfully.
Should not methods of stopping ‘‘collateral damage’’ have a central place in the
handbook rather than be an issue of relatively low importance that is mentioned in
only a few sentences in 150 pages? And ‘‘strategic communication’’ masks the reality
of propaganda efforts. Here we have a two-layer propaganda process which uses
doublespeak to hide from policy makers and the public what the military is actually
doing, which is to use propaganda in an operation. This doublespeak might also
prevent a process of self-reflection by military leaders and personnel who might
otherwise notice the contradiction and decide in favor of human rights protection
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rather than operating in ways that kill significant numbers of civilian noncombatants. This raises a yet deeper issue.
The authors promote conducting ‘‘Psychological Operations (PSYOP) to influence
perpetrators, victims, and other actors’’ (57). The military will attempt to manipulate
through psychological pressure even victims of violence or potential violence. Clearly
dominance over everyone in a situation, even those who are supposed to be helped by
the US military, is the goal here, but this is covered over by a vague term. To the
extent that these activities are recognized for what they are, it is of little wonder
that people in affected areas as well as human rights groups and other NGOs would
be suspicious of US motives and attitudes regarding any military intervention. This
issue will be revisited in the next section of this paper.

Issue 6: An Ideologically Closed Discursive System
Perhaps the most significant impact of the MARO Handbook will not be human
rights promotion, which, for reasons discussed in this paper and other critical evaluations, will likely be minimal if not undermined by it. Rather, MARO’s significance
lies in what it reveals about the mentality of contemporary US military upper- and
mid-level leaders and the discourse they have fashioned with the support of militarist
politicians, policy makers (such as MARO’s lead author Sarah Sewall), police forces,
and others in successive waves from the post-Vietnam reclamation process, through
the re-introduction of blatant militarism in the post-Cold War world of the first
Gulf War, to the post-September 11 consolidation of what might be termed the
‘‘New Militarism.’’ The focus on human rights and the exceptionality of MAROs
offered military strategists an opportunity in the MARO Handbook to break free
from the discursive limits that have emerged and are manifested in everything from
the fallacy that criticism of US military action is ‘‘unpatriotic’’ or ‘‘anti-American’’ 18
to the view that the standards of democracy and liberty require that US military
personnel not be subject to an international court such as the International Criminal
Court for allegations of human rights abuses.19 The fact that MARO’s authors did
not take that opportunity in this work is telling.
The analyses provided in the handbook reveal what can be termed an ‘‘ideologicallyclosed discursive framework’’ in which no potential critical points about the US
military are recognized because they are either spun as innocent mistakes or misperceptions by others or omitted entirely from discussions of military issues. This
ideological closure is a problem for two reasons. First, it renders invisible the many
points in history in which the US military has engaged in human rights abuses.
There has never been a sustained engagement with this history by the US military,
and so the institutions, attitudes, culture, and practices that produced such abuses
and continue to be formed through them remain intact because nothing has been
done to counter, reverse, or exorcise them. The similarity of this aspect of the handbook to genocide denial is disturbing. Second, the report studiously avoids a substantive, explicit engagement with the failures and mistakes of the US military
in regards to past MAROs and other military missions that the authors consider
similar to MAROs, especially past humanitarian interventions and engagements
in counterinsurgency warfare. MARO reads as if it were written in an ahistorical
vacuum, projecting into the future all sorts of suggested procedures and plans
without engaging the past data that should have been studied carefully as the bases
of plans and speculations.
MARO includes list after list, plan schematic after schematic, and so forth,
there are virtually no explicit, specific, comprehensive discussions of actual military
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operations that have occurred in recent history or the obstacles, problems, or issues
revealed in these operations. There is no discussion of what worked and did not work
in relevant past operations, such as humanitarian interventions or peacekeeping
operations. Here the abstractness discussed under Issue 3 becomes more than a
correctable shortcoming; it becomes a method of avoidance. Generic recipes and lists
do not merely fail to include useful information; they exclude data and insights that
would reveal negative things about the US military.
Examples of ahistoricity in the handbook abound. It includes ignoring highly
relevant causal factors, past human rights abuses as indicators of possible future
abuses by US forces, and similar issues. The authors state, for example,
Military actions to halt the targeting of civilians may therefore develop from, or even
coexist with, other operational concepts in the context of a larger campaign in which
US forces are engaged. For example, it is easy to imagine how systematic mass
atrocities could emerge from a security vacuum created by the withdrawal of a foreign
counterinsurgency force. Thus, mass killings could haunt US forces as they exit Iraq.
(14–15)

Here a critical evaluation of the US invasion of Iraq, centering on the question of
how the specific form and approach of the US invasion and occupation have created
conditions that might lead to mass violence if the United States withdraws its
troops, is avoided. The future possibility of mass violence in Iraq is disconnected
from all causal factors: the US military is presented only as a potential brake on
mass violence, not as the key destabilizing force producing the possibility.
The authors also suggest that ‘‘the analysis [of a MARO situation] should include
key considerations with respect to agriculture, manufacturing, trade, gross domestic
product, natural resources, income distribution, poverty, unemployment, corruption,
black marketing, narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, and humanitarian assistance
needs’’ (53). There is no recognition here or elsewhere that peacekeepers themselves
routinely use trafficked girls and women and sometimes traffic girls and women20
so there need to be active steps to prevent this in any MARO.21 Peacekeeping
missions might be motivated by a ‘‘world community’’ desire to protect the human
rights of victims, but that does not necessarily mean that military personnel will
be similarly motivated. Everything depends on the character of the troops deployed
and how they are supervised. The military commander(s) and other US leaders at
various levels should make the issue explicit and caution against any such activities,
monitor personnel with an eye toward such violations, and pursue vigorously and
sincerely any suspected violations. Rather than sacrificing civilians in cases of
accusations against US military personnel to preserve US military power, control,
and immunity from human rights standards as much as possible, in a humanitarian
intervention US forces must place respect for the human rights of all civilians in
their area of operation at the center of concern.
The misassumption that other groups might commit human rights abuses but
U.C. military personnel are somehow immune from such behavior is captured particularly clearly on page 120: ‘‘Positive measures may serve as incentives for Country X
forces or military-to-military contacts to improve their professionalism. This may
make indigenous forces less prone to conduct mass atrocities.’’ This ignores the unfortunately significant number of recent abuses of human rights by US forces, during
and outside of wartime. Most notable are the rampant rapes. Susan Brownmiller
highlights just how normalized the rape and trafficking of Vietnamese women and
girls by US military forces in Vietnam became and the degree to which these became
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a part of military culture.22 A wartime to peacetime parallel is the huge number of
rapes, as well as related murders in some cases, documented or estimated to have
been committed by US military personnel against Okinawan and Japanese women
from the time that the island was captured near the end of World War II to the
present.23 As previously, news stories coming from Iraq presumably show just
the tip of the iceberg.24 Perhaps the most publicized story was that of the rape of a
14-year-old Iraqi girl and the murder of her and her family by US soldiers in 2006.25
The relative impunity of perpetrators as well as the lack of concern from or even
complicity of military leaders at various levels regarding the sexual abuse of Iraqi
women and girls26 is consistent with the Okinawa, Vietnam, and other situations
discussed above.
Other human rights abuses committed or encouraged by US forces with highlevel political and military approval or instigation include the extensive murdering
and torture perpetrated by countless human rights abusers trained by the US Army’s
School of the Americas27 and the torture practiced against prisoners in the global
‘‘war on terror,’’ in Afghanistan, Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, and beyond.28 In the entire
handbook there is no mention, not even in one single sentence, of the risk of
US military personnel abusing human rights and absolutely no provision for this
contingency, which has been a constant in the US military for at least decades, in
any aspect of the suggestions for MARO planning.
If there is any doubt that human rights abuse, including violence against noncombatant women and girls, by US forces is a real risk that should be addressed in
any plan, one need only take account of the fact that in Iraq, as in previous peace
and wartime situations, sexual assault of female US military personnel has occurred
at an astounding level. Even statistics from the Department of Defense show that
about 30 percent of scientifically surveyed US servicewomen who served at some
point from the Vietnam era forward experienced rape or attempted rape, often
repeatedly.29 Incident after incident has exposed too many military leaders at every
level as well as many under them for their indifference to hostility toward women
who attempt to seek justice for these violations of law.30 In Iraq, for instance, it
appears to be routine for commanders to dismiss the claims, while rapes are covered
up and the women who report them suffer retribution.31 This appears to be a
pervasive aspect of US military culture. As Sadler et al. put it, ‘‘Consistent rates of
rape across eras of service indicate that violence towards military women remains
an unresolved problem.’’ 32 While the rapes of US servicewomen are of tremendous
concern in themselves, the extensive and institutionally complicit human rights
abuse they represent is also an indicator of the risk of human rights abuse of other
targets by US military personnel.33 It is a reasonable inference from these abuses
that there is a substantial risk of human rights abuse of non-US civilians in MARO
areas.
It is important to point out that denial of these kinds of abuses does not have
to be the result of a set of explicit decisions or a conspiracy within the military.
Indeed, while in the nineteenth century cover-up and acceptance of US military
human rights abuses, including genocide, was authorized by a broad and deep antiNative American genocidal mentality,34 one can see the most recent wave of denial
as the long-term consequence of the defensive reaction to the broad criticisms of the
military’s abuses in Vietnam, especially as contrasted with the universal support the
military enjoyed during World War II. This defensive cognitive dissonance emerged
as a way of preserving a problematic military culture and conduct in a morally com-
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fortable manner. Similar to the abuses themselves, this defensive reaction does not
need to be seen as the function of explicit top-down decision-making or conspiracy
to be seen as a pervasive problem in an evolving US military culture. As genocide
studies scholars such as Irwin Staub and Vahakn Dadrian argue, the impunity of
the perpetrators of human rights violations not only encourages them to continue
abuses, but sets an example for others toward a broadening prevalence and intensification of human rights abuses.35 The problem is not the result of any one explicit
policy or decision, but has evolved as the consequence of countless half-decisions to
look the other way, encourage, or otherwise enable human rights abuses that have
produced a self-reinforcing process which forestalls the kind of self-reflection and
-analysis that would drive genuine moral accountability and change. Far from excusing such problems, however, the real significance of their genesis is that they have
become embedded at a level deeper than policy and law and thus addressing them
requires much more than proscriptive rhetoric.36
Perhaps the central reason for the lack of factual and historical appraisal of the
US military in the handbook is the source of its content. It is striking that, beyond
the three primary authors (which includes one person whose career has been in the
defense establishment and one military officer), the entire team of consultants
consists of military personnel, many of whom participated in the invasion of Iraq
and other operations that would seem to beg for critical analysis at both the human
rights and operational levels. While it is certainly not the case that all military
personnel think in the same way about human rights, military strategy, and so forth,
the narrow range of discourse on these issues in the handbook in relation to the
obvious points of analysis that should have been included and the homogeneous
nature of the analyses presented provide evidence that no effort was made to find
even within the military true dissenters who could have added greatly to the report,
let alone analysts of the military and others from outside who could have provided
much-needed objective analyses. It is also striking that a bibliography that is
only 33 percent longer than the list of acronyms does not include a single historical
analysis of the relevant aspects of the Vietnam War, the Somalia intervention,
Yugoslavia, or any other such case. What should have been the core of the research
done for the handbook is, quite simply, absent.
The absence of critical perspectives is not only a matter of omission. Where
criticisms are referenced in MARO they are uniformly dismissed as ungrounded.
The authors appear to have been well aware of the kinds of issues highlighted
above as well as others, yet chose to discount actively and explicitly all criticisms of
the US military, no matter how well-grounded in fact. This discounting of facts is
obviously poor scholarship, but it has deeper implications in a discussion of human
rights. Apparently, the authors of the report could not bring themselves to recognize
real and serious human rights issues that were right in front of them, raising questions about the very notion of human rights underlying the handbook. This is the
core meaning of an ideologically closed discursive system. It is closed because all
potential facts and insights that fall outside of a narrow range of ‘‘acceptable’’
discourse are automatically and without any critical analysis dismissed, excluded,
or misrepresented. From within this mindset, legitimate criticisms become problems
to be handled, often pre-emptively, so that they do not derail the military agenda,
rather than reflections of problems with US military culture and conduct that need
to be addressed through change in that culture and to that conduct.
The most typical method, repeated many times, is the misrepresentation of substantive criticisms as mere perceptions implied to be functions of misunderstanding
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or some political outlook such as anti-Americanism. As the report authors state
in reference to the inevitable grey areas of moral decision making that will arise
in a MARO,
Interveners must not only anticipate [moral] dilemmas, but prepare themselves for
criticism from interested parties—to include neighboring countries, human rights
groups, and diaspora communities. The potential ethical backlash could be debilitating. Instead of producing the pride and satisfaction of being recognized for humanitarian
action, a MARO may cause service members to question the morality of their actions
and nations to second-guess their decisions to intervene.
Doing the right thing without being prepared for tough choices and potential
ethical backlash can undermine the effectiveness of the operation and dissuade
parties from future humanitarian action. (39)

There is no concern here that the ethical criticisms might actually be correct, but
merely that they might interfere with the operation and cause moral quandaries for
military personnel. Yet, if there are moral issues with the ‘‘humanitarian’’ action
itself and the methods used to carry it out, is it not the duty of all involved to
take those issues seriously? MARO, on the contrary, counsels commanders here
to inoculate those serving under them from any moral qualms about what they are
doing, a form of advice that itself increases the likelihood that they will commit
human rights violations. If they follow such guidance, commanders will not only
reinforce any existing human-rights-violating tendencies among their soldiers, but
will in fact manipulate or push soldiers to suspend the moral compunctions against
human rights abuse that they have. If this advice is followed, the un-self-critical selfrighteousness underlying this statement—the military is always right and critics are
always wrong—will be transferred to soldiers through their commanders. What is
more, MARO forces are represented as automatically right in their decision making
by virtue of their good intentions. Rather than recognizing that it is in fact good to
‘‘question the morality of [one’s] actions,’’ even when they appear on the surface
to be morally right, MARO’s writers call on military personnel to hold on to their
notions of what is right dogmatically and without taking responsibility when they
make bad decisions, bad decisions that are likely to result in the deaths of innocent
people. This creates a very dangerous self-justifying dogmatism that can mean that
those who are inadvertently creating problems or even engaging in human rights
violations are actually convinced they are promoting human rights.
The authors further inform their readers that
the MTF [MARO task force] could become the target of numerous factions that are
frustrated by their perception of the situation, particularly if their expectations
are not met. Mitigation approaches include strategic communication to influence the
population, perpetrators, and other actors favorably regarding the intervener’s
actions. (63)

Not only are potential criticisms that an operation will face dismissed as the result
of ‘‘frustration’’ by ‘‘factions’’ based on their ‘‘perception,’’ by the handbook, but the
solution is to use propaganda to manipulate them and others to see the operation in
a favorable light. The language here is quite loaded: we have ‘‘frustration’’ rather
than ‘‘critical evaluation,’’ ‘‘factions’’ rather than ‘‘legitimately interested parties,’’
and ‘‘their perceptions’’ rather than ‘‘the facts of the situation.’’ The term ‘‘factions’’
connotes belligerent parties representing narrow agendas that they are attempting to impose on others. That the MTF will become a ‘‘target’’ suggests that it
is the victim in the situation, which could be far from the truth. What if these
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‘‘factions’’ are responding to real problems with the MARO operation? Even unintended problems—as abound in Iraq and Afghanistan—require thoughtful critical
evaluation.
The issue comes up again on page 113: ‘‘Interveners may be motivated by other
than humanitarian motives, which could cause others to view their actions skeptically.’’ Again, the actions will be viewed skeptically, as if this is just a matter of
perception. But the authors themselves admit that the United States might be using
the cover of humanitarian intervention to advance a political or economic agenda.
While it might be in the political or economic interest of the United States for US
military forces to discount such criticisms and might even be useful in manipulating
US soldiers so that they will complete their mission without moral qualms, promoting this in a handbook that is supposed to be concerned with human rights, not
cynical advantage, is a glaring ethical failure. The advice the authors should be
giving is, ‘‘do not engage in violations of sovereignty and other kinds of interventions
under the guise of humanitarian concern when in fact they are motivated by goals
other than supporting human rights.’’
It gets worse. The authors identify as a key vulnerability of intervention ‘‘opposition from other countries because of their concern over ‘imperialism’ ’’ (113). The
use of quotation marks delegitimates the term, turning it into yet another misperception. The implication is that ‘‘imperialism’’ is a term bandied about by malcontents who are always there to detract from the positive image the United
States should rightfully have. There is no consideration that the term in fact does
apply to many US military interventions and that, given this history, the burden
is on the United States to demonstrate its good intentions and lack of military
and economic expansionism whenever it uses its troops to violate another state’s
sovereignty or it engages in similar military actions. The invasion of Iraq violated
that country’s sovereignty with the result of a military conquest whose ultimate
goal many see with good cause as economic benefit through increased and favorable
access to oil.37 Other contemporary examples of military actions that can be interpreted as attempts to advance global US power and influence from Vietnam forward
abound.38 Once more the handbook’s authors miss an excellent opportunity to produce positive change in the US political and military culture, this time by pushing
for a serious commitment to human rights promotion in the place of instrumental
use of human rights rhetoric in the service of less laudable agendas. Instead, a
legitimate concern is misrepresented as inherently unjustified and itself a cynical
rhetorical move.
Even if the report’s authors do not view this kind of criticisms as reasonable or
empirically-justified, they nevertheless go too far in their delegitimation of it. They
refuse to recognize that US military and related political actions in recent years
at least make it reasonable for others around the world to be concerned about the
projections of US military power, even when accompanied by human rights justifications. The authors seem to lack the basic self-reflective realization that people
around the world might possibly have reasonable cause to be suspicious of the US
military, even if they do not agree with the expressed concerns.
MARO does recognize the potential criticism of the disconnect between the
stated humanitarian goals and the realities of some US military operations connected to humanitarian rhetoric: ‘‘the fact that a MARO’s endstate appears to be
humanitarian in nature might not necessarily be accepted at face value by all
NGOs’’ (49). It never occurs to the authors here or elsewhere to ask, why not? This
brings us back to the ahistoricism discussed at the beginning of this section. The
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handbook’s authors do not analyze potential problems such as this in order to understand why such perceptions exist and thus get at the root issue, but instead recommend that MARO planners attempt to maneuver around them. Setting aside the
moral concerns that this approach raises, it also represents a poor way of approaching human rights problems—the approach of developing some limited surface understanding of an issue and then addressing only that, usually in a limited tactical way,
which thus leaves intact the problems generating the surface symptoms.
It is also telling that the authors recognize the criticism that China has received
for support of the Sudan government throughout the Darfur Genocide (49), but they
fail at any point in their work to recognize quite similar concerns about the motives
and effects of US intervention based on active US support for dictators such as the
Shah of Iran, Anastasio Samoza in Nicaragua, Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines,
and Indonesia’s Suharto and for genocides by Guatemalan and Indonesian governments (twice),39 as well as support for human rights abuse through training at the
School of the Americas. This ideological blindness to the human rights issues of the
US military is not acceptable and in fact contradicts the handbook’s purported goal
of human rights support.
Beside the potential hypocrisy of humanitarian interventions by US forces
and the significant potential for human rights abuse by those forces, there is an
‘‘innocent’’ shortcoming of the handbook that could have just as devastating an
effect. The authors fail to consider adequately the possible unintended consequences
of military intervention, even when genuinely aimed at the promotion of human
rights. They do acknowledge all sorts of lower-order potential problems, such as US
forces inadvertently supporting and strengthening members of the protected victim
groups in possible retribution against perpetrator groups. But intervention has the
risk of radically destabilizing the area of the MARO and far beyond, as there is
good evidence occurred through the US intervention in Iraq.40 Even indirect intervention has the risk of dramatically increasing the military capacity of potentially
dangerous players in a situation, as the US support for the Afghan resistance to the
Soviet invasion that helped create Osama bin Laden and others like him shows.41
Direct intervention can do as much as being the precipitating factor in a major genocide, as in the case of the US bombing of Cambodia that perhaps became the key
factor in the rise to power of the Khmer Rouge and their subsequent genocide of 1.8
million Cambodians.42 Central to any MARO process has to be consideration of such
‘‘doomsday’’ possibilities, given how frequently they have occurred in the practice of
‘‘targeted’’ or ‘‘limited’’ military operations.

Issue 7: Post-Intervention Recovery and Economic Development
Post-intervention economic development is discussed repeatedly in the handbook.
For instance, the authors state,
Other mid-term goals [of the post-MARO process] include prioritized restoration of
key infrastructure in large population centers, development of international trade,
establishment of a banking system, implementation of World Bank and International Monetary Fund programs, and creating an environment that attracts foreign
investment. (95)

Two important issues emerge. First, there is no discussion in the handbook of any
local decision-making in post-intervention economic reconstruction and development.
While there is some discussion of the development of governing institutions, especially if the home government is defeated as part of the MARO or collapses because
of it, the involvement of such entities as the World Bank and International Monetary
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Fund (IMF) is assumed rather than left to the affected population. Second, a
number of elements in ‘‘reconstruction’’ and ‘‘economic development’’ raise questions
about the ultimate result of these processes. For instance, what does ‘‘creating an
environment that attracts foreign investment’’ mean? It can mean foreign exploitation of local workers and foreign control of the economy generally, which undermines
rather than promotes the human rights of the local population. In fact, the World
Bank and IMF are often viewed with good cause as mechanisms of foreign (US)
domination and exploitation of a developing economy.43 Two core criticisms must be
addressed in any responsible discussion of these two entities in relation to human
rights: that the IMF and World Bank function to re-mold economic and political
systems to open them up to US corporations44 (typically rendering the affected areas
providers of cheap labor and/or raw materials) and that they impose conditions of
damaging debt on weaker economies that bring them under the control of foreign
creditors and provides significant economic benefits to those creditors through devastating losses to targeted societies and the individuals within them.45 At the very
least, the serious effects of structural adjustments imposed by the IMF on local
economies—the driving down of wages, lowering of safety and environmental standards,
and so forth46 —should be discussed in the handbook, so that planners can decide
whether they should promote or block IMF involvement in the post-MARO process.
There is an additional concern. The general model presented in sections of the
handbook dealing with the post-military process seems to follow the post-2003 Iraq
script rather closely. Despite statements from official US military and other sources,
from an outside perspective it is fairly clear that this ‘‘reconstruction’’ has not
succeeded well and has also benefited companies such as Blackwater Worldwide47
and Halliburton48 much more than the Iraqi people.

Issue 8: Recycling
The authors bill the MARO Handbook as a radical new departure in military and
human rights thinking. In fact, in the concluding remarks to the body of the work,
they include the overused quote from William James, ‘‘A new idea is first condemned
as ridiculous and then dismissed as trivial, until finally, it becomes what everybody
knows’’ (101). The problem is that MARO appears to be much more a recycling of old
military ideas than it is the development of anything new. In fact, it is unclear if any
of the military strategies or tactics presented is a genuinely new approach, despite
the insistence by the authors that MAROs are in some crucial aspects very different
from traditional military operations (17; 23–29).
This recycling is similar to the absence of historical analysis highlighted above.
The recycling is in fact ahistorical and uncritical; models that appear to have been
standard operating procedure for military operations are simply imported into the
handbook without critical evaluation or explicit modification. As already suggested,
the most frequent model is the 2003 Iraq invasion and subsequent counterinsurgency war and occupation. MARO’s Main Approach 1, in fact, is explicitly
modeled on ‘‘the occupation of Iraq after the 2003 invasion’’ (72). It is rather telling
is that, despite the fact that five of the nine members of the MARO Project Core
Planning Group working with the three main authors were involved in the Iraq
invasion and/or its aftermath, there is no critical discussion of what worked and did
not work in Iraq. Approach 5 is also based in part on Operation Enduring Freedom,
again without critical commentary (80–81).
Other elements are also present. For instance, Approach 2 (72–75) is acknowledged as a classic strategy of counterinsurgency dating from 1964 and was pre23
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sumably a mainstay approach to the Vietnam War. Given what would have to be
understood as its failure in Vietnam and how much has changed militarily in 46
years, one would expect that if this approach was retained as an option it would
have been updated to address the shortcomings experienced in Vietnam. Of special
concern is that civilian noncombatants suffered tremendous casualties by US forces
in Vietnam, and counterinsurgency techniques had a significant role in producing
those casualties.49 Approach 5 imports without comment an element that was used
in Vietnam as well, the use of military ‘‘advisors’’ for partner forces (80).
Approach 6 is based on methods used in Iraq from 1991 to 2003 and the former
Yugoslavia from 1995 to 1999, especially ‘‘the use of air . . . power to strike perpetrators or isolate them with . . . no-fly zones’’ (82). While there is a discussion of some of
the negatives that presumably has some basis in these two concrete situations, given
what must be understood as an overall failure in the former Yugoslavia prior to 1999
as well as Iraq after the Gulf War, planners would benefit from a detailed analysis of
how these methods could be updated and modified to address their past shortcomings. Instead, they appear to have been simply imported into the handbook.
By presenting seven different approaches (70–87), MARO’s authors create the
impression of comprehensive flexibility, but if each option is more or less some
combination of commonly used military strategies, many of which have not been
particularly successful even in non-MARO situations and some of which seem not
to be good fit MARO situations, then the appearance of a diversity of options is
misleading. What is needed is not a smorgasbord of the same old foods, but some
genuinely new dishes. It is not enough to have a large number of options if those
options are largely well-worn; what is needed are new options that are generated out
of the specific needs of a MARO situation, not applied from very different kinds of
military situations.

Power Politics
As stated above, good intentions do not guarantee good acts. This is not just a question of choosing between motives and consequences as the measure of morality. Even
good intentions can mask deeper attitudes, commitments, and processes that undermine a stated commitment to human rights. Of course, the standard response is
that the reality on the ground is messy and the best that can be done is a partial
promotion of human rights that might involve setting aside or even directly violating
some human rights. This is not true. And it is not good enough.
Two things come out of the foregoing examination of the MARO Handbook. First,
perhaps the most effective strategy for the US military to promote human rights
is for it to stop abusing human rights. The US military leadership and community
as a whole could dramatically reduce sexual violence against women and girls by
stopping their own violations of women within the US military and women and girls
in the zones in which the US military operates in peacetime and wartime. The US
government could dramatically reduce the number and intensity of human rights
violations throughout Latin America by closing the School of the Americas and
the Guantanamo prison. The US government and military could promote human
rights by ending military occupations, not invading other countries to create refugee
problems, and not supporting dictators and other governments—for instance, with
military aid—that violate the rights of their own people and others. A good 3,000
people would not have been killed in Chile during the 1970s and 1980s if the US
government had not aided and abetted the coup by arch human rights abuser
Augusto Pinochet against the democratically elected president Salvador Allende.50
The United States could have perhaps saved tens of thousands of Iranians from
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the 1950s to the present if it had not helped oust democratically elected Prime
Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 and installed arch human rights abuser
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.51 Not only would this have prevented his mass
violence and other abuses,52 but also, if he had not come to power, there presumably
would never have been the 1979 revolution that installed Islamic extremists who
themselves have violated human rights extensively. The United States could have
saved 100,000 to 200,000 Mayans had we simply not provided prior military support
and later political support to oppressive governments and genocidal dictators in
Guatemala.53 And so on.
Of course, from the perspective of the ideologically closed discursive framework
that does not allow even the slightest criticism of the US military, such points will
be dismissed as impractical or representative of some sort of extremist agenda. But,
it is one thing to justify US military action based on power politics and ‘‘national
interests’’ and another to claim that it is in fact what is best for those in MARO
areas. It is quite possible that military intervention performed correctly and morally—
without economic, political, or other strings attached—could have saved lives and
promoted human rights in some historical circumstances and that there will be cases
in the future in which this will also be true. But it is just as likely that in more
future cases military intervention carried out for real or pretended humanitarian
purposes will result in the long run in equal if not greater human rights abuses
than those being opposed. Before MAROs are likely consistently to have positive
benefits without significant negative impacts, there needs to be a dramatic improvement in US military culture and the US government’s relationship to human rights.
Respect for human rights is not controlled by a switch, which can be turned on
for MAROs and turned off for US-supported coups. One military will engage in
both, and the disrespect for human rights in one context will inevitably bleed into
the other.
The real question here is not how to carry out MAROs, but why MAROs have
come to be seen as important for the future of human rights. Though the authors do
recognize that MAROs are just one option among many to support human rights,
they are pushing for their handbook to become an official tool of the US military
and for the MARO Concept to be an important human rights idea for policy makers
and military leaders. The only moment of (partial) moral self-reflection in the entire
handbook supports this push. It occurs with a throwaway comment at the end of
the discussion of the seven military approaches to a MARO: ‘‘an eighth approach is
simply to do nothing (or to conduct mild, pro-forma suasion efforts). For a variety of
reasons policymakers may opt for this method, as has been demonstrated throughout
history’’ (87). This is not a criticism of the US military, but in fact a criticism of US
policy makers who have not used military intervention when it has, in the authors’
view, been called for. Where did the notion that policy makers who do not use
military intervention are morally culpable come from?
MARO appears to be a consequence of the shift in human rights thinking driven
by such figures as Samantha Power. Her 2002 Pulitzer Prize-winning ‘‘A Problem
from Hell’’ 54 is a polemic that reduces the problem of genocide in the twentieth
century largely to one of the failure of the United States and other powers to
intervene militarily. In Power’s work there is nothing of the truly complex process
of genocide and absolutely no moment of self-awareness of the role that the United
States played as a perpetrator of or accessory to genocide in a number of cases,
such as the genocides of various Native American groups, Indonesia’s 1965 genocide,
the Guatemala Genocide, the East Timor Genocide.55 Genocides are reduced to the
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crises they eventually became and presented in such a way that, in most cases, only
a military solution appears to have been reasonable—which Power then promotes
again and again. The core is an emotional appeal presenting the executions of genocides, exposure of the attitudes of and omissions by outside parties, and the justified
outrage at what happened, in order to mold public opinion to see military responses
as the right solution to human rights crises. Instead of untangling the knot of causal
factors to locate the full range of culpable as well as innocent actions and omissions
by the United States and other state and international actors that helped produce
or supported genocide, Power ignores the genesis of crises, which makes it ‘‘selfevident’’ that the only thing that could have been done was military intervention.
By dismissing hesitation as an indifference to human suffering or a sacrifice of
human rights to other agendas, with either resulting in a lack of will to intervene
militarily, this approach closes off the kinds of debates over the use of military power
that are necessary for it to be used correctly and with respect for human rights—as
well as offering a quick fix for problems that allows the United States to continue
with global military, economic, and political policies that have contributed to many
human rights crises, including genocides, that Power conveniently omits from her
book.
The accomplishment of works such as hers has been to compress the framework
of discussion of genocide and related violent mass human rights violations from a
full consideration of how they might be prevented—including by having the United
States simply stop its military and other support for human rights abusers—and a
genuine analysis from various angles of the question of military intervention into a
simple binary opposition: either you are against genocide and other mass human
rights abuses and thus support military intervention or you are one of the bystanders who lets them happen. The MARO Handbook ‘‘operationalizes’’ this privileging of military solutions. It clearly follows and supports the Power shift. As the
authors put it,
While military force will not always be required to halt mass atrocity, the MARO
Project helps make credible, effective options more likely and it better prepares intervening forces in the event that they are directed to act. In this respect, the Project can
help shift the policy debate from ‘‘whether’’ to ‘‘how to intervene to stop widespread
violence against civilians. (5)

It does not occur to the authors that the real issue is how to prevent violent mass
violations of human rights, and that addressing this problem in a serious way could
very well obviate the issue on which they focus.
If one must assume that military intervention is the solution to some human
rights crises, the question is still not ‘‘How should military intervention be carried
out?’’ The question is, rather, ‘‘Is the US military a force that can perform MAROs
in an appropriate manner?’’ or ‘‘How can the US military’s relationship to human
rights be transformed so that it would be highly likely to consistently perform
MAROs in an appropriate manner?’’ The MARO Handbook might indeed be ahead
of its time, but not for the reasons the authors fear. It is ahead of its time because
a US military force that could intervene on behalf of human rights in a genuine and
morally correct way and a US government that could choose this path for the right
reasons do not yet exist. And without them, intervention is not a path to human
rights promotion, but a road to inevitable abuse. What is needed now is a deep
transformation of US policy and military culture toward a genuine concern for
human rights throughout their activities and institutions rather than a spotty concern
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for human rights when no military or other ‘‘national interests’’ conflict with it or
when intervention will support those interests. That transformation must include
radical changes in (1) the present orientation of the US military toward violence
against women and girls and (2) its attitude toward civilians in combat and occupied
areas. At an individual level, there are presumably those in the rank-and-file
and leadership of the US military who struggle on behalf of human rights in these
deep ways already. If the MARO Handbook does not support their quest, perhaps
the kinds of analyses contained in this Genocide Studies and Prevention special
issue will.
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René Lemarchand, ‘‘Genocide in Rwanda and Burundi,’’ Encyclopedia of Genocide, ed.
Israel Charny, vol. 2 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1999): 508–13, 511.
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Introduction
Genocide can be defined as a complex process of systematic persecution and annihilation of a group of people by a government. In the twentieth century, approximately
40 to 60 million defenseless people became victims of deliberate genocidal policies.
The twenty-first century did not begin much better, with genocidal episodes going
on in Darfur and the Congo. We can speak of genocide when individuals are persecuted and murdered merely on the basis of their presumed or imputed membership
in a group rather than on their individual characteristics or participation in certain
acts. Although it makes little sense to define genocide by a specific number of victims
affected by it, we can state that a genocidal process always concerns a society at
large and that genocide destroys a significant and often critical part of the affected
community. It can be argued that genocidal processes are particularly malicious and
destructive because they are directed against all members of a group, most often
against innocent and defenseless people who are persecuted and killed regardless of
their behaviour. Genocide always denotes a colossal and brutal collective criminality.
For this reason, genocide has been studied as a modern phenomenon that is distinct
from other forms of mass violence. After Raphael Lemkin died in 1959, the term
seemed to be a dead letter. But in the 1970s historians and social scientists rediscovered the concept and published the first academic work on genocide. Since then,
the number of publications has grown and today genocide studies, with journals
and research institutes in North America and Europe, is a respectable intellectual
specialism.1
Three questions are central in this research field. First, what are the causes of
a genocidal process? Or, put another way, how does the systematic destruction of
a group of people begin? Second, how does a genocidal process develop? There are
strong indications that, when such a process has been put in motion, it develops
its own dynamic. How does that process evolve from the individual to the collective
level? Finally, it is important to investigate the consequences of genocide. How are
perpetrators, victims, and third parties affected by genocide? How do they process,
if at all, the traumatic events? In the growing, interdisciplinary field of genocide
studies much useful research has been conducted into the evolution of separate genocides such as the destruction of Ottoman Armenians in 1915, the Holocaust, and the
genocides in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, Rwanda in 1994, and Bosnia during
the Yugoslav civil wars. A significant amount of knowledge about certain aspects of
genocide exists as well. Both separate and comparative research has been conducted,
for instance, on the turn of a fairly ‘‘normal’’ civil society into a persecutory one, the
motives of the ordinary people who are involved in mass murders, the power and
effect of charismatic leaders, and aspects of violence as they relate to gender. From
time to time, publications appear trying to understand the causes of genocide in
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order to integrate that knowledge into policy mechanisms aimed at the prevention
of genocide. Such a report, MARO: Mass Atrocity Response Operations; A Military
Planning Handbook, was published by the US army and attempts to build on this
tradition.

MARO: Fallacies, Missteps, Naiveté
It is important for military personnel across the world to understand genocidal situations. Clusters of perpetrators need to be told that they can be held accountable for
their actions and that the old excuse of ‘‘orders are orders’’ (Befehl ist Befehl) is not
exculpatory. It is crucial for intervention forces to recognize a genocidal situation
because of the nature and purpose of their work. For example, during the separation
of Muslim men from women and children in Srebrenica, the Dutch UN officials
should have immediately understood that this action was a pernicious omen if not
a direct indicator of mass murder to come. Historically, the gender segregation of
groups of unarmed civilians has not led to the containment or de-escalation of
the conflict; in fact, it has served little other purpose than further destruction. For
this reason, in principle, a handbook such as MARO is a laudable effort. However,
genocide is a political act, not one that can be simply understood and tackled
through a purely military prism. Most of the handbook’s flaws emanate from its
inability to integrate the political dimension of genocide into its report. In the
analysis that follows I will confront this report with existing genocide theory as well
as several concrete scenarios.
There are some bizarre passages in the handbook. For example, when discussing
victims the report states the obvious: ‘‘Victims will probably require significant
humanitarian assistance and will likely desire to return to their land, seek justice and/
or retribution against the perpetrators, and gain knowledge of what happened to family
members or acquaintances who may have disappeared during the crisis.’’ 2 More
importantly, the handbook insufficiently discusses the problem of state sovereignty.
For example, the handbook develops the idea that decisions need to be made ‘‘whether
to target, pursue, or prosecute perpetrators, which potentially could mean that the
MTF [MARO Task Force] would need to attack the HN [host nation] military or
government’’ (60). Does this mean that the United States, in an effort to stop
genocide in Darfur, would declare war on Sudan—a major ally of China? Or would
an elite unit in a helicopter secretly land in Khartoum, sneak into the presidential
palace, and assassinate Omar Al-Bashir? This scenario is taken straight from the
latest Rambo film, in which Stallone and a clutch of mercenaries infiltrate the
Burmese jungle and liberate a group of victims. In other words, the ambitions laid
out in this handbook challenge the imagination of the social scientist.
Having worked on genocide perpetrators in my past research, I wish to present
some thoughts on the report’s (mis)understanding of perpetration.3 The obvious
example is paramilitarism. According to the report, perpetrators are a clearly definable,
easily identifiable group of killers. But comparative research into the involvement
of paramilitary units in mass crimes, such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, demonstrates that governments benefit from relying on paramilitary groups as they provide
governments with plausible deniability for the violence that units commit against
targeted populations. The regime can simply disavow any linkage with the paramilitary organizations by claiming that they operated on their own volition.4 This model
fits virtually every case of genocide in the twentieth century. Although the report
acknowledges the different types of perpetrators (paramilitaries, military, top state
elites, and so forth), it fails to recognize the fundamentally different political contexts
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in which they operate. Intervening in a situation where a breakaway rebel group
is persecuting a group in a limited territory requires following entirely different
procedures than a situation in which the very political top is involved in the organization of violence (44–45). Deploying a well-armed force to stop massacres against
Banyamulenge civilians in the Eastern Congo may be relatively easy. After all, the
Congo is a failed state in an advanced stage of decomposition and its resistance as
host nation might be negligible. But there are three not unrealistic scenarios for
future conflict. All of the three examples to follow build on recent violent events
that captured the attention of newspaper readers throughout the world.
The first example is China’s persecution of the Uighur population of Xinjiang.
The ongoing marginalization and persecutions, the Uighur reaction and riots, and
the ensuing backlash by the government have demonstrated that violence against
civilians is not considered a serious transgression by the Chinese government.
Should the persecution increase intensively as well as extensively into collective
dispossession, displacement, and the murder of elites, China’s Uighurs would face
extremely bleak prospects. During the riots in early July 2009 more than 100
Uighurs were killed, 1,700 injured, and an unknown number ‘‘disappeared.’’ What
is particularly relevant is that the Chinese government did not only arrest and
imprison Uighurs in Urumqi (where the riots had taken place), but also in other
cities including Kashgar.5 This potentially signifies ethno-categorical thinking by
the Chinese security forces, which constitutes a serious and radical development.
After these arrests and killings, no amount of protest from NGOs or governments
made a serious impact on the Chinese government’s policies in regards to the Uighurs.
A second example comes from the Gaza Strip. In a wide-ranging comparative
study of ethnic cleansing, Michael Mann included the Palestinians, especially those
in the Gaza Strip, in a select group of victimized communities that are facing a slow
but imminent process of persecution and drifting in the long term toward critical
decline if not destruction.6 A recent example of asymmetrical violence in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict is the 2008 to 2009 Gaza Winter War. The UN report produced
by Richard Goldstone concluded that Hamas committed violations of the laws of war
and other war crimes and that the Israeli army had used disproportionate force,
targeting Palestinian civilians and destroying civilian infrastructure. The war ended
in the very asymmetrical body count of 1,417 Palestinian and 13 Israeli deaths.7
To any dispassionate scholar of mass violence, these figures and the dynamic of
the violence must be interpreted as unmistakable signs of an escalating counterinsurgency potentially heading toward catastrophe. The issue is not so much the discriminatory population policies of the Israeli government—these measures are being
sharply criticized and satirized in Israeli society. The real issue is the asymmetry of
violence, which can polarize even further.8
The final example comes from Chechnya. Whether under Russian imperial or
federal rule, from a long-term perspective, the North Caucasus has been a thorn in
the side of Russian political elites.9 The March 2010 suicide bombings in the Moscow
subway sparked a sharp radicalization of a conflict that has been lingering since the
eruption of the first war in 1994. On the part of the Chechens, the ruthlessness of
these attacks also denotes an awareness of the asymmetrical nature of the conflict,
a sense of collective despair, an acceptance of blind revenge, and a lack of belief in
future prospects of mutual reconciliation, conflict de-escalation, and societal integration. This conflict escalated to such an extent that in May 2001 the Committee
on Conscience of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum placed Chechnya
on its Genocide Alert list.10 Here too, the asymmetry of the conflict is striking:
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although the Chechen rebels targeted both Russian soldiers and civilians, the total
losses they suffered far exceed those of the Russian military campaign. In a comparative study of ethnic cleansing, Norman Naimark expressed fear that Chechnya
may be on the brink of genocide if the conflicts in the Caucasus deepen.11
In all three cases, a militarily and politically superior state attacked a vulnerable
minority that included not only political elites (whatever their political colouring)
but many civilians as well. In all three cases, recent conflagrations fit in a pattern
of long-term disempowerment and persecution from the early- and mid-twentieth
century. Now, if we believe MARO, there are several strategies to tackle these cases
successfully: saturation, oil spot, separation, safe areas, partner enabling, containment, defeat perpetrators (70–85). How would future escalations in similar scenarios
be stopped? Turn Gaza into a safe area after the flotilla scene? Deploy forces in
Urumqi and use the method of the oil spot? (Operation Deepwater Horizon?) Demilitarize the Caucasus, a major source of Russia’s internal and external security policy?
None of these constraints and problems is discussed in a satisfactory way in the
handbook. In Annex F (‘‘Intelligence Considerations’’), the handbook does, however,
pose questions for the ‘‘intelligence personnel to assist their analysis of the MARO
environment’’ (118). Let us consider these questions in a hypothetical, but not
unthinkable, new phase of a serious escalation of mass violence in Chechnya:
1. Who are the perpetrators?
Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev
2. Where are they located?
The Kremlin
3. How are they organized?
In the Russian domestic secret service, FSB, which has eleven departments
and directorates
4. What are their usual modes of operation?
Counterintelligence, counter-terrorism, border protection, export control
5. What are their capabilities and vulnerabilities?
They are capable of anything and vulnerable to little.
6. What are their objectives and ideology?
‘‘[We will] eliminate them [terrorists] like rats.’’ 12
7. What are their recent and current activities?
Appointing Ramzan Kadyrov as President of Chechnya and unconditionally
endorsing his policies of murder, extortion, embezzlement, intimidation, rape,
forced disappearance, torture, and other acts of violence against civilians
8. What support mechanisms exist to sustain their operations?
Spetsnaz and organized crime
9. What are their possible courses of action and which of these will likely be
taken?
Burn villages, massacre civilians, bomb buildings, and destroy property.
10. What is the level of government complicity with the perpetrators?
Full
11. Are there any divisions among the perpetrators?
Not anymore
The tragicomic absurdity of the situation is clear: the handbook does not offer a
serious and credible way of intervening in possible escalations of real crises.
Another important issue is the relationship between domestic support (i.e.,
political will) and foreign policy. Nowhere in the report is there any discussion of
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the relationship between American political dynamics and a MARO. How will the
use of funds be justified to the population or to parliament? Moreover, there is no
sensible explanation of how a MARO would function in the case that an ally of the
United States would commit mass atrocities. Mann has argued that ‘‘the United
States is currently intervening on the side of dominant states against their ethnicreligious insurgents. From Palestine to Georgia, to Chechnya, to Kashmir, to the
southern Philippines, to Colombia, U.S. policy favors state terrorists.’’ 13 Without a
critical discussion of this problem, one cannot take the handbook seriously.

Conclusion
Two proverbs and a quote capture the essence of MARO. To begin with, a German
proverb suits the handbook well: ‘‘Well meant is not always well done’’ (Gut gemeint
ist nicht immer gut gemacht). Although the handbook means well, it commits the sin
of utter naı̈veté in its assumptions and hence also in its conclusions. Secondly, reading it immediately invokes the Turkish proverb ‘‘Calculations at home won’t match
the market’’ (Evdeki hesap çarşıya uymaz) or Moltke the Elder’s famous saying
‘‘No battle plan survives contact with the enemy.’’ In other words, if we believe the
handbook, the eight scenarios outlined in MARO are predictable and will seamlessly
conform to conditions on the ground. All in all, the handbook cannot see the forest
for the trees. It is full of excessive detail and out of touch with reality. It might
have been much more useful to take real historical or current events and analyze
them in light of two or three potential future developments. What we need is not
a desk fantasy about how to curb hypothetical ‘‘mass atrocities’’ but (a) credible
argumentation linking military planning with international politics and (b) thorough
analysis of existing genocidal processes, such as Darfur. For instance, the failures of
the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia during the Kosovo War—the bombing escalated
the atrocities rather than stopped them—could have been scrutinized carefully. But,
instead, the handbook very briefly refers to airpower only at the end and does not
seriously consider it as a form of action.
MARO is also ridden with obscure jargon, vague abstractions, incredible non
sequiturs, caricatural acronyms you forget after a few paragraphs, fictional scenarios
seemingly drawn from a computer game, ambitious flowcharts that only serve to
elicit roaring laughter, and naı̈ve assumptions about international relations. One
can read page after page and still not understand what the report intends to convey
to the reader or where it is heading in general. Some passages are worthwhile, but
further probing demonstrates that it is difficult to intellectually engage with this
naı̈ve military-planning document for genocide prevention because genocide is
embedded in political structures. In order to verify the military recommendations
and commentary in the handbook, one likely needs to approach military sociologists
for their expert opinions.
An unforgivable sin that the handbook commits is that it searches for that
one single solution that will serve as a panacea for all evil, a deus ex machina that
will intervene and stop genocide. Ultimately, this will accomplish the utopia of
a genocide-free world. This is an ideology that ignores the pragmatic arguments
marshalled by specialists in the field of conflict prevention.14 Unfortunately, more
realistic and sober accounts of genocide recognize that such an elixir does not exist.
We need to recognize that political violence will continue to play a part within and
between human societies. As Jacques Sémelin has reminded us in his penetrating
study of genocide, ‘‘We are really going down the road of formulating a superbly
pious wish: because conflict is obviously inherent in the history of man, and so any
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intention to prevent it is doomed to fail from the start.’’ 15 No early-warning system,
preventive diplomacy, rapid response unit, structural prevention, MARO, or other
well-meant effort can fully extinguish our potential for mass violence.
The handbook ties in with many themes in Daniel Goldhagen’s recent documentary film with the dubious title Worse than War. (Apropos, really? Is genocide worse
than war? In other words, if I would write a book on the enormous destruction of
human lives and property wrought by a war, would I title it Better than Genocide?)
In the film, Goldhagen ignores the thorny issue of state sovereignty and travels
across the world to preach American military invasion as the most effective form
of genocide prevention. As in the book with the same title, the documentary does
not deploy any dynamic political science model but uses static binaries of bad guys
versus good guys. Destroying the bad guys will pave the way for the genocide-free,
multiethnic Walhalla to which we aspire. This is a complete failure to recognize the
fact that there is a lot that we do not understand about mass murder yet. The film
compensates for this lack of intellectual sophistication with an overdose of moralistic
indignation about the phenomenon rather than dispassionate reflection. (Moreover,
the documentary grossly exaggerates the supposed threats that emanate from
Muslim parts of the world and from current Islamist terrorism. Ironically, in the
three examples provided above, it is mostly Muslims who are living under threat of
collective victimization.)
Viewed from this broader perspective, MARO truly seems to be a reflection of
its time and political culture. Well-intentioned do-gooders in the West often do not
grasp the complexity of the many processes that occur during genocide. They insufficiently recognize the difficulty of being able to grasp, let alone control, the international minefield of states and the outcome of this constellation. The handbook’s
reasoning denotes a certain blind belief in the formability of the world through a
series of measures that can shape the future. Its credibility, however, is critically
undermined by the authors’ naı̈ve views on global power relations. The authors
believe in a world in which everything is feasible and they have answers to every
possible human problem. The handbook suffers from a lack of modesty and instead
surrenders to a blind conviction in the otherwise laudable goal of genocide prevention. Most of all, the authors also turn a blind eye to the politics of a MARO itself.
Will not such a phenomenon become the object of political manipulation? And what
if American forces are the ones committing the atrocities?
Nothing epitomizes this intransigence better than the last scenario described
in MARO, ‘‘Defeat the Perpetrator.’’ Under this heading, the handbook actually
includes the reference ‘‘Iraq 2003 model.’’ With the 106,035 civilian deaths in Iraq
in mind,16 one can hardly be surprised that the US army has produced a report this
credulous. Surely its annual budget of more than $660 billion could be spent in a
more prudent way. All in all, the handbook fails to understand that in the international state system states are allied and profoundly interconnected to each other
through a series of economic, political, and security interests. Intervention into the
interests of one state means manipulation or influence of other states’ interests as
well. The simplistic thought processes deployed in this handbook fail to convince
this reader of its usefulness in an intervention in a genocidal process.
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American policy on genocide prevention often reads like a children’s story or a
screenplay for a Hollywood B-movie. The ‘‘bad guys’’ (the wolves) are committing
horrific acts against innocent civilians (the sheep) out of sheer malice and can only
be stopped by the ‘‘good guys’’ wearing the uniform of the US Army. The problem is
that this approach not only dominates the media, but it has also become popular
among academics.
Many well-intentioned Americans, outraged at the human suffering shown on
network news broadcasts, call for immediate action to ‘‘stop genocide’’ at any cost.
And because of the media’s political agenda, this usually means human rights abuses
in the Sudan rather than in Colombia or Sri Lanka. However, this ‘‘buy now’’ television marketing of foreign policy is hardly conducive to serious academic discussions of
such a complex and contradictory phenomenon as systematic mass murder.

The Rule of Law
Simplistic calls for trigger-happy intervention in ‘‘genocide hotspots’’ ignore the fact
that America too is bound by the rule of law. Ever since the first moral codes were
developed by the Ancient Egyptians, Hebrews, and Babylonians, the primary purpose of law has been to repress or control our innate capacity for evil so that we can
live together in peaceful communities. Similarly, modern international law, which
began as an attempt to safeguard territorial sovereignty in the seventeenth century
in Europe, has developed into a complex set of constraints to prevent us from harming others.
True, there have been attempts in the past to create a form of ‘‘enemy criminal
law.’’ The logic of such legislation is simple: those who fail in their duties as citizens
forfeit their rights as citizens and can be treated as enemies. We need only define
someone as a bad guy in order to place him or her beyond the law and give free
rein to our worst impulses. Legislation of this kind has a long history in Europe
where it has been used, among other things, to legitimate the Nazi genocide.
According to the West, in particular the United States, during the Cold War
period the bad guys were the Communists in the East. Behind the Iron Curtain
lurked the Red Menace and beyond that the Yellow Peril. Once the Cold War was
over, this division of the world into capitalist (good guys) and Marxist (bad guys)
was no longer sustainable. However, there has been renewed interest in enemy
criminal law in the wake of 9/11. For example, the concept of ‘‘illegal enemy combatants’’ as developed recently by the Bush administration has allowed a stigmatized
and dehumanized enemy to be imprisoned and tortured without trial, habeas corpus
rights, or due process of law.
Daniel Feierstein, ‘‘The Good, the Bad, and the Invisible: A Critical Look at the MARO
Report,’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, 1 (April 2011): 39–44. 6 2011 Genocide Studies
and Prevention. doi:10.3138/gsp.6.1.39
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Down the Slippery Slope
Equally serious is the fact that the same massive and systematic human rights
violations that were ignored during the Cold War era because they supposedly
helped to defeat the common enemy are being used as an excuse for a new model
of intervention in the twenty-first century. An insidious logic links Samantha
Power’s criticism of the United Nations and the US government for failing to
‘‘prevent genocide’’ 1 to the Responsibility to Protect (a US responsibility, of course)
and, from there, to the explicit modes of intervention laid out in the Mass Atrocity
Response Operations (MARO) Report, a technical operations manual for US military
intervention to prevent mass atrocities.
The Responsibility to Protect, together with a distinctly American interpretation
of the concept, is mentioned explicitly in the opening pages of the report:
The MARO Project has emerged in parallel with growing consensus around the
international norm of the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ (R2P). The R2P concept was
introduced in the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS), which shifted the discussion away from the debate about
whether a state had the right to intervene to save civilians at risk and toward the
formulation of a state’s ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ global citizens.2

On the next page, the report defines the roles assigned to the international community:
The UN General Assembly has articulated a requisite Security Council process for
international decision-making about the use of military force in R2P situations. The
MARO Project, as such, is agnostic about the politics; the concepts and tools we
are developing can be used in an R2P case, in a ‘‘humanitarian intervention,’’ or
whenever national leadership decides it needs to conduct a MARO. (12–13)

But whoa! Hold your horses. . . . Who decides that an atrocity crime is taking place
somewhere on the planet? Which international body is ultimately responsible for
these military interventions to stop genocide? And how do we ensure that intervention does not bring about more deaths than it is intended to prevent? How
do we prevent a rerun of Iraq or even Kosovo, to mention just two examples from
the report?
These are not merely academic questions. US intelligence reports about weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq led to a unilateral intervention that has cost tens
of thousands of civilian lives. Unconfirmed reports put the figure as high as several
hundred thousand. On the other hand, Carne Ross, the former first secretary at the
United Kingdom’s mission to the United Nations, told the Chilcot inquiry in July
2010 that there was no ‘‘ ‘significant intelligence’ to support claims that Saddam
Hussein had amassed an arsenal of deadly weapons’’ and that ‘‘Britain was taken
to war in Iraq on the basis of ‘lies,’ scaremongering and deliberate exaggeration.’’ 3
Why then should we assume that reports of mass atrocities will be any more reliable?
It is disturbing, to say the least, that MARO seems to give the US government
a free hand to intervene anywhere in the world without the need for regional or
international agreements. It is also disappointing that the report focuses only on
the ‘‘willingness to act’’ without taking into account what is known about policies of
extermination and the origin and nature of evil in the world.

Milgram, Evil, and Obedience
Most readers of this journal will be familiar with Stanley Milgram’s 1963 experiments on obedience.4 Briefly, subjects were told to give what they believed to be
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electric shocks to a ‘‘learner’’ (in fact, a paid actor) for nothing worse than failing to
memorize a list of word pairs. They were asked to increase the voltage by 15 volts for
each wrong answer. Even though the victim began to scream and displayed apparent
signs of pain at the 150-volt level, two thirds of the subjects were persuaded to
administer a massive 450-volt electric shock and only one third refused to administer
shocks between the 150- and 300-volt levels.
The important thing about these experiments is that Milgram’s subjects were
ordinary Americans—professional people, technicians, housewives, teachers, and
students. The experiments were designed to see if the subjects would obey immoral
orders as many ordinary Germans had done under the Nazis. Of course, the usual
objection to Migram’s results (apart from ethical considerations) is that the world
has changed since 1963. However, Jerry Burger’s 2006 partial replication of the
experiments found obedience rates almost identical to those found by Milgram.5
This is a reminder, if one is needed, that Americans are as human as the rest of
the world’s populations and that the United States is just another community within
the international arena. The fact that most of us can be persuaded to torture another
human being for no good reason should make us more cautious about unilateral
military intervention. How do we ensure, for example, that new Abu Ghraibs or
Guantanamos do not spring up all over the occupied territories? The risk seems
especially high in Africa, which is portrayed in the report as a veritable breeding
ground for genocide.

The Limitations of Binary Logic
The MARO Handbook’s 161 pages are packed with hard-to-decode acronyms describing how to reduce American casualties in various military interventions to stop
atrocities. But there is little advice on how to limit ‘‘enemy’’ civilian casualties.
Pages 70 to 87 describe seven different military intervention strategies: saturation,
oil spot, separation, safe areas, partner enabling, containment, defeat perpetrators.
In the section on containment there is one brief paragraph about the possibility of
‘‘collateral damage’’ from the indiscriminate shelling of the areas under the control
of the ‘‘aggressor nation’’ (68). But collateral damage here refers primarily to thirdparty populations and victims of the aggressor state. The report seems to assume
that civilians of a state that violates human rights are automatically accessories to
these crimes and so their deaths are of no importance.
These oversights are inevitable if we reduce our prevention model to how to
get the good guys to have the political will to neutralize the bad guys. The report’s
implicit Manichaeistic worldview makes too many assumptions that are never named
or addressed:
1. There is only one way to detect mass atrocities worldwide; this method is
reliable and would never be distorted to justify a military attack for any other
purpose (e.g., to overthrow an anti-American regime, to control natural
resources such as water or oil, or to control a vital geopolitical territory).
2. Mass atrocities tend to be one-sided with a perpetrator population that either
commits or supports genocide and a victim population that is helpless.
3. These atrocities can be prevented by the use of military force. It is enough to
defeat the perpetrators in order to liberate the victims—a classic Hollywood
happy ending.
But not only Hollywood is to blame for these simplistic views. The report reflects the
growing trivialization of genocide since the term was coined nearly seventy years
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ago. A simplistic model has emerged that requires each case of genocide to have one
and only one victim and one and only one perpetrator. Victims, perpetrators, and
accomplices that do not fit the model are ignored or rendered invisible.
For example, the Holocaust is often reduced to the persecution of Jews by
Germans under the Nazis. Little attention is given to the other victims of Nazism—
3 million non-Jewish Poles, 3.3 to 3.5 million Russian prisoners of war, and hundreds of thousands Sinti and Roma. Even less attention is given to the hundreds of
thousands of German victims, including not only Jews, Sinti, and Roma but also
political dissidents, Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals, the unemployed, and the
handicapped. The Austrians, Croatians, Hungarians, French, Latvians, Lithuanians,
Poles, and Romanians who also killed and tortured are forgotten.
In the same way, genocide scholars tend to focus on the massacre of Armenians
between 1915 and 1923, ignoring the large numbers of Greek and Syrian Christians
who were also murdered by the Young Turk Ittihadist party during the same period.
More recently, oblivion has befallen the Hutu moderates killed in the Rwandan
genocide in which Hutu militias mainly targeted Tutsis. However, the complex
system of interrelated conflicts in the former Yugoslavia has proven impossible to
explain away using a banal dualism of ‘‘goodies’’ and ‘‘baddies,’’ even if the Serbs
could play the role of the bad guys. Attempts to label the current conflicts in the
Sudan in terms of Arab Muslims against black Christians have similarly turned out
to be oversimplified. Most of the groups involved are Muslim and black and define
themselves as Arab.
All of this is not to say that the report’s recommendations might not be of use
to international organizations—and I stress the word international—where mass
atrocities really are being committed by bad guys against good guys. But most
conflicts are more complicated than the CNN would have us believe.

Counterinsurgency Doctrine: A Blast from the Past
One good thing about MARO is that it makes no bones about where it is coming
from. Its authors took part in the US invasion of Iraq and the opening paragraphs
make it clear that this is their model for ‘‘intervention.’’ Describing the origins of
the project, the report states:
The US military has long focused on preparation for major conventional operations,
rather than preparing for other types of military operations. As it struggled with
counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States military realized
that preparation for conventional warfare was inadequate for some other military
challenges. MAROs also generate such unique requirements. (5)

A few pages later, the report describes the role played by counterinsurgency doctrine
in designing different forms of intervention:
Counterinsurgency (COIN) has some aspects that are similar to those of mass atrocity
response. COIN also prominently features the civilian, along with insurgents and
local and/or foreign counterinsurgents. Insurgent and counterinsurgent forces compete for civilian loyalties using positive (protection/assistance) and negative (threats/
violence) actions, and some civilians will be allied more closely with the competing
groups. (25)

This comparison is an interesting one. Throughout the Cold War, French and then
American counterinsurgency doctrines brought terror to Latin America, Indonesia,
Vietnam, and parts of Africa and Southeast Asia. They led to hundreds of thousands
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of deaths in political, ethnonational, and religious genocides. Now, the same techniques designed to commit those crimes are thought suitable to prevent them.
The really frightening thing about this golden oldie remake, however, is that
non-victimized civilians no longer deserve protection: ‘‘in COIN, all civilian protection is instrumental and relevant to the sides’ competition for legitimacy. In a
MARO, protection of civilians victimized by perpetrators is the core objective of
the mission’’ (25). This is the enemy criminal law doctrine mentioned earlier. In
Hollywood it is cheaper these days to use computer animation than to shoot
hundreds of extras.

UNASUR and the Crises in Bolivia, Honduras, and Ecuador
To their credit, supporters of military intervention argue that we cannot simply
stand by and do nothing while atrocity crimes are being committed. But again, this
is binary thinking. I wish now to consider a case study which shows that other
options exist.
During the Cold War era, Latin America was ravaged by military dictatorships
supported directly or indirectly by the US State Department. Since then, countries
in the region have embarked on a process of political empowerment and regional
reorganization. One of the institutions to emerge from this process is the Union of
South American Nations (UNASUR), which is made up of twelve Latin American
nations. Strangely, UNASUR is never mentioned in the MARO report, which refers
to only one regional institution: the African Union.
Nevertheless, since the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty was signed on May 23,
2008, UNASUR has helped three countries in the region that have suffered
attempted coups: Bolivia (2008), Honduras (2009), and Ecuador (2010). In each
case there was a major crisis with the strong potential to trigger atrocity crimes.
The Bolivian crisis commenced in September 2008 with the massacre of poor
campesinos by right-wing militias acting on the orders of the governor of Pando, the
country’s northernmost province. The US Embassy in Bolivia not only failed to
condemn the attempted coup—technically, a civic coup as the armed forces were not
involved—but seemed to actively support it. However, a swift diplomatic response by
UNASUR prevented the coup from spreading.
Officials from several Latin American countries traveled to Bolivia to show
support for Evo Morales and persuade his democratically elected government to
ignore calls for revenge from the Bolivian indigenous movement. Instead, a commission of inquiry was set up to look into the Pando massacre and advise on appropriate
sentencing. The situation in Bolivia remains tense and is monitored each month.
However, there have been no new crimes or attempts to overthrow the government.
The Honduran crisis started when President Manuel Zelaya was ousted by a
military coup in June 2009. Zelaya was expelled from Honduras, but he returned
and took refuge in the Brazilian embassy, where he was granted political asylum.
The response from UNASUR and OAS (the Organization of American States) members was immediate: they refused to recognize the military government and instead
called for the deposed president to be reinstated and for a democratic commission to
investigate crimes committed by the rebels.
The new Obama administration initially agreed to the UNASUR and OAS initiative but later recognized the government that emerged from a rigged election called
by the rebels in November 2009. Unfortunately, Honduras is one of the poorest countries in Latin America and, unlike Bolivia and Ecuador, it depends heavily on trade
with the United States instead of trade with UNASUR members. So, Manuel Zelaya
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never returned to power and the killing of journalists and political activists has
continued under the ‘‘elected’’ government.
Finally, the Ecuadorean crisis began in September 2010 when riot police
kidnapped and threatened to kill President Rafael Correa. On the same day,
presidents of UNASUR countries met in Buenos Aires, declared the coup illegal,
and sent their foreign ministers to Quito to defend the deposed president with the
threat of sanctions if necessary. Arguably, the coup was just a well-planned mutiny
since no leaders came forward to proclaim a new government. However, UNASUR’s
rapid condemnation almost certainly played an important role in persuading Ecuador’s
armed forces to intervene and free Correa, restoring institutional stability to the
country.

To Thy Own Self Be True
Of course, this is not the only form of intervention possible and once atrocities are
being committed, diplomatic efforts and verbal condemnations may not be enough
to stop them. Stronger interventions, including the use of military force, might
be necessary. However, because of the enormous risks involved in peacekeeping
missions, including the possibility that the conflict will escalate, the decision to
intervene militarily should never be made by just one nation, not even the United
States. Only regional organizations have the legitimacy and authority to make such
decisions.
If we accept this principle, then some of the techniques suggested in the report
might actually work as long as there are thorough checks to prevent the sort of
human rights abuses and collateral damage we have seen in Iraq. However, we
should remember that some conflicts have been raging for centuries and that a
peaceful solution to a conflict has a greater chance of being a lasting one. Quick and
easy answers may satisfy our moral outrage, but in the long run they lead to greater
suffering.
Let us also remember that we, as scholars, have a responsibility not to deny or
distort the concepts that have developed over decades of fighting for the victims of
gross and systematic violations of human rights. To borrow a line from the American
actor and humorist, Will Rogers, ‘‘There’s only one thing that can kill the movies,
and that’s education.’’
Welcome to reality.
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Introduction
The following commentary aims to analyze the main characteristics of intervention
described in MARO: Mass Atrocity Response Operations; A Military Planning Handbook and to also provide a legal and historical context in which to address that work.
In other words, we believe that in order for the inner value of MARO to be assessed,
the handbook should be contextualized with the history of American intervention
and several aspects of international law.
First, it is important to provide the context in which this article was produced.
On the one hand, we promote interdisciplinary work, especially work on law and
history, since it enriches perspectives, contributions, and opinions. On the other
hand, because we are from Argentina we might offer a different perspective on intervention operations in general and on MAROs in particular. That is to say, living
in and being part of a developing region give us the opportunity to offer different
opinions on intervention practices. It is also necessary to make it clear that because
our professional training is not of a military nature we are not able to provide an indepth analysis of the action plan described in MARO, particularly regarding the
operative aspects that were formulated by military strategy experts. These limitations,
however, do not push us away from our objective; rather, they bring us closer to it.
This commentary does not intend to provide instructions on how to conduct a military
operation in cases of massive crimes; rather, it intends to investigate whether a
MARO constitutes an ethical and moral option and whether it is the best practical
way to avoid, prevent, and control crimes against humanity (such as genocides,
massacres, and war crimes). Although MARO intends to describe the military actions
to be taken in cases of massive crimes, there is a lack of introspective and selfreflexive analysis of American interventions in the handbook along with a unilateral
view, created by US military forces, of the operating methods in these situations.
Both of these aspects compel us to combine a historical perspective with a legal one
in our consideration of MARO.
Taking into account the observations made above, we divided this commentary
into three sections and a final conclusion. In the following section we provide a short
analysis of different American military interventions, focusing on the way they
unfold in the intervention regions. The second section deals with intervention and
considers the legal contributions and change in paradigm after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union. The last section concentrates on the concept of a MARO, providing
Federico Gaitain Hairabedian and Alexis Papazian, ‘‘Critical Reflections on MARO: The View
from Argentina,’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, 1 (April 2011): 45–51. 6 2011 Genocide
Studies and Prevention. doi:10.3138/gsp.6.1.45
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a critical analysis of the contents of the book in question, especially of the role of
international organizations and local agencies. Apart from reconsidering action plans
and interventions in cases of mass crimes against civil society for future discussions,
we discuss the controversy that surrounds this issue.

A Short History of American Interventions
The United States is the country that has intervened most often in the affairs of
other states in the world. Those interventions were responses, in general terms, to
interests related to external policies and/or economic interests over the affected
nation.
The purpose of this section is to place MARO into a historical context. By doing
so, we may find that MARO has hidden intentions under its pragmatic proposal
to provide instructions on ‘‘how’’ to militarily intervene in cases of massive crimes
against a civil society.
We can go back in history to the year 1916 as the starting point of this issue.
Beginning in this year, American military forces occupied the Dominican Republic
for eight years because it got into arrears with a loan. The formal declaration stated:
Dominican Republic is in a state of military occupations . . . and remains submitted to
the military government and to the exercise of the military Law applicable to such
occupation. This military occupation has not the purpose of destroying Dominican
Republic sovereignty, but on the contrary, is intended to help the country to recover
the internal order condition, what will be helpful to fulfill provisions stated on the
named Convention, and also to comply with all obligations that may correspond as
member of Nations Family. . . . I ask all Dominican citizens . . . to cooperate with US
Forces in occupation.1

After the Second World War, the United States intervened directly in more than
eighty countries (this figure includes cases of joint and unilateral interventions).
Most of these interventions were linked to the Cold War against USSR Communism.
As examples we can mention interventions like the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949),
interventions in Italy (1947–1948), Greece (1947–1949; 1964–1974), Philippines,
Korea, Iran (together with England in 1953), Guatemala (1953–1990), Vietnam
(1950–1973), Cambodia (1955–1973), Congo/Zaire (1960–1965), Indonesia (1965),
Nicaragua (1978–1979), Granada (1979–1984), El Salvador (1980–1992), Haiti
(1987–1994). Notably, we are not taking into consideration indirect interventions
that, just to give an example, provided support (i.e., military intelligence) to several
leaders that governed in Latin America during different military dictatorships.
Looking back to the history of interventions, especially in the areas of Latin
America, Africa, and the Middle East, should call the attention of MARO’s authors
to the nature of intervention and its historical effects. It can be stated that the
current situation is different from that in the time of the Cold War, but the traumatic
effects of interventions do not disappear with time and can be used against American
forces. In other words, as professionals trained in Argentina, we wonder why it
is that the MARO project would have better results in preventing, controlling, and
stabilizing countries where massive crimes against civil society are committed
and if such would indeed be the case. The answer is open to the (dis)trust that the
United States inspires in peripheral countries. MARO does not take into account
historical characteristics of each country, and even if the project centers its efforts
on the analysis of the nation in which the intervention is to occur and even if
assistance to the transition government is part of its stabilizing practice (55–58),
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it nevertheless subsumes the role that the intervened nation adopts into its own
operating power.

Legal Aspects of Intervention
The Difference between ‘‘Humanitarian Intervention’’ and
‘‘Humanitarian Action’’
Within the framework of Public International Law there exists a substantial distinction between the concept of ‘‘humanitarian intervention’’ and that of ‘‘humanitarian
action.’’ Even if we can distinguish between two fundamental approaches within this
topic, such as International Law of Human Rights and International Humanitarian
Law, both seem to come together when dealing with issues related to intervention.
What is important to underline is that ‘‘intervention’’ is in general a broader concept
than the concept of humanitarian military intervention since the latter refers strictly
to direct and exclusive armed action. Meanwhile, when we talk about humanitarian
action in a strictly judicial sense, we refer to the actions considered by International
Humanitarian Law as assistance law that can guide organizations like the International Red Cross. On the other hand, a clear example of humanitarian military
intervention is the case of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.
Humanitarian military intervention and humanitarian action are similar in that
they are both used as ultima ratio, that is to say, when there are no other ways of
solving the consequences of a conflict.
It is important to highlight the internal contradiction between the use of forces
and the humanitarian motive. The exercise of military force can never constitute a
humanitarian act, even when it uses humanitarian discourse to justify its repressive
action.
Thus, from a juridical point of view as well as that of the conceptual principles of
Public International Law, a humanitarian intervention may constitute an exception
to the three most consolidated principles of international law: (1) state sovereignty;
(2) the principle that one state should not intervene in the internal issues of other
states; and (3) the prohibition of the use of armed forces.2
These three principles constitute the basic pillar of international relations and
they are stated in the United Nations Charter. The Charter does not refer explicitly
to humanitarian intervention, but in regards to the use of force the Charter provides
the Security Council with the option to adopt two types of measures, which are
outlined in Chapter VII, particularly in Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter.3 Article
41 specifies the measures that can be applied without armed forces (such as the
complete or partial interruption of communications, economic activities, or diplomatic
relationships), and Article 42 describes the measures that can be used involving
the participation of armed forces and states (such as demonstrations, blockades, and
military operations such as those in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and so forth).
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the development of a globalized
world, the idea of humanitarian military intervention, including in some cases unilateral military intervention, was put into practice in several cases such as Somalia
(1992–1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995), Rwanda (1994), Sierra Leone
(1997–1999), Kosovo (1996–1999), Liberia (1999–2003), and the Congo (1998–
present).
Taking into consideration the elements stated above raises questions about the
effect of intervention on state sovereignty.
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The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the MARO Project versus
State Sovereignty
The increasing importance of humanitarian military intervention and the potential
risk of this principle becoming an international practice that may threaten state
sovereignty are publicly debated.
The type of interventions mentioned above occurred within the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and the deepening neoliberal policies of the capitalist system and its
political consequences, especially these consequences as they relate to the principle
of state sovereignty at all levels.
Discussions about intervention in cases of humanitarian crises may find their
starting point in the famous phrase of a former United Nations General Secretary,
Koffi Annan: ‘‘. . . if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault
on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and
systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common
humanity?’’ 4
After the debate generated by this issue, Canada was the head office of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) where two main
basic principles were defined in order to justify the doctrine of Responsibility to Project
(R2P)5: first, state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility
for the protection of its people lies with the state itself, and second, when a population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression, or
state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the
principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.
Even though the MARO project states that it does not defend military intervention and that its action field is confined to cases of extreme need, like cases of
genocides and mass killings, the R2P doctrine is the basis of its ideological support.
The document outlined by ICISS represents a ‘‘before and after’’ in the conception of state sovereignty and military intervention as it tries to create a new
vocabulary by which to define antique practices and justify the change of paradigm
towards a global world which would include a project such as MARO as an operative
tool but restricted to extreme cases.
R2P and the MARO project are perfect expressions of global strategies of
unilateral action for military intervention. Proof of this became evident, for the
first time, when NATO bombed Serbia’s position in Kosovo after approving the New
Strategic Concept in April 1999.
The New Strategic Concept redefined NATO’s future objectives, methodology,
and scope of action. The main way in which NATO was transformed was in its
move from defensive objectives to the assumption of the essential mission of defending security and democratic values within and outside its boundaries, a mission that
includes a struggle against genocide, terrorism, and the elimination of weapons of
mass destruction. Further, tensions existing between the development of R2P and
principles of state sovereignty can be understood under the New Strategic Concept
which allowed NATO to retain its right to act without the formal authorization of
the United Nations Security Council provided that its actions respect the Organic
Charter or the Council Resolutions. In this way, NATO obtained its own unilateral
humanitarian intervention right disregarding all emerging principles of the United
Nations Charter which stipulated that regional organizations should not apply any
coercive measure without the consent of the Security Council.
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All of the changes mentioned occurred after the end of the Cold War as the
United States emerged as a dominant world power. As an example, we can recall
that it acted above the United Nations in the case of the ‘‘preventative attack’’
of Iraq.
As a conclusion, we can observe that the role played by the United Nations
became of secondary importance in the world despite the end of the Cold War and
the dissolution of the absolute principle of state sovereignty.
In relation to this last point, the concept of national sovereignty raises another
issue. Although various states guarantee that they will observe the principles of
international law and human rights protection, most states are increasingly inclined
toward the consolidation of a globalized system in which transnational economic
power operates by means of supranational organizations like the World Trade
Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. The classic concept of
nation-state as it was understood at the moment when the United Nations Charter
was approved in 1946 is no longer valid.
The authority of the United Nations is fundamental in order to avoid the consolidation of a power axis capable of intervening unilaterally in sovereign states
either under the doctrine of R2P or within a MARO framework. However, the United
Nations Security Council is under the domain of the same powers that retain unilateral intervention capability, a paradox that presents a situation with little space
of action. It is time to rebuild and strengthen the United Nations in order to allow
for a plurality of voices and especially to allow the voices of those weak states that
face the potential risk of genocide and massive violations of human rights to be
heard.
Acting outside of the framework of international law can contribute to the discredit of legal entities; eventually, subjects of international law may be deprived of
judicial protection and, instead, the unilateral decisions of powerful states can come
to dominate the international arena.

Shoot MARO Heart: The Utility of Unilateral Intervention Practice6
MARO is presented as a potential military doctrine for the use of American armed
forces in cases of massive human rights violations. What the handbook’s authors
consider its key virtue is actually a fallacy: MARO does not question whether an
intervention should take place, but only ‘‘how’’ to intervene.7 Certainly, in situations
of extreme violence over a civil society in which the rate of massive killings multiplies at a rapid pace, and especially in cases when states’ governments are involved
as perpetrators of violence, wondering whether to intervene or not to intervene
can be a useless question, as cases such as those of Rwanda, Darfur, and Kosovo
evidenced. However, it is also dangerous to assume that it is necessary to intervene
unilaterally in regions that historically and culturally differ from the American
egocentric thinking and/or consider American military action as an imperialistic
advance over the self-determination of nations. Like many other American humanitarian organizations, they ask for military intervention in regions in which massive
crimes occur (13). Other humanitarian NGOs, however, disagree with the American
army assuming for itself the role of democracy’s spokesperson.
The fundamental questions in order to determine if a MARO is legally accepted
by nations and societies are, first, questions about who should intervene. Once this is
established, we can then wonder how to intervene. The unilateral intervention of the
United States and its allies, such as NATO, cannot be considered as a humanitarian
practice but as a hegemonic expansion over states with less democratic stability.
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Again, we can go over the analysis of the discord between MARO discourse and
the real interest of American interventions in the world. Following this question, a
MARO organization chart (58) proposes that the United States becomes the potential
figure of a Military Allied Committee. The real hierarchical relationship between
international and local allies is confined to coordination spaces.
It is perhaps unnecessary to specify that we are skeptical of the MARO project.
However, in regards to intervention, both the role of the United States and that of
the nations involved directly or indirectly in crimes against humanity or genocide
need to be considered.
We believe that it is necessary to stay away from hypocritical speeches that talk
about nations’ need of Democracy and Freedom to operate with legitimacy in order to
guarantee the protection of inhabitants within their borders and to provide diversity
of thinking and actions outside of their boundaries by means of the United Nations.
We think it is necessary to direct attention to new intervention locations. In
other words, intervention is not only necessary in areas that are destroyed by
genocides and in suffering countries; rather, intervention is also necessary where
the material tools used to perform mass killings and genocides (weapons, soldiers)
are being manufactured, even if intervening involves dealing with a world-wide,
multi-million-dollar business. In conclusion, it is time to start considering how
many and what types of intervention are necessary. It is time to understand that
massacres in a distant place may have responsible actors in the industries of the
central countries.
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Introduction
The authors of MARO: Mass Atrocity Response Operations; A Military Planning
Handbook, Sarah Sewall, Dwight Raymond, and Sally Chin, emphasize more than
once in their proposed manual that while MARO is not currently US military doctrine
‘‘it should be.’’ Clearly favoring the idea that the US military should be prepared
to carry out missions other than traditional warfare and counter-terrorism, MARO’s
authors give us a reasonably solid first crack at how military force might be profitably used to deter and stop genocide and other atrocities. Although the authors
contend, correctly, that the MARO project is different from many elements of the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, the rationale for and content of the handbook are in fact grounded firmly in R2P’s overarching principle of protecting populations at risk of serious harm. It is more accurate to say that MARO, while not the
operationalization of all of the R2P doctrine, is the operationalization of one specific
aspect of R2P: the responsibility to react through military intervention.
While the step from principle to planning is an important and worthwhile
exercise, we should not assume that this step will necessarily lead to effective intervention when the world is confronted with mass atrocities in the future. Instead,
MARO simply offers a preliminary blueprint for how the United States and other
would-be coalition forces could carry out different kinds of humanitarian missions to
stop or deter atrocity crimes should they be asked to do so by their political masters.
And the latter, of course, is the rub. Without the political will to live up to their
international responsibility to protect, the United States and other governments
will not assign to their armed forces the mission of saving lives in distant places,
thus leaving the prospects for effective intervention and prevention as uncertain as
ever. In the most optimistic but unlikely scenario, the adoption of the MARO project
or something like it into US military doctrine might serve to embolden political leaders
to sanction humanitarian military missions. With a plan in the drawer, so to speak,
political leaders might feel more confident that they can use military force to protect
vulnerable populations since they would have a set of options for how to use that
force effectively available to them from the start. Having this capability may in turn
reduce the fear of failure or of being drawn into a humanitarian quagmire.
Whether or not MARO will become US military doctrine or serve to deter and
stop atrocities, the handbook is worthy of serious consideration. The present commentary will begin by briefly suggesting that MARO is the operationalization of
some of the principles underpinning military intervention formulated in the R2P
doctrine and then discuss the degree to which Sewall, Raymond, and Chin have
succeeded in this task. On the positive side, they have produced a nuanced document
that takes into consideration many of the complexities of mass atrocity crises includMaureen S. Hiebert, ‘‘MARO as the Partial Operationalization of R2P,’’ Genocide Studies and
Prevention 6, 1 (April 2011): 52–58. 6 2011 Genocide Studies and Prevention. doi:10.3138/
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ing the differing and at times competing roles of the various actors involved in such
crises and their possible resolution, the complexity of different kinds of humanitarian
military operations, the possibility of reversals, and the likelihood that MAROs will
not always be perceived in the same way in the United States, in the area of operations, and internationally. Given the clear-eyed view with which the authors have
considered much of what would be required for humanitarian military missions, the
weakness of the proposed handbook is essentially a failure to extend that critical
capacity to a few key omissions and assumptions. These include the historical lack
of enthusiasm for US military cooperation with the United Nations and other forces
and peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations in general, a lack of adequate
consideration for exactly how coalition forces might work together, insufficient
concern over the ability to collect accurate intelligence and appropriately analyze
that intelligence, and a perhaps unwarranted assumption that the US military,
powerful though it may be, will always be successful on the battlefield.

MARO and R2P
In establishing the need for mass atrocity response planning and operations, the
authors argue that MARO is closely related to but qualitatively different from R2P
in a few key respects: MARO’s focus on the use of military force after the killing
has begun rather than a constellation of diplomatic, economic, and other approaches
referred to in R2P doctrine; an emphasis on preparing the US military specifically
for MAROs rather than advocating, as the R2P does, that international military
force should be deployed to counter atrocity crimes; and an ‘‘agnostic’’ view of the
politics of how the US military would come to engage in a MARO rather than R2P’s
requirement that the use of military force be sanctioned by the United Nations
Security Council.1 In short, MARO concentrates, as the authors tell us, on ‘‘how’’ to
use military force, rather than on ‘‘whether.’’
Despite the evident differences between MARO and R2P, the expressed need for
MARO planning by the US or other military forces seems to be at the very least
indirectly influenced by the central principles of R2P. In defining the international
community’s responsibility to protect, the International Commission on International
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) argued that while the responsibility to protect a given
population lies ‘‘first and foremost’’ with the state which controls that population,
there is a ‘‘residual responsibility’’ shared by all states in the international system.2
This residual responsibility, the ICISS continues, is triggered ‘‘when a particular
state is clearly either unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibility to protect or is
itself the actual perpetrator of crimes or atrocities, or where people living outside a
particular state are directly threatened by actions taking place there.’’ Further, ‘‘the
substance of the responsibility to protect is the provision of life-supporting protection
and assistance to populations at risk.’’ The responsibility to protect is said to be
composed of three separate sub responsibilities: to react, prevent, and rebuild. The
forward to MARO begins by noting that the ‘‘MARO project seeks to enable the
United States and the international community to stop genocide and mass atrocity’’
and that it is based on the ‘‘insight that the failure to act in the face of mass killings
of civilians is not simply a function of political will or legal authority’’ but also a
‘‘lack of thinking about how military force might respond’’ (5). Although no reference
is made in this passage directly to R2P’s constituent responsibilities, we can see
oblique references to the responsibility to react in the suggestion that MARO planning would enable the United States and others to stop genocide and that lack of
such planning has led to the failure to act in the past. Sewall, Raymond, and Chin
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continue by suggesting that not only does planning for MAROs allow for more
effective military responses, but the ability to use military force effectively to stop
atrocities may ‘‘help strengthen deterrence of would be perpetrators’’ (i.e., the
responsibility to prevent [5]). In a later section in which the authors outline different
kinds of MARO missions, the most interventionist scenario ends with proposals
for the restoration of security and proper local governance (i.e., the responsibility to
rebuild [70–87]).
Similarly, although MARO does not overtly refer to the six principles governing
military intervention set out in R2P (right authority, just cause, right intention, last
resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospect),3 there are hints that MAROs
should be designed to conform to at least some of these principles. For example,
that the purpose of a MARO is to stop mass atrocities once the killing has begun or
is imminent suggests just cause to safeguard or save populations that are either at
risk or already the targets of mass atrocities. The insistence that MAROs are distinct
from other kinds of military operations because they are strictly for the purpose
of assisting targeted populations sounds a lot like right intention, despite the very
real possibility that perpetrators of atrocity crimes and some elements of the international community will see MAROs, particularly if conducted by the US military,
as illegitimate violations of another state’s sovereignty.
Finally, even though MARO’s authors claim that MAROs do not involve nonmilitary methods of preventing and stopping mass atrocities, the handbook nonetheless devotes a section to Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs). The concentration
is, appropriately, on a sliding scale of military FDOs from heightening the alert
status of designated units to increasing surveillance activity and prepositioning
military assets in the region, and to establishing no-fly zones, for example (67–68).
But there is an acknowledgment that military commanders will need to be mindful
of how military FDOs will affect and be affected by non-military diplomatic, informational, and economic FDOs pursued by civilian leaders and departments and the possibility that military FDOs will be used to support non-military FDOs (69). Although
not explicit, the notion that non-military FDOs will likely precede military intervention or may require the support of the military in order to, for example, gather
intelligence or position forces to make diplomatic threats of the use of force credible
seems to suggest a tacit acknowledgement that any MARO will follow R2P’s injunction that the use of military force be a last resort. In short, this and the above examples would seem to suggest that although proposed MARO planning does not follow
the letter of all of R2P doctrine, it certainly follows the spirit of central aspects of it.

MARO’s Strength: Acknowledging Complexity
The great strength of the handbook is the authors’ refusal to take the easy route and
suggest one simplistic plan for circumstances that are anything but simple in the
real world. Instead, the handbook acknowledges throughout that mass atrocity situations, and by extension MARO operations, are highly complex. The handbook, for
example, refers at various points to the different kinds of actors involved directly or
indirectly in mass atrocity situations and possible MAROs: perpetrators who may be
state or non-state actors, victims, interveners such as external military forces as well
as UN peacekeepers or regular and irregular forces from neighboring countries, and
‘‘other actors’’ such as uninvolved populations in the country, neighboring populations or leaders, regional organizations (e.g., AU, NATO), UN agencies or political
missions, international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the
media—all of these can be categorized as bystanders, ‘‘negative influences,’’ or
54

MARO as the Partial Operationalization of R2P

‘‘positive influences’’ depending on their actions (44–49). Although one can argue
that regional organizations, UN missions, and NGOs can just as easily be conceptualized as interveners, albeit of a non-military variety, MARO nonetheless
acknowledges the sheer variety of potential actors involved and, more importantly,
it does not assume a static role for these actors. The authors note, for example, that
as atrocities and MAROs evolve, victims may become perpetrators, local or regional
bystanders—be they civilian or military—may also become perpetrators, and perpetrators may not be deterred by initial non-military or military FDOs and instead
calculate that they must move quickly to strike down their targets before it is
too late.
Similarly, the handbook recognizes that all of these actors have their own
specific, often competing, interests that can shift over time. Importantly, the authors
note that competing interests are not only a characteristic of the relationship
between adversaries, such as perpetrators and interveners, but also of relationships
between those who are on the ‘‘same side,’’ as in the case of intervening military
forces and NGOs as the latter usually seek to maintain distance from the former
while sharing the goal of assisting the victims. Further, MARO also identifies the
ways in which actors perceive their own actions as well as the ways in which their
actions are perceived by other local actors and members of the international community as variable and often at odds with each other. Sewall, Raymond, and Chin
repeatedly caution, for instance, that although the US military and the United
States in general may perceive a MARO to be strictly for humanitarian purposes,
the use of military force against the perpetrators of atrocity crimes will be seen as
adversarial by the perpetrators themselves and possibly as imperialistic by regional
and international observers. While the authors do not suggest concrete ways of
dealing with such perceptual disconnects, it is crucial that the United States and
other coalition forces are aware of the possible problem of differing, often negative
perceptions, in order to anticipate how their actions will be received by various
audiences and how this reception may affect MARO missions.
The authors also acknowledge complexity by formulating not one but several
different MARO scenarios, all of which are identified as possible responses to different kinds of mass atrocity situations and/or force levels available for such operations.
Scenarios range from relatively minimal interventions that involve using military
assets such as ships, aircraft, and long range surveillance mostly from outside of
the country to those that involve the setting up of safe zones in order to safeguard
target populations that are geographically concentrated, major operations in which
the country is saturated with intervening forces in several locations when the target
group is dispersed, and to operations that aim for the complete military defeat of the
perpetrators. The problems cited above of competing and changing roles, interpretations, and perceptions are written into each scenario. The relative advantages and
disadvantages, the latter of which frequently hinge on what could possibly go wrong,
are also addressed, albeit in a rather brief fashion.

MARO’s Weaknesses: Forgetting Complexity
Given the evident ability of the authors of MARO to consider how convoluted mass
atrocity situations and MAROs are likely to be, it is surprising that some of the
most vexing problems that have led the United States and other states to reject
MARO-like military interventions in the past are missing from the proposed plan.
Admittedly, not all of the missing complexities are of a directly military nature, but
they are highly relevant to the process of conceptualizing possible MARO missions
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since these missing complexities will directly shape political commitments to
MAROs, the availability of resources, and the willingness of the US military to take
on and the ability to succeed at such missions.
The first missing element of complexity is a more detailed and explicit recognition that, on the one hand, the US government and military have been reluctant to
work closely with the United Nations and forces operating under UN command and,
on the other hand, that US forces are unlikely to conduct a MARO unilaterally.
Although the US military has operated alongside the United Nations and other
coalition forces for humanitarian purposes in the past, especially NATO, MARO’s
authors correctly note the reluctance of American forces to engage in multilateral
operations. The authors use this reluctance as a justification for proposing a manual
that would be used by the US armed forces regardless of whether a MARO operation
is sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council and/or is carried out alongside
UN or other international forces. But if the past is any predictor of the future, there
is little evidence that the United States will be willing to conduct such a mission
alone in response to a mass atrocity situation. Since the end of the Cold War,
MARO-like humanitarian military interventions have been multinational coalition
operations, usually under some sort of UN mandate. Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia
for better or worse are all examples. As such, MARO should have spent or, to put it
more constructively, future iterations of the handbook should spend, much more time
setting out exactly how US forces will work alongside international forces.
A second and closely related forgotten complexity is the issue of military culture.
The US military sees itself as an institution tasked with protecting and projecting American military power by preparing for traditional warfare and, since the
September 2001 attacks, counter-terrorism operations. For MARO to have any
currency inside the US military, a parallel process of changing military culture to
accept MARO missions as a legitimate use of personnel, military assets, planning,
and training will be necessary. Without this kind of shift in military culture starting
from senior commanders and spreading down the ranks, MAROs will likely be seen
as second class operations unworthy of the world’s most powerful military and, as
a result, American armed forces will fail to properly prepare for them. Further,
resistance to MAROs may lead senior commanders to advocate against such missions
at the political level. It is of course a hallmark of civil-military relations in all
democracies that civilian leaders decide when, where, and why to deploy military
forces, but it would be naı̈ve to think that civilian leaders do not on occasion face
objections from senior military commanders to missions that they would rather not
carry out or objections in favor of missions that senior commanders would rather
pursue. One way of gaining acceptance of MARO missions and ensuring that the
military can successfully carry out MAROs might be to add a section on training.
This could include the nuts and bolts of instructing officers and NCOs on what is
expected of them during MARO missions as well as an emphasis on the importance
of these kinds of missions. Concerning the latter the manual could underline the
moral worth of humanitarian missions to stop atrocities while also making a case
for the practical ways in which MARO missions enhance American and international
peace and security. The recently released Will to Intervene Project, developed by the
Montreal Institute of Genocide and Human Rights Studies (MIGS), could serve as a
template for the realpolitik reasons for legitimizing MARO missions.
Third, MARO seems to assume that intelligence gathering and analysis will be
a relatively straightforward process. The authors rightfully integrate the need for
effective intelligence gathering and analysis into MARO planning and missions,
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specifically the role intelligence plays in discerning the intentions and concrete plans
of actual or would-be perpetrators. The handbook fails, however, to address the very
real possibility of not obtaining timely and accurate intelligence in some circumstances or the possibility that the US military and the Pentagon may misinterpret
the intelligence collected. If genocide or another atrocity breaks out in parts of the
world where the United States and other major powers have little strategic interest,
the capacity to directly collect timely and accurate intelligence will be diminished
from the start. In such circumstances intelligence may have to come from other
second-hand sources and, as a result, it may be less reliable intelligence or intelligence that is unintentionally or deliberately misleading. Although local and international media reports may be an alternative source of information, the domestic
media can become a weapon in the hands of abusive states (which in itself may, of
course, turn out to be a highly accurate source of perpetrator intentions) while the
international media at times approach news stories from particular regions of the
world with pre-existing and often inaccurate narratives in mind (e.g., that Africans
habitually engage in ‘‘tribal violence’’).
Regardless of where the intelligence comes from or how accurate it is, there is no
guarantee that civilian and military agencies tasked with analyzing intelligence will
be able to correctly assess the true nature of an atrocity situation. One need only
think of the inability of most Western states to comprehend until it was too late
that the killings in Rwanda were not spasms of tribal violence or the collateral
effects of the civil war or that Iraq’s Saddam Hussein regime did not in fact have
weapons of mass destruction. Sewall, Raymond, and Chin tell us that MARO
planning must be based in part on a clear understanding not only of perpetrator
planning and intentions but also of the historical, economic, political, and strategic
context within which atrocities are perpetrated. This makes imminent sense, but
generating this level of understanding under what at times may be very pressing
time constraints is likely to be a weighty and vexing task. Scholars have spent years
trying to figure out the dynamics underpinning mass atrocity situations with varying
degrees of success and agreement. To be able to meet the challenge of effective
intelligence analysis, relevant civilian and military agencies will need to acquire considerable analytical expertise in genocide studies and other atrocity crimes.
Finally, there is the perhaps overly optimistic unspoken assumption that the US
military, once committed to some sort of combat operations as part of a MARO, will
succeed on the battlefield. The US army is the largest one in the world and it
has gained, complements of extended engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, some
serious recent combat experience. These two theaters of war show that although
the American military has little difficulty prevailing in traditional set-piece combat
operations, it has faced problems despite its overwhelming capabilities in irregular
and counterinsurgency settings. It is these latter kinds of operations that will likely
characterize most MARO missions. MARO’s authors do, to be fair, acknowledge in
different MARO scenarios the possibility of set-backs and reversals, but this possibility
is attributed to other actors and not to the US military itself. A frank acknowledgement of the possibility of failure on the battlefield is crucial for understanding what
might go wrong with the application of force itself, how to avoid such problems, or at
least how to compensate for problems or make successful mid-course corrections.
In sum, the proposed handbook is a good first step on the road to figuring out
how military force, if it is needed, can be used effectively to stop the perpetration of
atrocity crimes against vulnerable populations. Grounded in the R2P principle of the
responsibility to react, MARO has tried to confront much of the complexities that
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surround atrocity situations and possible military responses to them. To move the
conversation forward we need to confront the equally complex problems of finding
ways in which the US and coalition forces, such as the United Nations or NATO,
would work together on the ground in MARO missions; the ways in which to get
American and other national militaries to take MARO missions seriously; the ways
in which to collect and analyze accurate and timely intelligence; and the ways in
which to anticipate from an operational point of view, what might go wrong on the
battlefield and how to fix it. Sewall, Raymond, and Chin should be commended for
their initiative, creativity, and evident hard work in conceptualizing MARO. The
conversation they have started should be continued inside and outside military
circles and is of the highest importance if the major states in the international system ever hope to live up to their responsibility to protect those who need protection.
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Most literature produced in the past two decades on the prospects of intervention to
prevent genocide can be summed up by a cliché: ‘‘Where there’s a will, there’s a
way.’’ 1 In that context, a vital if imperfect corrective is provided by MARO: Mass
Atrocity Response Operations; A Military Planning Handbook (henceforth, MARO),
produced jointly by Harvard University and the US Army. Contrary to the naı̈ve
optimism of many past analyses, this report starts with the fact that, without feasible
options, effective humanitarian military intervention is unlikely, if not impossible.
As MARO makes clear from the outset, ‘‘the failure to act in the face of mass
killings of civilians is not simply a function of political will or legal authority; the
failure also reflects a lack of thinking about how military forces might respond.’’ 2
Accordingly, the report details precisely how such forces could intervene, in hopes
that they will be better prepared and more likely to act in future crises. The report’s
guiding ethos could thus be summed up by reversing the cliché: ‘‘Where there’s a
way, there’s a will.’’
By focusing on practical matters, rather than wishful thinking, MARO is a vast
improvement over the 2008 report of the Genocide Prevention Task Force, chaired by
Madeleine Albright and William Cohen, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S.
Policymakers.3 Unlike that previous report, MARO lays out an impressive spectrum
of realistic military options, ranging from deterrent threats to full-blown military
occupation, which could prevent or mitigate genocide (20; 65–87). The new report
also includes the dry doctrinal language that would be necessary for a huge bureaucracy like the US military to implement such a policy.
MARO builds upon three important lessons from the past (17–18). First, intervention creates a strategic interaction between at least three players—the two (or
more) parties involved in the conflict plus the interveners—so its precise consequences
are unpredictable (25–26). Second, intervention is almost never neutral. Even if
interveners provide aid impartially—that is, to all sides based exclusively on
need—they inevitably will alter the balance of power in a conflict.4 Third, widespread killing and expulsion can be, and often are, perpetrated remarkably quickly,
so if intervention builds only gradually—as the domestic politics of the intervening
states typically necessitate—it will likely fail to prevent such atrocities (29).5
The report then addresses stubborn military realities (18). For example, in airborne interventions especially, there is an unavoidable trade-off between the speed
of deployment and the weight of armor and equipment used to protect intervening
forces. In other words, it takes longer to deploy well-protected forces. Yet, quicker
interventions can save more lives. As a result, there is also a painful trade-off
between how many potential victims will be protected and how many interveners
Alan J. Kuperman, ‘‘Mass Atrocity Response Operations: Doctrine in Search of Strategy,’’
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will be killed or wounded in the process. Hypothetically, a lighter intervening force—
that is, one without armored vehicles, helicopters, and artillery—might deploy three
times as fast and save 10,000 more lives, but at the cost of 50 more intervener
casualties. Would such a trade-off be worthwhile? Who should decide? MARO does
not answer such questions or even explore them in detail, but deserves credit for
acknowledging them rather than pretending, as have many previous analyses, that
all such challenges can be overcome by political will.
MARO also astutely recommends advance planning for specific military interventions. Very few countries actually are at risk of genocidal violence, and experts
are generally able to identify them.6 If military planning teams were provided
several months to research past patterns of violence and current political trends in
these states, they would be able to pinpoint the most likely perpetrators and targets
of atrocities, the locations and means of entry for interveners, the potential staging
bases in neighboring states, and the best strategies to stanch violence. Such advance
planning would make intervention much faster and more effective when and if
deployment orders ever came, potentially saving tens or even hundreds of thousands
more lives in a case such as the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.
Full-blown intervention is not the only type that can prevent atrocities, as
the report accurately observes, because smaller-scale deterrent operations also can
decisively affect outcomes (65–69). An excellent example, not cited in MARO, took
place in Liberia in 2003. The mere deployment of US Marines off the coast—
accompanied by military over-flights, deft diplomacy, a regional peacekeeping contingent, and a small evacuation force—successfully persuaded President Charles
Taylor to leave office, thereby ending a savage civil war and alleviating a humanitarian
emergency for tens of thousands of displaced civilians.7
Despite these many attributes, MARO is marred by two shortcomings. First, it
focuses mainly on military operations to the relative neglect of political strategies
and consequences. Second, it often relies on a simplistic, idealized conflict scenario,
giving rise to intervention proposals that could backfire in more realistic and complex settings. Although MARO refers in passing to ‘‘second-order’’ (40; 52; 68) and
‘‘third-order’’ (27; 40) effects of military intervention,8 it largely ignores the implications of such ‘‘system effects,’’ which, as Robert Jervis has noted, can radically alter
policy prescriptions.9 The report explicitly avoids complex policy questions about
intervention, stating that ‘‘The MARO Project itself is concerned with answering
the ‘how,’ not the ‘whether’ ’’ (13). Unfortunately, since military intervention can
unintentionally increase the likelihood of atrocities, the ‘‘how’’ of intervention is
inextricably linked to debates about ‘‘whether’’ such action is advisable.

Strategy versus Operations
The Prussian military officer Carl von Clausewitz famously noted that war is ‘‘a
continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means.’’ 10 While this
dictum is well known, its policy implications are less widely understood. Clausewitz
was criticizing the tendency—still prevalent today—of war planning to focus more
on military operations than on the achievement of underlying political objectives.
Essentially, he warned against winning the battle while losing the war. Or, as he
summed it up, military ‘‘means can never be considered in isolation from their
purpose.’’ 11
Modern scholars and practitioners of military arts have institutionalized this
lesson via an analytical prism comprising three levels of analysis that represent
progressively wider scope: tactics, operations, and strategy. Tactics refer to the ways
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in which force is utilized locally to achieve small-scale military objectives. Operations
refer to the ways in which tactics are utilized on a wider scale to achieve broader
military objectives. Strategy refers to the ways in which military operations are
utilized to achieve political objectives.
MARO, as its title indicates, focuses on military operations. This is necessary,
but not sufficient. Since the advent of widespread humanitarian military intervention in the 1990s, such operations have frequently backfired strategically, by
increasing civilian suffering, contrary to their political objective. From a Clausewitzian
perspective, interveners often win the battle but lose the war. For example, in 1999,
NATO bombing accomplished its military objective by compelling the retreat of
Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. But it failed strategically by unintentionally amplifying
the killing and expulsion of ethnic Albanian civilians—five-fold, at minimum—and
then enabling the revenge killing and expulsion of ethnic Serb civilians.12 This
outcome was precisely opposite to NATO’s stated humanitarian objective of protecting civilians.
The only way to avert such perverse outcomes is to design military operations
with an eye to strategy based on realistic scenarios that draw upon accurate descriptions of past interventions. Unfortunately, here too MARO sometimes falls short.

White and Black Hats
The greatest flaw of MARO is that it assumes that most atrocities are committed in
the context of one-way violence by a state against its civilians. The report thus views
intervention as having the straightforward effect of stopping the bad guys and protecting the good guys, with assistance from non-governmental and multilateral organizations.13 As it summarizes, ‘‘The four categories [of actors] include: perpetrators,
victims, interveners, and a more nebulous group of ‘others’ ’’ (44).
In reality, as scholars have long documented but only recently emphasized, most
atrocities by states are committed in response to rebel challenges, including armed
secession. States typically target civilians who are suspected of supporting, harboring, or secretly being rebels. From 1943 to 1987, Harff and Gurr identified 44
episodes of ‘‘genocide and politicide,’’ state-sponsored campaigns lasting at least six
months that deliberately killed thousands of noncombatants.14 In 30 of those 44
cases (68%), as I observed in a 2005 analysis, rebels provoked the state’s retaliation
against civilians.15 In a separate study, Helen Fein identified 19 cases of genocide
from 1945 to 1988. She similarly concluded that ‘‘one could classify at least 11 cases
[58%] as retributive genocide in which the perpetrators retaliated to a real or
perceived threat by the victim to the structure of domination.’’ 16 In a more recent
quantitative analysis, Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay
likewise find that atrocities are best explained as a state strategy to ‘‘drain the sea’’
of rebels.17
Because of these complex dynamics, international efforts to protect at-risk
civilians, as called for by the emerging norm of the Responsibility to Protect, can
perversely backfire by exacerbating violence. This is so because intervention to
defend targeted civilians, whether through military or diplomatic action, often has
the effect of also protecting and assisting rebels. This emboldens the rebels to
escalate their attacks against the state, provoking still greater atrocities. In some
cases, rebels even deliberately provoke state retaliation against civilians to attract
international intervention. Over the last two decades, this moral-hazard dynamic
has exacerbated atrocities in three of the worst cases: Bosnia, Kosovo, and Darfur.18
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A pre-publication draft of MARO failed almost entirely to contemplate this
dynamic. Only one sentence in an appendix noted that international deterrent
operations ‘‘may inspire opposition groups to increase any activities that may have
been contributing to the situation and prompt a harsh governmental response.’’
Following comments from me (and perhaps others), MARO moved that sentence
into the main text and added that opposition groups may try to ‘‘manipulate an
intervention by external parties’’ (68). The final report also warns that ‘‘rebel groups
may conduct mass atrocities to intimidate populations, undermine the government’s
legitimacy, or provoke the government into a disproportionate response’’ (45). These
are important correctives. But MARO still fails to address the implications for
strategy, because it focuses nearly exclusively on military operations.19 As a result,
the report prescribes military action that could mitigate some atrocities but might
exacerbate others, thereby potentially increasing the total violence against civilians,
constituting strategic failure.
The report’s simple scenario of good versus bad guys also distorts lessons from
the past. In Rwanda, for example, MARO explains the victimization of both of
the country’s main ethnic groups as follows: ‘‘Rwandan [Hutu] genocidaires killed
moderate Hutu in addition to Tutsi’’ (39). This ignores long-standing evidence that
the invading Tutsi rebels, known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front, themselves killed
tens of thousands of Rwandan Hutu civilians before, during, and after the genocide,
thereby helping provoke and fuel the massacres by Hutu extremists.20 Ironically, the
report cites only the Hutu for using media ‘‘to attempt to control, or decisively shape,
the information environment’’ (55). In actuality, worldwide media reported Hutu
crimes within weeks but failed to report Tutsi crimes for nearly 15 years because
the propaganda of the rebels successfully blamed the Hutu for all atrocities and
impeded UN investigations. MARO, in this instance, falls victim to precisely the
kind of information operations that it warns against.
The history of rebel provocation also calls into question the report’s policy prescriptions. For example, MARO insists repeatedly that increased international
‘‘witness’’ and ‘‘transparency’’ of atrocities, through better surveillance and reporting, would deter perpetrators (35–36). That is possible. But the literature on moral
hazard reveals that sub-state actors sometimes rebel precisely because they expect
media reports of the state’s retaliation to compel intervention on their behalf.
If so, greater reporting of state atrocities would actually increase the incentive for
rebel provocations. It remains unclear, therefore, whether heightened ‘‘witness’’ of
atrocities would increase or decrease such violence.
Finally, MARO’s prescriptions ignore a broad body of literature illustrating how
even purely humanitarian aid, such as food, water, sanitation, shelter, and medical
care, may exacerbate conflict.21 For example, militants often intermingle with civilians
in refugee camps, so the aid may sustain the rebels and inhibit their reintegration
into society, thereby prolonging fighting. Combatants sometimes intercept aid and
resell it or charge a tax for its safe delivery, helping to fund war. In some cases,
factions even fight each other to control delivery of aid, creating an extra incentive
for violence. Humanitarian aid also may damage the local economy by under-pricing
nearby merchants and producers, and it can delegitimate local political authorities
by providing better services than the government. In addition, aid organizations
often hire away the best-skilled local residents to serve as translators, drivers, or
office staff, draining the human capital necessary for entrepreneurship and good
governance. Unless such historical lessons are incorporated into military doctrine,
future interventions are likely to repeat the mistakes of the past.
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Military Doctrine Is Not Enough
The noble objective of reducing mass atrocities requires a multi-pronged strategy.
First, the international community should pursue preventive rather than pyromaniac
diplomacy. As noted above, states are most likely to perpetrate atrocities when confronted with violent domestic threats to their rule. Thus, diplomacy should emphasize
consensual mediation, and carrots rather than sticks, to facilitate negotiated outcomes.
By contrast, coercing a state to hand over power or territory to a domestic challenger
is extremely dangerous because it heightens the risk that the state will resort to
atrocities to retain control.22 Diplomats should avoid such muscular mediation
unless they also take steps to avert the likely backlash—for example, by providing
soft landings for senior officials of the departing regime, or by pre-deploying a robust
peacekeeping force.23
Second, the United States and its allies should adopt criteria for intervention
that minimize moral hazard.24 Most importantly, they should refrain from helping
rebels on humanitarian grounds unless state retaliation is grossly disproportionate,
in order to provide both sides with an incentive to reduce violence. Interveners
should also deliver humanitarian aid in ways that minimize its benefit to rebels,
by guarding the supply routes and camps where assistance is provided to threatened
populations.
Third, the United States should structure and base its military forces in ways
that facilitate rapid reaction, because speed saves lives. Several ‘‘ultra-light’’ brigades
should be designed and equipped so that they can deploy and operate without
significant armor or heavy weapons in relatively permissive threat environments.
To further reduce deployment time, some units or at least their equipment should
be pre-positioned at bases in Africa, where mass atrocities are most likely to occur.
Finally, as MARO proposes, the United States and other like-minded states
should adopt military doctrine to stop atrocities. Yet, even here, caution is required.
Such routinization of intervention by itself could do more harm than good by further
emboldening rebels to provoke state retaliation in expectation of the benefits from the
humanitarian response. Only if properly embedded in a comprehensive strategy—
including enlightened diplomacy, strict intervention criteria, and well-designed
forces—would MARO’s proposed doctrine contribute unambiguously to the protection of at-risk civilians and thereby help implement the emerging norm of the
Responsibility to Protect.
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Comments on the Mass Atrocity Response
Operations (MARO) Handbook
Stephen F. Burgess
US Air War College

The MARO Handbook provides realistic scenarios and well-developed possible
courses of action, which would enable strategists, policy makers and planners to
prepare for an intervention operation to stop genocide and other mass atrocities.
The handbook stipulates three defining characteristics of genocide and mass atrocities
and eight operational and political implications. It offers well-founded advice and
discusses the impossibility for an intervening force to remain impartial when mass
atrocities are being committed. Also, unlike most peace and stability operations,
MAROs must protect civilian victims from the perpetrators of mass atrocities and
have to deter or defeat the perpetrators, in a similar way to other forces (usually
guerrilla movements).
One purpose of the handbook was to map out operational responses to genocide
and mass atrocities that can be implemented by the US military. The assumption
was that compiling the handbook would produce a guide that could readily be pulled
off the shelf by officials in the US National Security Council (NSC) and the Department of Defense (DoD) and put into practice. In addition, it was assumed that
having such a plan available would make it easier for the US President and Secretary of Defense to react to genocide and mass atrocities by deploying the US military
with the certainty that a well-developed operational plan could be implemented.
Enlisting Sarah Sewall, one of the authors of the US Army/US Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual, helped elevate the credibility of the MARO project as well as
the probability that the handbook would be taken seriously in the corridors of
power. The handbook has been presented to US government agencies, including the
military, and to international organizations and non-governmental organizations.
In spite of its intentions, it is questionable whether or not MARO would be
something that the NSC and DoD would adopt. The DoD may be the master of the
planning, doctrine, and training involved in deployment, but it is reluctant to become
involved in new doctrinal commitments, especially given its existing ones involving
counterinsurgency and peace and stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Unless there is a new initiative from the US President or another compelling
genocidal crisis, it is unlikely that the MARO project and handbook will be adopted
as part of DoD doctrine regardless of the US Army Institute of Peacekeeping and
Stability Operations Institute’s efforts to persuade the DoD otherwise.
It can be argued that doctrine and operational plans that are sufficiently
adequate to guide the deployment and operation of US forces to stop genocide and
mass atrocities already exist. Even so, the United States has not deployed ground
forces in a humanitarian intervention since 1993 in Somalia. After the 1994 genocide
in Rwanda, both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations ordered
the NSC to devise contingency plans to respond to crises that can degenerate into
Stephen F. Burgess, ‘‘Comments on the Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) Handbook,’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, 1 (April 2011): 66–69. 6 2011 Genocide Studies
and Prevention. doi:10.3138/gsp.6.1.66
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genocide or mass atrocities. For instance, in 2001, after President Bush pledged that
there would be no genocide ‘‘on my watch,’’ he ordered the NSC to put together a
contingency plan for Burundi as the country was moving through a very difficult
phase in the peace process and it appeared that genocide would recur. While the
contingency plan for Burundi was probably not as detailed as the MARO Handbook,
the Burundi plan was put together with knowledge of the particular circumstances
on the ground—something which MARO does not provide. In addition, it can be
argued that the DoD already has response operations to genocide and mass atrocities
covered with FM 3–24 (Army/Marine Corps Manual for Counter-insurgency); Joint
Publication 3–07.3 (Peace Operations); and FM 3–07 (Army Manual for Stability
Operations).1 Intervention to stop genocide and mass atrocities involves peace
enforcement and counterinsurgency (covered in FM 3–24 and JP 3–07.3) and the
protection of civilian populations is outlined in JP 3–07.3 and FM 3–07. The US
military is already training on the basis of this doctrine and applying it in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The United States has also developed rapid reaction capability which
would enable its armed forces to intervene in mass atrocities.
In addition, guides already exist regarding the deployment of US forces from the
continental United States to the distant locations in which genocide might take
place. For example, in The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention, Alan Kuperman2
provided a detailed account of the airlift requirements for three different types of
intervention—heavy, medium, and light—to stop genocide in Rwanda. The heavy
and medium interventions would involve the deployment of the 82nd Airborne
Division, massive use of the US air mobility fleet, and a major logistics and refuelling
operation. The three scenarios underline the fact that US humanitarian intervention
to stop genocide and mass atrocities would require a costly global effort, which may
cause decision makers to think twice about ordering such a venture.
The fact remains that political will is the biggest obstacle to a US response to
incidents of genocide and mass atrocities, the MARO Handbook and other manuals
notwithstanding. In actuality, the United States politically has gravitated in the
opposite direction from ordering US forces to intervene on the ground. After reacting
to mass famine and widespread killing in Somalia, the United States withdrew its
forces from Somalia after the ‘‘Black Hawk Down’’ incident of October 1993. The
Congress and President decided that preventing Somalia from once again degenerating into the type of chaos that led to the famine and killings in the first place was
not worth the cost of the deaths of eighteen service personnel. This decision was
codified in May 1994, when the NSC issued Presidential Decision Directive 25, which
restricted US participation in humanitarian intervention and peace and stability
operations to situations in which the US interest was at stake. The Clinton administration’s active campaign against any type of intervention to stop the 1994 Rwandan
Genocide was another sign of the United States’ aversion to the anticipated high
costs in blood and treasure involved in military deployment. In Bosnia, the Bush
and Clinton administrations allowed mass atrocities to continue for three years
without sending in ground forces to stop it, fearing another Vietnam-type quagmire.
Only after the Srebrenica massacre did the Clinton administration authorize the
escalation of air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces. Ground forces were deployed
only after the Dayton Accords finalized a ceasefire. Similarly, in Kosovo from 1998
to 1999, the United States did not react to mass atrocities by sending in ground
troops. Instead, the United States used air strikes against Serbia and reacted to
mass atrocities by deploying humanitarian relief units to Albania.
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In response to the Rwandan Genocide, the Clinton administration proposed the
African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) as the most logical way for the United States
to help direct African militaries on the ground to stop mass atrocities. However, the
initiative was judged to be too hegemonic and interventionist for African states
to adopt. Therefore, the Clinton administration retreated and came back with a
watered-down proposal—the African Crisis Response Initiative—that would train
potential peacekeepers and do nothing to stop genocide or mass atrocities.
While President Bush promised that there would be no genocide on his watch
and authorized a contingency plan for Burundi, he allowed genocide to grind on
and on in Darfur, beginning in 2003, without responding. Even after Secretary of
State Colin Powell had testified in 2004 that genocide was occurring in Darfur and
after both houses of Congress had resolved that genocide was happening, the Bush
administration did not act other than to support a weak African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission that did nothing to stop mass killings, displacement, rapes, and
other atrocities. Barack Obama campaigned on a platform that included a no-fly
zone to stop the Sudanese military from carrying out sustained campaigns involving
mass atrocities in Darfur. He made no promises about placing US boots on the
ground. When he came to office, there was no further mention of a no-fly zone.
Presently, there is no indication that President Obama will deploy US forces to stop
atrocities in Sudan or anywhere else.
If the United States will not intervene to stop genocide and mass atrocities, then
who will? In Africa, the African Union is supposed to provide leadership in stopping
genocide and mass atrocities. In 2003 the AU Peace and Security Council and
Defense Chiefs, led by South Africa, authorized the creation of the African Standby
Force (ASF), which included stopping genocide and mass atrocities as one of the
six main tasks that had to be addressed by 2010. Some of the brigades of the ASF
have already been created and developed rapid reaction forces that can be quickly
deployed to stop genocide. Therefore, the ASF is in the process of developing the
capability and the timeliness required to intervene and stop genocide. The United
States could assist in providing training based upon the MARO Handbook. However,
most African states would still be unwilling to intervene in the internal affairs of a
fellow member of the African Union.
Given the reluctance of most African leaders to violate the sovereignty of a fellow
leader’s state, it would probably fall to a coalition of the willing, whose states would
make the decision to assemble forces, downplay the significance of sovereignty, and
intervene in the internal affairs of a ‘‘fraternal’’ state in order to stop genocide
or mass atrocities. Rwanda is one state that has experienced genocide, expressed
a willingness to deploy the Rwandan Defense Force to stop genocide and other
mass atrocities, and deployed over 3,000 troops to Darfur for five years. However,
Rwandan forces have committed mass atrocities in retribution for the 1994 genocide
and may not be expected to act in the best interests of the international community.
In any event, MARO might be useful to a coalition of the willing. Given the lack of
political will to adopt and implement the MARO project, the United States and other
states could offer the ASF and willing states, such as Rwanda, training and joint
exercises based on MARO.
Another party that works to put an end to genocide is the International Criminal
Court (ICC). The ICC’s indictment of President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and other
mass atrocity perpetrators has created a deterrent for other leaders who might be
tempted to use genocide and other mass atrocities to wipe out an insurgency or
an ethnic group to advance their own interests. In concert with pressure from the
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ICC, the campaign at the United Nations for the adoption of the Responsibility to
Protect principle provides another mechanism for pressuring leaders to not resort
to genocide or mass atrocities to solve their problems. Leaders will be held responsible
for their actions and stand a better chance of being deterred.
An alternative to persuading states that may be willing to intervene or influencing the United States is to aid guerrilla groups that are attempting to overthrow the
regime that has decided to carry out genocide. The United States provided military
assistance to the Bosnian government in 1995 and to the Kosovo Liberation Army in
1999 in the fight to end ethnic cleansing. Aid to the Rwandan Patriotic Front might
have enabled it to push through to the capital, Kigali, and other parts of Rwanda
in a more rapid time frame and stop the genocide. Similarly, aid to the Sudanese
Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) might have
brought an end to the Sudanese military and janjaweed militia’s genocide in Darfur
in 2004. However, the volatility of guerrilla movements and their tendency to violate
human rights make it difficult for the United States and other actors to work too
closely with them on a regular basis.
In a September 30, 2010 op-ed in The New York Times, ‘‘Chronicle of a Genocide
Foretold,’’ Nicholas Kristof mapped out the path to genocide/mass atrocities in which
Sudanese forces would invade Southern Sudan in the wake of the January 2011
referendum and carry out mass atrocities as they did in Darfur. In a perfect world,
the Obama administration would deploy the US military, armed with the MARO
guide, to stop Sudanese forces and protect Southern Sudanese civilians. However,
US interest in Southern Sudan is not enough for the US government to generate
sufficient political will to intervene. Instead, in order to prevent this scenario from
coming to pass, the United States stepped up its diplomatic campaign in both North
and South Sudan. Sustained US aid to the government of South Sudan (GOSS)
to stop the northern Sudanese military from committing mass atrocities may be
the most effective way to do stop genocide. Another scenario would have the rapid
reaction force of the East African Brigade of the African Standby Force, led by a
Rwandan special forces battalion and backed by the United States, deploying to
stop genocide in Southern Sudan.
In conclusion, MARO could be useful but not for the purpose for which it was
intended. It is unlikely that the handbook will become part of US military doctrine
and training. However, if the handbook is distributed more widely to willing states,
organizations, and institutions in areas where the threat of genocide or mass atrocities exists, it might have the effect of preparing willing states and organizations
to intervene.
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As we become evermore aware of the costs and consequences of genocide and various
other human rights abuses, the recognition of the need for more effective prevention
and intervention strategies also becomes evermore clear. All too often when outbreaks of violence have occurred, the international community has appeared powerless to prevent it and absolutely ineffective when taking steps to stop the violence
and the killing. Perhaps the worst contemporary example of this impotence comes
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rooted in the destabilizing effects of
the 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda, the Eastern Congo has been the setting
for mass rapes, massacres, and other atrocities since 1995 as various factions and
groups have struggled for power and/or resources or have capitalized on the chaos
and brutality. Some estimates suggest that more than 5 million people have been
killed since the outbreak of hostilities in the mid-1990s.1 This has been the reality
there, even though the Congo is the site of one of the longest-standing and largest
United Nations peacekeeping missions in existence. Begun in 1999, the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC,
renamed MONUSCO in April 2010) has gone from a contingent of about 5,000 troops
and 500 military observers to over 20,0000 troops, 700 military observers, 1,000
police personnel, and several thousand assorted other civilian personnel in early
2010.2 Despite this significant international presence, the violence has continued to
the present day. In fact, some of the more recent mass rapes and massacres have
occurred in close proximity to contingents of the UN peacekeeping forces, which
have been unwilling or unable to intervene in these atrocities.3 Keep in mind that
these are not always hit-and-run attacks that occur too quickly for a peacekeeping
response. In some cases, the assaults lasted for days. Clearly, MONUSCO has
not been very effective in preventing the victimization of innocents. Unfortunately,
this has often been more the norm than the exception in locations across the globe.
The United Nations and the International Community have usually been unable to
prevent and unsuccessful in intervening to stop atrocities.
Because of this apparent lack of prophylactic ability, we have seen the creation of
a number of reports, such as the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, better known as Responsibility to Protect or R2P 4
and the Albright-Cohen Report, Preventing Genocide.5 The purpose of these documents has been to chart a path forward so that the all too frequent mistakes of the
past will not be repeated. Both have been produced with a tremendous amount of
fanfare and high expectations for their implementation, although their impact to
date has been negligible and their long-term prospects unclear. Nevertheless, these
well-intentioned projects have been important first steps in conceptualizing and
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institutionalizing strategies to prevent genocide and related forms of human rights
violations and will hopefully help create and spur further action. To this list, we
can now add MARO: Mass Atrocity Response Operations; A Military Planning Handbook, which seeks to outline how military interventions to save civilian lives should
take place. Comprehensive and thorough, MARO is intended to provide a framework
to assist the military in visualizing the relevant issues and assessing the specific
difficulties inherent in military interventions to prevent atrocities. The handbook
is also intended to guide the planning and implementation of such a response.
This is certainly no abstract theoretical exercise since it utilizes the insights and
experiences of a good number of active duty and retired military personnel. MARO,
in short, is grounded in the expertise derived from real world operations and
exercises. Therein lies the greatest strength of this project but also, however, what I
perceive to be a significant weakness.
The first issue that I have with this handbook concerns some fundamental
assumptions that are made by the architects of this plan and has nothing to do
with its content. For me, this first issue has more to do with the way we approach
or frame the topic rather than the actual strategies suggested or the ways in which
they should be implemented. Essentially, this handbook provides a planning guide
for military intervention. While I absolutely understand that military intervention
is sometimes necessary and that operational plans are crucial for any military
intending to act effectively in order to put an end to atrocities, I question our constant willingness to privilege military options over other strategies of intervention.
This handbook continues that focus. If this were simply another internal military
operations guide or field manual—one of the many that presumably exist—that
would be one thing, but the widespread dissemination of this handbook and its
attendant publicity suggest otherwise. Essentially, MARO explicitly asserts its purpose
as such:
[MARO] seeks to enable the United States and the international community to stop
genocide and mass atrocity as part of a broader integrated strategy by explaining
key relevant military concepts and planning considerations. The MARO Project is
based on the insight that the failure to act in the face of mass killings of civilians is
not simply a function of political will or legal authority; the failure also reflects a lack
of thinking about how military forces might respond.6

This ambitious goal suggests that the MARO Handbook is intended to be or envisions
itself as an important component of US strategy when dealing with human rights
abuses. In some ways, MARO is analogous to FM 3–24, the US Army’s field manual
for conducting counterinsurgency operations, which was arguably not intended solely
for a military audience.7 Its widespread release for download and the fact that
it was printed as a book suggest that the public and political audience were important constituencies whose support of the COIN (i.e., counterinsurgency) doctrine it
outlines was necessary. At that time, public support for the war in Iraq was in deep
decline and the marketing of the strategies outlined in FM 3–24, often referred to as
‘‘ the troop surge’’ or simply ‘‘ the surge,’’ helped garner enough popular and political
support for it to be implemented.8 The presentation of this document suggests a
comparable vision and/or approach.
This focus on military intervention is somewhat problematic since it helps to
frame and shape the nature of the discourse about options and policies in ways that
reflect an increasing orientation towards military solutions for international problems.
I do understand that the primary author of the handbook, Sarah Sewall, developed
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this initiative after having spent time in the Pentagon, that her experience there
has been fundamental in shaping the nature of this project, and that the numerous
military participants in this project were invaluable in creating a realistic document;
yet, it seems to me that, as a society, we already emphasize military options and
responses over diplomatic, legal, humanitarian, economic, and informational ones.
In his recent critique of our national security mindset, Andrew Bacevich points out
that since the Second World War our statecraft has ‘‘ emphasized activism over
example, hard power over soft, and coercion (often styled ‘negotiating from a position
of strength’) over suasion.’’ 9 This focus, however, comes at a cost. We tend to perceive non-military options as too slow or too ineffective and often discount them in
favor of armed intervention strategies. We want quick solutions to difficult issues
and military options often appear to provide that. Yet we live in an increasingly
interconnected world in which international economic and social relations have a
power and relevancy all too frequently ignored by political and military strategists
who continue to perceive the world through old paradigms. This handbook, while
filling a gap in the military’s preparedness for humanitarian intervention, also
serves to perpetuate a mentality in which force remains a pre-eminent tool of
intervention. That is not to suggest that military interventions are already the most
common international tool. Far from it. But the frequency with which the United
States has engaged in military actions around the globe has increased to the extent
that this country exists, to borrow Bacevich’s term, in a ‘‘ condition approximating
perpetual war.’’ 10 If recent history is any guide, the United States is increasingly
relying upon its military forces to project American power abroad and to intervene
in a variety of settings for numerous causes. From Lebanon, Grenada, Kosovo,
Bosnia, and Somalia to Yemen, Haiti, Liberia, Columbia, the Philippines, Iraq, and
Afghanistan, it seems that the United States frequently relies on military intervention for a variety of causes.
To be fair, MARO does explicitly assert that ‘‘ Military FDO’s will be more effective when combined with diplomatic, informational, and economic actions’’ (69). Yet
the diplomatic measures, informational deterrent options, and economic deterrent
options discussed in this handbook are conceived as ways to prove support for military operations, not the other way around. This is an extremely important point
since it suggests that the military options should enjoy supremacy over other nonforce based options. Is this appropriate? Should force and military intervention be
the default options for US strategy, even when other tools are available? Or should
military intervention be the fallback when other strategies fail? Given the hazards
and enormous costs of military intervention, economically but especially in terms of
human life and suffering, should we really be suggesting, either overtly or through
implication, that military intervention to curtail human rights abuses be our favored
approach? Although many non-military options, such as diplomacy and sanctions for
example, may take time to implement and come to fruition, it is equally true that
these alternatives can be quite effective and that a greater reliance on these kinds
of alternatives also demands a more proactive approach to dealing with atrocity
situations than we have often adopted. A great deal of work has been done in recent
years on developing effective tools for identifying precursors and warning signs for
genocidal atrocities and many NGO’s have become quite effective in calling attention
to developing situations in countries around the world.11 These alternatives, however, are typically not given the same weight as military solutions even though they
have the potential to prevent atrocities before violence ever breaks out. Military
intervention, on the other hand, is by definition reactive rather than proactive. The
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killing has already begun. Diplomatic, economic, informational, and other such means
dictate through necessity an earlier and more preventative approach. Additionally,
military interventions are absolutely fraught with a multitude of dangers that can
include an escalation of the conflict and the killing of civilians. The NATO intervention in Kosovo, for example, initially served to accelerate the pace at which the
Serbs were targeting and killing Kosovar Albanians. When Slobodan Milošević, the
president of Serbia, began attacking Albanian separatists in Kosovo in 1998, the
international community began applying pressure for him to cease to no avail. Tired
of the delaying tactics used by Russia and China in the United Nations Security
Council, the United States and its’ NATO allies began a bombing campaign against
Serb forces in Kosovo and in Serbia itself that, apart from its questionable legality,
initially created more refugees and internally displaced persons and increased the
intensity and scale of the killings by Serb forces.12 Clearly, this was not the intended
outcome of this military intervention and, while it was ultimately successful, it took
over two months to achieve an end to the hostilities and, as noted above, increased
the numbers of civilian victims. American political leaders and NATO officials,
anxious to prove the relevance of NATO in a post-Cold War world, had not envisioned the extent of Serbia’s resolve and its willingness to endure sustained air
attacks. In fact, the top military commander of NATO, General Wesley Clark, had
initially expected the mere threat of force to bring an end to the violence in Kosovo.13
This kind of difficulty is compounded in atrocity situations, which are notoriously
difficult and unpredictable. Atrocities tend to happen during times of other conflicts
such as civil wars or low intensity or insurgency wars. In these conflict zones, combatant groups are sometimes indistinguishable from civilian populations or groups
from both sides of a conflict engage in war crimes and atrocities. In this confusing
and dangerous context, the possibility of civilian casualties, or ‘‘ collateral damage’’
as they are sometimes euphemistically called, becomes very real and serves to
negate the gains from military intervention for humanitarian reasons. As MARO
acknowledges in the section titled ‘‘ Moral Dilemmas,’’ ‘‘ In a MARO, the difference
between doing right and wrong will be strategically crystalline and tactically elusive.
Moral dilemmas will proliferate’’ (38). Clearly, military intervention is not necessarily an easily implemented panacea and while the handbook acknowledges this in
the section titled ‘‘ Escalatory Dynamics,’’ I am not sure that the underlying implications of this reality are fully addressed.
Military interventions truly must be a tool of last resort. This particular critique
does not dispute or challenge the essential strengths of the MARO Handbook; rather
it questions the underlying assumptions implicit within its development and dissemination. My criticism is really about the frames of reference or the starting points
we use in order to understand and resolve a problem. MARO, unfortunately, replicates our over-reliance on military solutions to international human rights violations. My argument, therefore, does not truly address the validity of the specific
suggestions contained in the handbook, but instead argues that we, as a society and
as individuals and groups interested in making the world a safer place for civilians,
need to emphasize more proactive and non-military approaches to resolving conflicts
and trouble spots before they ever erupt into atrocities.
My second major critique is closely connected with the first and also concerns the
narrow focus of the handbook. Essentially, the project treats military intervention as
a purely military issue without much regard for the political or social aspects of any
intervention or, as the authors put it, their purpose is to, ‘‘ answer the ‘how,’ not the
‘whether’ ’’ (13). Yet to ignore the political dimensions of intervention, even military
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interventions, is to suggest that they occur in a vacuum. While MARO does not
completely ignore the political realities of intervention, it does appear to suggest
that they are only ancillary to the organization and philosophy of this handbook.
The political sphere should be integral in the planning and development of such
a handbook. All too often military operations have been hampered and negatively
affected by a divergence and lack of cohesion between military goals and political
ones. I wonder if it would not have ultimately been more productive to have included
political actors in the creation process of MARO in order to integrate effective
strategies designed for better coordination and communication between the military
leaders responsible for humanitarian missions and the administration and political
leadership who must contend with popular opinion, international pressure, and
various other governmental and diplomatic concerns. While it is suggested that the
MARO Handbook provides an operationalization of the R2P document, this does not
substitute for the need to develop and embed mechanisms to address the political
realities of intervention within the MARO project. Additionally, R2P addresses three
main areas of responsibility that include the prevention of atrocities, reacting to mass
atrocities, and rebuilding after mass atrocities; MARO, therefore, only addresses one
of the three main goals of R2P.
Military operations are always constrained, shaped, altered, and retasked according to the variable winds of the political situation and the more that a project such
as MARO can integrate clear guidelines and procedures for working with and within
political structures, the more effective such a project will ultimately prove. To
suggest that the political sphere is ancillary or irrelevant to the military is to ignore
certain realities. A good case in point is the American intervention in Somalia in
1992. Initially tasked with saving lives, Operation Restore Hope was created with
the intent to use American troops to create a more secure environment in which
humanitarian aid could alleviate the suffering of the Somali people by bringing in
food and other vital supplies to the starving population.14 While President Bush
overtly initiated this mission in response to humanitarian concerns, some have
suggested that it was also implemented partially to divert attention away from the
then ongoing situation in Bosnia and/or in response to being a lame-duck president
in need of a grand gesture. Regardless of the relative merits of these arguments,
there does seem to be a political role in the decision to send in troops. In response
to pressure from UN headquarters, American troops were nominally placed under
UN control. When the mission subsequently changed, with the prevalence of
American troops in combat operations and within the UN command structure in
Somalia, it was widely viewed as an American operation. The ‘‘ mission creep,’’ as
it became known, led to the poorly informed decision to capture one of Somalia’s
leading warlords with disastrous results. Importantly, the widely viewed videos of
the bodies of slain American soldiers subsequently being dragged behind vehicles in
Mogadishu led to the American public’s widespread loss of confidence in the mission,
influencing then President Clinton to order the American contingent to head home.
At every stage of the process, political realities and pressures influenced the use of
military forces and this is unlikely to ever change. Suggesting that an important
next step involves ‘‘ harmonizing interagency roles’’ (102) and involving actors from
government and NGOs does not seem particularly helpful given that the terms of
the discourse have already been established.
Lastly, MARO appears to be remarkably unilateral in its orientation. In Part III,
‘‘ Future Research Areas and Ways Forward,’’ MARO’s authors assert that ‘‘ for a
variety of reasons, the MARO Project’s efforts have been initially US-centric’’ (102).
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This is problematic since it appears that, at least at this initial stage, the handbook
perpetuates a unilateral approach to the idea of military intervention that is
extremely troubling in this day and age. Regardless of the intention, American
actions have all too often been perceived extremely negatively at home, within the
affected region or nation, and internationally. Any single nation that engages in
unilateral action, especially if it often uses military intervention as a strategy, runs
the risk of having its motives discounted or assumed. Consider the recent case of the
2003 invasion of Iraq. Even though a small coalition of forces had been mustered in
support of the action, many around the world condemned the action as American
unilateralism at its worst. While American political and military leaders presented
the action as a part of the ‘‘ war on terror’’ and as a means of overthrowing a dictator
and spreading democracy, many within the international community, within Iraq,
and even within the United States saw it more as about a mission for oil and power
than anything else. This perception certainly helped to mobilize popular opinion
against the war in Iraq, and especially the American military presence there, and
ultimately helped fuel the nationalism and religious factionalism that turned Iraq
into a mass graveyard during the insurrection. That is not to suggest that multilateral actions are easy to organize and implement. On the contrary, they are difficult, highly politicized processes that require a great deal of consensus and much
negotiation. Nevertheless, multilateral military interventions are inherently more
legitimate as they do not automatically invoke the same kinds of negative reactions
within the nation that is being invaded by troops and within the international community. In other words, the more nations that send troops to end atrocity crimes, the
harder it is to portray the intervention as illegitimate. As Martha Finnemore
reminds us, ‘‘ To be legitimate in contemporary politics, humanitarian intervention
must be multilateral.’’ 15
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The proposed handbook, MARO: Mass Atrocity Response Operations; A Military
Planning Handbook, offers many valuable suggestions about how the military can
be prepared for intervention in situations of mass atrocity against civilians. The chief
flaw of the document is that it places the military at the center and banishes the
political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and reconstructive elements of intervention to
the periphery of its focus. As a result, it sets up utopian goals for the military to
rebuild devastated societies, fails to ask crucial questions about coordination and
decision making in the political and military hierarchies, largely ignores international relations and their possible impact on intervention, creates structures that
are excessively complicated, and by emphasizing structure (formal organization) it
tends to ignore the vital element of process (the process by which decisions are
made and implemented). The authors of the report view genocide and mass atrocity
against civilians almost exclusively from the lens of the military. This approach is
severely flawed for a variety of reasons, the main ones being that genocide and
atrocity do not exist in a military vacuum and that many of the tasks that the handbook assigns to the military are beyond its competence.
The military focus is announced in the first paragraph of the report: lack of
thinking about how to use the military to intervene in the face of mass atrocities
against civilians has contributed significantly to the failure to act in the past.1 The
problem has not been simply a failure of political will, but of military doctrine and
planning with respect to humanitarian intervention. The handbook that is offered
by the MARO Project ‘‘can help shift the policy debate from ‘whether’ to ‘how’ to
intervene to stop widespread violence against civilians’’ (7). The authors’ hope is
that it can ‘‘catalyze,’’ that is act as an agent to precipitate and speed up, action
during mass atrocities (15).
Also in the opening pages, there are already some of the unasked questions that
characterize the report. Is it the case that the failure to intervene has been the
result of a lack of military doctrine, a calculation of national interest, or sheer
indifference? Is the report’s bias toward intervention shared by those in the military
who would have to face what the report itself describes as an operation characterized
by complexity, contingency, and a high potential for unanticipated consequences?
Further, would the military leaders welcome the many tasks that the report assigns
to them in the aftermath of the fighting, such as the tasks of nation-building
and economical restoration, or view these as outside of the military’s call of duty?
And crucially, no criteria are provided to determine when intervention would be
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warranted and the handbook does not offer any discussion of the various factors that
must be considered before embarking on such a path: ethical and political issues,
reactions from other countries, the probability of success, possible conflicts with
other goals, and the duration of the intervention. None of these questions are
intended as arguments against interventions, but they are questions that must
be considered.
The unasked question that runs throughout the report is that of competence. The
military is expected to gather enormous amounts of intelligence on every aspect
of a MARO situation: political, economic, social, possible international reactions to
intervention, and so forth. Do they have the competence to do so? And is it even the
case that so much information must be collected and analyzed in order for a successful intervention to stop the atrocities? There appears to be a built-in tendency in the
report to attempt to cover every possible base but to also leave important questions
unasked. The result is a complexity that obscures what is vital to the success of
the mission and the introduction of much that is irrelevant to the project at hand.
Consider in this light what the authors have to say about the economic information
that MARO planners must have:
The analysis should include key considerations with respect to agriculture, manufacturing, trade, gross domestic product, natural resources, income distribution,
poverty, unemployment, corruption, black marketing, narcotics trafficking, human
trafficking, and humanitarian assistance needs. (49)

Perhaps all of this information could be useful, and certainly information on humanitarian assistance needs is necessary, but the planners need to focus more on the
mission at hand, distinguishing between information that is essential and that which
is not. Even so, the question of who is competent to collect and analyze the information remains.
The report views the many issues of intervention mainly as an exercise in
military preparedness and execution. It recognizes, however, that the matter of
intervention is vastly complicated and that coordination with many groups must
ensue. This theme surfaces from time to time in the handbook, but it is always on
the periphery, and what is actually to be done about coordination is vague in most
instances. At the same time, there is the re-appearance of the unnecessary complexity to which this report is prone even as it pushes everyone but the military to
the sidelines.
The problem of intervention is obviously related to politics, domestic concerns,
international relations, international organizations such as the United Nations, and
NGOs (non-governmental organizations), as well as the military forces that might
carry out the intervention. With regard to the latter, it can involve one country,
several countries, or a broad array of forces; above all, it is a question of authorization, but such authorization has not generally been granted under international
law. The humanitarian gunslingers (who have not been disinterested, shall we say)
have pretty much had their way. India went into East Pakistan in 1971 without
authorization, but stopped the slaughter in what is now known as Bangladesh; the
Vietnamese invaded Cambodia and brought an end to the Khmer Rouge killing of
its own people; the United States intervened in Kosovo with NATO’s authorization
but without the support of the UN Security Council.
The authors of the report recognize the need for coordination and the many problems associated with it (and they focus on the US military and political institutions
rather than take a broad look at complicating factors, such as the fact that other
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countries exist and have interests and points of view as well). But their response is
to sponsor a structural solution and, in so doing, to increase the complexity that
stands in the way of both an understanding of the issues and action where it is
required. The kind of coordination they describe is absolutely impossible: bureaucrats from a multitude of agencies, and perhaps also those from other countries and
international organizations, would be bumping into each other. Because this particular statement about the parties that would be involved extends for about two pages,
I will only cite a portion of it, but it can speak, as it were, for itself:
Currently within the US government, the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is the primary point of contact for
interagency (‘‘whole of government’) training, assessments, plans, and associated
planning processes that pertain to MARO. S/CRS coordinates with other agencies,
particularly other offices in the Department of State, USAID, and the National Security
Council (NSC), which chairs Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs) that are responsible
for coordinating national security policy. During a crisis, the Interagency Management
System (IMS) may be activated including the formation of a Country Reconstruction
and Stabilization Group (CRSG) which is chaired by the appropriate Regional Assistant Secretary of State, the S/CRS Co-ordinator, and the appropriate NSC Senior
Director. Other IMS structures include the Integration Planning Cell (IPC), the
Advance Civilian Team (ACT), and, potentially, Field Advance Civilian Teams
(FACTs). For any government effort, joint military training, exercises, and similar
types of habitual engagement among civilian and military actors help to build
common operating assumptions and procedural familiarity. (84–85)

This line of thought continues for another page and brings in even more groups and
the need for coordination, but the point, I think, has been made. The approach of the
MARO Project is bureaucratic, structural, and impossibly complicated. It also utterly
ignores process in favor of structure. Further, there are surely divisions within
the ranks of some groups or governmental units within the many groups that are
mentioned and there may also be conflicts between the many different units and
organizations that the quotation outlines. The question is not just what structures
there are, though this is important, but about the process within and between such
organizations. It is this question that is totally ignored by the MARO report.
There are unasked questions as well as utopian expectations in the report,
despite the fact that it provides some notes of caution. The report is realistic in
recognizing that difficulties could occur on the ground during intervention, that there
could be shifting forces within the group(s) of perpetrators, and that neighboring
countries could aid and abet those engaged in the killings. It does not, however,
address how the home country would perceive mounting casualties or whether it
would even understand the reasons for the intervention. And if the duration of the
intervention—whether conducted by the United States, on which the report focuses,
or another nation—extended would support for the intervention decline significantly? If so, what impact would the loss of that support have on the existing intervention and/or on future interventions?
Having recognized the dangers of intervention, MARO’s author-group, from
Harvard and the US Army, goes on to create all kinds of utopian expectations and
make excessive demands on the US military, which would be involved in humanitarian interventions to stop the slaughter of civilians wherever they might occur. In
this 2010 report there is no mention that the United States is already involved
in two wars.
The US military is capable of conducting a military intervention to prevent mass
deaths of civilians at the hands of their own government or of other perpetrators.
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But the question that always arises is ‘‘what about the aftermath?’’; what will
happen after the killing ends? It is here that MARO becomes utopian in the extreme,
reaching not only far beyond the military’s capability to repair the scourge of
genocide, but really reaching beyond anyone’s capability to do so. The deaths, devastation of the landscape and of cultural monuments, the destruction of the economy
and of the justice system, and the need to reconstruct the society and the state to
prevent such atrocities in the future are quite complex issues.
MARO sets up very expansive goals, and just how they are to be met is unclear.
The handbook places huge burdens on the military to carry them out in ways that
the military has little experience of doing. Of course, there are also calls for working
with civilian groups; nevertheless, the initial requirement is that a transitional
military force will be the governing authority. The document discusses the many
complications that can arise at this point and the responsibilities that will be
involved in confronting them. Another issue that arises has to do with the duration of
the operation: Is this a short-term commitment or will it perhaps continue for years?
MARO demands a utopia from the American military, forgetting that Washington
is and always has been reluctant to intervene to stop genocide. The demands made
in the report indicate a misplaced allocation of responsibility onto the military and
assign untenable responsibilities to it in the aftermath of genocide. Further, the
expectations that are made of the military do not constitute the only issue present
in the report. For the scope of the present commentary, I will consider only one
example of such demands, but it is indicative of the tenor of the whole report:
Governance and Rule of Law.
Support establishment of effective institutions and laws, and the rule of law.
Identify and apprehend perpetrators.
Locate and safeguard witnesses, documents, and other evidence.
Support peaceful redress of grievances.
Monitor vulnerable groups and prevent human rights abuses; implement effective
warning mechanisms.
Protect key political and societal leaders.
Establish Transitional Military Government, if needed.
Transition authority to others, as appropriate.
Support legitimate and effective governance.
Dissuade corruption. (107)

In the end, I think that the MARO group has done a service to us all, but much of it
constitutes in warning us about the simplistic, bureaucratic, and structural thinking
that went into the report. My feeling is that, having produced the report from the
perspective of the military, they now need to re-produce it from the perspectives of
genocide scholars, foreign scholars, and even from the Washington establishment,
which, I think, will not like this report.
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Two international courts—the UN’s International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ)—have
established that genocide occurred in Srebrenica in Bosnia in 1995. Germany’s
courts have concluded that genocide occurred in both Northern and Eastern
Bosnia in 1992, and an appeal against a conviction for genocide on this basis
was dismissed by a third international court—the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR). Yet, there has been minimal international punishment of genocide
in Bosnia. Serbia was convicted by the ICJ only of a failure to prevent and punish
genocide. Only one middle-ranking individual has been convicted of a genociderelated charge by the ICTY; three others of similar or lower rank have been
convicted but are appealing the convictions. Only six individuals from Serbia or
Montenegro were ever indicted by the ICTY for war crimes in Bosnia and no
one has yet been convicted. Of the two most notorious Bosnian Serb genocide
suspects—Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić—the first has not yet been
arrested while the second was arrested only in July 2008 and has not yet been
convicted. International awareness that systematic mass murder occurred in
Bosnia and the courts’ conclusive verdict that at least some of this involved
genocide have translated into minimal punishment of the perpetrators. This paper
explores the reasons why international justice has underachieved in regards to
the mass murder in Bosnia by examining the structural weaknesses, political
pressures, and errors of judgment that have hampered the international courts.
Key words: Bosnia, Serbia, genocide, international justice, war crimes

The systematic mass murder that occurred in Bosnia in the first half of the 1990s
has perhaps entered into the international consciousness more than any other case
of systematic mass murder since the Holocaust. The Bosnian War has been described
as the most publicized war in history. Partly as a result of this, the mass murder in
Bosnia has received an unprecedented level of attention in the international courts.
In 1993, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to prosecute individual war criminals. The ICTY
has indicted over 150 political and military figures from the former Yugoslavia. So
far, the ICTY has successfully prosecuted one individual for genocide—the Bosnian
Serb officer Radislav Krstić. He was convicted on 2 August 2001, but on 19 April
2004 his conviction was reduced on appeal to the lesser charge of aiding and abetting
genocide. A second Bosnian Serb officer, Vidoje Blagojević, was convicted of genocide
on 17 January 2005 but subsequently acquitted on appeal on 9 May 2007 of all
genocide-related charges. Finally, on 10 June 2010, two more officers, Vujadin
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Popović and Ljubiša Beara, were convicted of genocide while a third, Drago Nikolić,
was convicted of aiding and abetting genocide; all three appealed their convictions on
8 September 2010, and the final outcome remains uncertain at the time of writing.
In the same year that the ICTY was established, Bosnia filed charges with the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing Serbia of genocide. The ICJ delivered
its verdict in 2007, acquitting Serbia of genocide, but nevertheless finding Serbia
guilty of failing to prevent the genocide at Srebrenica and of failing to punish genocide
by sheltering war criminals indicted by the ICTY. Also, in 1997, a German court,
the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, convicted Nikola Jorgić, a Bosnian Serb,
for committing genocide in the Northern Bosnian region of Doboj in 1992. Jorgić
challenged his conviction, and brought his case all the way to the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR), to which he appealed on the grounds that the definition
of genocide used to convict him in Germany was not in accordance with the international legal definition of the crime. The ECHR rejected his appeal and confirmed
the legality of Jorgić’s conviction, noting that ‘‘the German courts’ interpretation
has not only been supported by a number of scholars at the relevant time of
the commission of the crime’’ but that ‘‘the UN General Assembly agreed with the
wider interpretation adopted by the German courts in the present case,’’ and that
‘‘[c]onsequently, the applicant’s acts, which he committed in the course of the ethnic
cleansing in the Doboj region with intent to destroy the group of Muslims as a social
unit, could reasonably be regarded as falling within the ambit of the offence of
genocide.’’ 1
Thus, three different international courts—the ICTY, the ICJ, and the ECHR—
have reached verdicts that support the view that genocide occurred in Bosnia. There
is, however, some disagreement between the courts. The ICJ resolved that genocide
in Bosnia occurred only in the Srebrenica massacre of 1995. The judges specifically
stated that genocide did not occur at other times or places in Bosnia.2 The ECHR,
by contrast, upheld the decision of the German courts that crimes consistent with
the international legal definition of genocide did indeed occur outside of Srebrenica—
in Northern Bosnia in 1992. Another German court, the Bavarian Appeals Chamber,
concluded in the hearing on 23 May 1997 of the appeal of another Serb suspect,
Novislav Džajić, that genocide occurred also in the Foča region of East Bosnia in
1992. The ICTY prosecutors tried unsuccessfully to prosecute Bosnian Serb perpetrators for genocide in areas other than Srebrenica. Momčilo Krajišnik, a member of the
presidency of Bosnia’s Serb Republic—Republika Srpska—was the highest-ranking
Bosnian Serb official to be acquitted of genocide. But unlike in the case of the ICJ,
the judges at the ICTY did not say genocide had not occurred, but rather that it
had not been proven beyond all reasonable doubt.3 Ongoing proceedings at the
ICTY, in particular against Radovan Karadžić, may yet uphold the prosecution’s
contention that genocide occurred in Bosnia outside of Srebrenica, though this
remains to be seen. Nevertheless, despite these differences, three different international courts agree that genocide occurred in Bosnia or that crimes occurred in
Bosnia that can legitimately be defined as genocide.
The paradox is that there has been minimal punishment of this genocide, which
has essentially been limited to the punishment of a handful of low- and middleranking individual Serb perpetrators; the highest-ranking suspects thus far convicted
of genocide-related charges have been Radislav Krstić, a major-general and deputy
commander of the Drina Corps of the Army of the Serb Republic (i.e., the Bosnian
Serb army) and Ljubiša Beara, a colonel and Chief of Security of the General Staff
of the Army of the Serb Republic. Serbia was convicted of nothing worse than a
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failure to prevent and punish genocide. Bosnia’s claim for damages against Serbia
was dismissed by the ICJ. Only one individual—a lowly deputy corps commander—
has been convicted of a genocide-related charge by an international court (while
Jorgić was a still more lowly figure, a local paramilitary leader, convicted by a
national court). Two other low-ranking Serbs, Maksim Sokolović and Ðurad Kušlić,
were also convicted of genocide-related offences by German courts. The conviction of
Popović and Beara for genocide and of Nikolić for aiding and abetting genocide by
the ICTY remains to be upheld or overturned by the appeals chamber.
The War Crimes Chamber of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a hybrid tribunal in which the
national judges play the leading role and international judges a supporting role,4 has
a jurisdiction that is limited to ‘‘lower- and intermediate-rank accused,’’ but has been
readier to hand down genocide convictions; it found seven low-ranking Serbs guilty of
genocide on 29 July 2008, one of whom was subsequently acquitted on appeal. Three
other low-ranking Serbs were subsequently convicted of genocide by this court, and a
fourth has pleaded guilty to genocide before it. All these cases related to genocide
in Srebrenica. Prosecutors at the War Crimes Chamber have not been willing to
prosecute suspects for genocide outside of Srebrenica.
Only six people from Serbia or Montenegro were ever even indicted by the ICTY
for any kind of war crime in Bosnia. Most of the principal organizers of war crimes
in Croatia and Bosnia were never indicted. Of the six indicted, one was killed before
being arrested, one died during trial, and procedures against the other four are
ongoing. So at the present time, not one single official, soldier, or politician from
Serbia has yet been convicted by the ICTY for war crimes in Bosnia, let alone for
genocide. Yet it was the regime of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia and the Yugoslav
army controlled by Serbia that established the Bosnian Serb army and organized
the mass killing in Bosnia—a fact not disputed by the ICJ in its acquittal of Serbia
for genocide. Finally, up to the present day, of the two most notorious war-crimes
indictees apart from Milošević, namely the Bosnian Serb leaders Ratko Mladić and
Radovan Karadžić, the first has still not been arrested while the second was arrested
only in July 2008 and has not yet been convicted at the time of writing. So the
overwhelming international awareness that systematic mass murder took place in
Bosnia and the conclusive verdict of the courts that at least some of this involved
genocide have translated into very little in the way of convicting or punishing the
perpetrators for the crime of genocide and into relatively little in the way of convicting or punishing the most senior perpetrators even for lesser offences. This paper
aims to explore why it is that international justice has failed in the case of Bosnia.

Rejecting Conspiracy Theories
We can begin by rejecting the easy explanation that international justice failed
because the ‘‘great powers’’ wanted it to fail and the international courts are simply
the tools of great-power policy. A lot of the discourse about the war in the former
Yugoslavia has revolved around theories of Western imperialist conspiracies, and
interested parties have posited a number of these conspiracies, most of them supposedly directed against the Serbs. There was, according to various accounts, an
imperialist conspiracy to break up Yugoslavia; an imperialist conspiracy to demonize
the Serbs by exaggerating their atrocities; an imperialist conspiracy to provoke the
war between NATO and Serbia over Kosovo; and so on and so forth.5 One of
the most imaginative of these supposed conspiracies was the Jewish American conspiracy to appease the Muslim world at the expense of the Serbs to compensate for
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American support for Israel.6 On the other side, to a lesser extent, there has been
talk of imperialist conspiracies directed against the Muslims.7
All conspiracy theories should be rejected in principle because they are not
rooted in serious evidence or analysis. This does not mean that serious criticisms
should not be made of Western policy. But the most powerful critiques of this kind
are made on the basis of empirical evidence. A prime example is Brendan Simms’s
damning study of British policy toward Bosnia in the first half of the 1990s.8 One of
the fiercest critiques of the failure of international justice has been made by Florence
Hartmann, the former spokeswoman for Carla del Ponte, chief prosecutor at the
ICTY. Hartmann’s book Peace and Punishment catalogues many of the failures of
the ICTY.9 But although there are many things that are positive about Hartmann’s
book, its principal weakness is that it attempts to portray many of the staff at
the ICTY, in particular British and Americans, as motivated by the policies of
the Western, in particular British and American, governments which, according to
Hartmann, are above all concerned with trying to cover up Western complicity in
the Srebrenica massacre and Serbian crimes in general. Having myself worked at
the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY, I find the idea that most or many staff
members were motivated by their governments’ policies simply implausible. This
applies equally to accusations that the ICTY was ‘‘NATO’s court,’’ or a political
instrument of the great powers.10
The ICTY was an institution in its own right, and its actions were determined by
its relationship with other institutions and by its own internal structure. There were
different bodies and individuals within the ICTY, and there were different currents
of opinion. To imply that some of these currents simply reflected the policies of their
governments, while others did not, is not credible. This paper will adopt a different
approach, and examine the institutional, procedural and conceptual weaknesses and
mistakes which have characterised the work of the international courts with regard
to Bosnia. We shall begin with the ICTY, because the decisions of the ICTY themselves impacted upon those of the ICJ.

The ICTY’s Structural Weaknesses vis-à-vis the Outside World
The ICTY was structurally flawed in two respects: in its relationship to the outside
world and in its internal organization. It was established in 1993 on a shoestring
budget, without even the goodwill of most members of the UN Security Council other
than the United States. For example, Britain for years failed to donate any money to
the ICTY’s budget. The ICTY began as an apparently insignificant institution that
appeared destined to go after only the small fish. The first person prosecuted was
Dušan Tadić, a concentration camp guard who happened to be recognized by one of
his former victims in Germany where he was arrested. Although the two most senior
Bosnian Serb figures, the political leader Radovan Karadžić and the military leader
Ratko Mladić, were both indicted in 1995, the international forces made little or no
effort to arrest them in the years immediately following the signing of the peace
agreement.
Hartmann argues that the failure to arrest Karadžić and Mladić was deliberate, as these two could have incriminated Western politicians over the events at
Srebrenica.11 Former ICTY Deputy Chief Prosecutor Graham Blewitt confirmed
in an interview following his departure from the Tribunal in 2004 that there was
indeed a lack of Western will to arrest the two.12 The lack of will was probably
related, among other things, to an American fear of possible casualties that might
have occurred during an attempt at arrest. Following his arrest in July 2008 and
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delivery to the ICTY, Karadžić attempted to claim immunity from prosecution on the
grounds that Richard Holbrooke, the United States’s Balkan envoy who brokered
the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, had promised him such immunity on condition
that he retire from public life. The ICTY rejected Karadžić’s claim to immunity and
Holbrooke denied that any such deal had been made.13 Nevertheless, US history professor Charles Ingrao has confirmed, on the basis of US State Department sources,
that Holbrooke did indeed promise Karadžić immunity from arrest, though not from
prosecution, in return for withdrawal from politics.14 The ICTY, from the start,
therefore suffered from the fact that it had to rely on an unenthusiastic international
community to deliver the indictees to it. Furthermore, the ICTY prosecutors had no
means of collecting evidence except with the consent of the former Yugoslav states.
Both Serbia and, initially, Croatia were essentially hostile to the ICTY, and when
they were not forthcoming with the documentary evidence, the ICTY prosecutors
had to rely upon the international community to apply the necessary pressure. This,
too, was not always forthcoming or sufficient.
In the period after the fall of Milošević in 2000, Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte
made several trips to Belgrade to seek the cooperation of the new Serbian regime.
But this led her into negotiations with Serbian leaders, which arguably resulted in
the increasing politicization of the ICTY. Indeed, del Ponte’s recently published
memoirs reveal that international diplomacy—in the form of negotiations with
former-Yugoslav, Western and international officials, in which she was forced to
engage in a complex game of threatening and cajoling, demanding and conceding—
wholly dominated her work as chief prosecutor, at least as she presents it.15 This
representation of events has been upheld by Victor Peskin’s study of the international diplomacy of the ICTY and its sister tribunal, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda.16 In order to prove to her Serbian interlocutors that the ICTY
was not anti-Serb, del Ponte came under pressure to indict more non-Serbs. We do not
know if her policy on indictments was influenced by this pressure. But we do know
that of the 125 individuals indicted by the ICTY for war crimes in Bosnia, 89 of them
or 71% were Serb soldiers, politicians, or officials (including at least two non-Serbs
who held positions in Serb or Serb-controlled bodies), while 36 or 29% were Croats
and Muslims.17 Given that at least 86% of the killing of civilians during the Bosnian
war was the work of Serb forces, this amounts to a substantial overrepresentation of
non-Serbs among the indictees—non-Serbs carried out one seventh of the killing
of civilians but made up two sevenths of indictees.18 Serbia and the Bosnian Serb
Republic—Republika Srpska—were the least cooperative with the former Yugoslav
entities with regard to the ICTY and this resistance may have paid dividends, with
the ICTY prosecutors backing off.

Deficiencies in the ICTY’s Internal Organization
The National Quota
The ICTY has been caught between Serbian and Bosnian Serb obstructionism on the
one hand and inadequate support from the international community on the other.
But its failures also stem from its own internal organization. The internal organization of the ICTY’s Office of the Prosecutor is not open to the public, but as I worked
there myself, I can provide some inside information. Hartmann and del Ponte have
also provided some insights in their books, as have Blewitt and Geoffrey Nice (former
chief prosecutor in the Milošević trial) in interviews. I was working at the Office of
the Prosecutor in 2001, when the ICTY seemed to be at the height of its success. It
was in this period that Milošević arrived at the Hague. At that time, the Office of the
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Prosecutor had eleven investigative teams. Of these, seven teams were devoted to
Serb war crimes and four to non-Serb war crimes.
As noted above, at least 86% of the killing of civilians in the Bosnian war was
the work of Serb or Serb-controlled forces. There are no comparably precise figures
for civilians killed by Serb vis-à-vis non-Serb forces in the Croatian and Kosovo
wars. Total Croatian war losses between 1991 and 1995 have been most scientifically
estimated at 22,192; non-Serbs made up 15,970, or 72% of the total; of these, 45%
were civilians, while of the 6,222 Serbs killed or missing, the proportion of civilians
is unknown.19 Total Kosovo Albanian war losses have been estimated at 10,356 for
the period between March and June 1999 according to one scientific study and at
12,000 for the period between February 1998 and June 1999 according to another.20
There are no accurate figures to confirm how many of these were civilians—
something especially difficult to calculate, given that ‘‘Albanian military casualties’’
in Kosovo would refer to losses sustained by an irregular, guerrilla army. Nor are
there any accurate figures for Serb losses at the hands of the Kosovo Liberation
Army. But by any reckoning, Serb forces were responsible for well over 80% of
civilian casualties in all of the former Yugoslav wars combined.
However, at the time that I was working at the ICTY, seven out of the eleven
investigative teams (64%) at the Office of the Prosecutor were devoted to investigating Serb crimes and four (36%) to investigating Croat, Muslim, and Albanian crimes.
This means that Serb indictees were underrepresented in relation to their share of
the war crimes—less than two thirds of the investigative teams were devoted to the
side in the war that was responsible for over four fifths of total civilian fatalities.
Such an organizational structure appears to have been set up in order to guarantee
a particular distribution of indictees between the nationalities, as each investigative
team would work to achieve a certain number of ‘‘kills.’’ Indeed, the distribution of
indictments between Serbs and non-Serbs broadly corresponds to the distribution
of the investigative teams: of 159 total indictments, 108 or 68% were of Serbs (i.e.,
of soldiers, officials, and politicians of Serb or Serb-controlled bodies) and 51 or 32%
were of non-Serbs (i.e., of soldiers, officials, and politicians of Croatia, the Bosnian
government, Albanian or Macedonian bodies). The motive may have been to refute
accusations of ‘‘anti-Serb bias’’ and to convince the international public that the
prosecution was even handed.
There were some peculiarities that arose as a result. The top Yugoslav army
commanders, who commanded the Yugoslav and Serb forces against Croatia in
1991–1992, were not indicted. Only middle-ranking officers were indicted for the
single worst war crime of the Croatian war, at the Vukovar Hospital, while two other
relatively junior officers and two somewhat more senior but not top-ranking ones
were indicted over the JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) attack on Dubrovnik. By contrast, the most senior Croatian commander in the period between 1992 and 1995,
Chief of Staff Janko Bobetko, was indicted for a crime occurring when Croatia
attempted to recapture some territory in 1993 at the Medak Pocket. The top commander of the Croatian Interior Ministry forces, Mladen Markač, was indicted for
crimes carried out during Operation Storm in 1995. Overall, more senior Croatian
commanders were indicted over Operation Storm than was the case for Yugoslav
commanders indicted over the war against Croatia.
Similarly, the top Yugoslav army commanders who commanded Yugoslav and
Serb forces during the assault on Bosnia in 1992 were not indicted. Only Momčilo
Perisić, the Yugoslav Army commander from 1993 onward, after the direct Serbian
aggression had already ended, was indicted. By contrast, the two most senior
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Bosnian Army commanders during the war, Sefer Halilović and Rasim Delić, were
both indicted. So in terms of top commanders, Serbia was treated more leniently
than either Croatia or Bosnia, in regards to the war crimes committed in those
countries. This had nothing to do with lack of evidence. On the basis of the principle
of command responsibility, the prosecutors only had to prove that the top Yugoslav
commanders had formal command over the lower-ranking officers they had already
indicted—such as the Vukovar Three, for example—and they would have had a
case. The prosecutors simply chose not to make these indictments.

Overemphasis on Bosnians
There was, furthermore, an additional distortion, which was that the indictments
of both Serbs and Croats disproportionately targeted Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian
Croats. Thus, over three quarters of all Serb indictees were Bosnian Serbs, and over
three quarters of all Croat indictees were Bosnian Croats. This can be explained in a
number of ways. One possibility is that the policy of targeting Bosnians was related
to low expectations; that is, the prosecutors avoided targeting Serbs from Serbia
because they did not believe they would ever be arrested and so they felt that it
would be a waste of time. Hartmann claims that until Milošević actually arrived
at the Hague, even senior prosecutors did not believe that he ever would.21 This
appears possible to me. When I was working at the Tribunal, I remember that staff
would discuss among themselves whether Milošević or Karadžić would arrive first;
we just did not know. Indeed, when Bosnian Serb Presidency member Biljana
Plavšić, one of the most senior figures to be tried, arrived promptly at the Tribunal
after being indicted in January 2001, her arrival was something of a surprise and
the case against her had not been properly prepared. She was allowed to make a
plea bargain for a sentence of only eleven years, she was not required to testify
against others, and the genocide charge against her was dropped.
The ICTY began life as a Tribunal that targeted the little fish, and even as it
gained strength and confidence, it was not able to change its structural character
and behave like a Tribunal that targeted the big fish. Thus, the ICTY has prosecuted
numerous camp guards and middle-ranking officers, but has avoided indicting most
of the principal organizers of the war in Bosnia. A second explanation is that the
members of the Office of the Prosecutor who decided whom to indict did not include
any actual experts on the war in the former Yugoslavia. There were academic
specialists on the war, such as myself, who were working at the Tribunal, but we
were researchers, not decision makers. This is a point that Hartmann stressed to
me when we discussed this subject; the lawyers and police personnel who took the
key decisions on indictments simply may not have understood the mechanisms of
the conflict all that well.22 They may really have believed that the conflict was a civil
war for which Serbia was not directly responsible.

Failure to Pursue the ‘‘Joint Criminal Enterprise’’
We shall return later to the question of whether what happened in Bosnia outside of
Srebrenica was genocide or whether it was simply systematic mass murder. Leaving
that question temporarily aside, the evidence is nevertheless conclusive that what
happened in Bosnia was a centrally planned and directed programme of mass killings
that originated with the Milošević regime in Belgrade. All Bosnian Serb forces were
both de jure and de facto under the command of the JNA right up until 19 May
1992. The JNA was under the control of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro.
Mladić, the Bosnian Serb commander, was appointed to his position by the Yugoslav
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military command.23 The largest phase of mass killings occurred during the spring
and summer of 1992. This means that it was the regime in Belgrade that was
directly responsible for the largest phase of mass killings.
Indeed, the text of the indictment of Milošević for war crimes in Bosnia claimed
that he was part of the Joint Criminal Enterprise, the purpose of which was defined
as ‘‘the forcible and permanent removal of the majority of non-Serbs, principally
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, from large areas of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.’’ 24 The Joint Criminal Enterprise included the leaders of Serbia,
Montenegro, the Yugoslav army, the Bosnian Serbs, and the Croatian Serb rebels,
with Milošević accused of exercising effective control or substantial influence over
all of them.25 The indictment thus affirmed a central direction and an overall plan
to the programme of ethnic cleansing and mass murder. However, the prosecutors
did not follow this up. Of the seven other members of the Joint Criminal Enterprise
from Serbia and Montenegro who were mentioned in the indictment and were still
alive, only three were ever indicted and none of them has yet been convicted.

The Obsession with Milošević
This brings us to the final reason for the ICTY’s failure: the prosecutors’ obsession
with Milošević as an individual. When I was working at the Tribunal, I was attached
to the investigative team (Team 5) that was responsible for drafting the indictment
of Milošević for war crimes in Bosnia. My team originally drafted a joint indictment of several members of the Joint Criminal Enterprise, including all the other
members from Serbia and Montenegro. However, del Ponte rejected this joint indictment and insisted on indicting only Milošević. At the time, the rumor was that
for egotistical reasons she wanted to have something like a personal duel with
Milošević, as the most famous indictee, and did not want other indictees complicating the picture. Recently, Hartmann wrote to me to suggest a different reason
for Milošević being indicted alone. She argues that the prosecutors wanted rapidly to
indict him for Bosnia and for Croatia, as Milošević had just arrived at the Hague,
and the case against other senior figures from Serbia and Montenegro simply was
not ready.26
Be that as it may, the decision was a mistake. In a recent interview, Nice himself
recognized this. The decision meant that the trial came to an end when Milošević
died. Had several indictees been tried together, the trial could have continued
without him.27 Milošević, as the former president of Serbia and of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and as the genuine architect of the war, was certainly an
important figure to prosecute. Had he been convicted and sentenced, justice might
arguably have been at least partially satisfied. But this overemphasis on the internationally infamous figure of Milošević proved counterproductive when he died
before being convicted.
Even if he had survived, the prosecution’s excessive focus on Milošević created
enormous problems for its case. From November 2001, the prosecution sought and
eventually achieved the merging of Milošević’s separate indictments for war crimes
in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo into what Gideon Boas has described as ‘‘one gargantuan indictment,’’ motivated by del Ponte’s expressed belief that such a joinder
‘‘would finally make it possible to know the truth as to the real responsibilities of
the accused Milošević.’’ 28 Yet as Boas had shown, the prosecution’s attempt to have
Milošević tried for a very large number of charges over a very wide crime base not
only made its case quantitatively difficult to manage, but resulted in confusion at
the conceptual level that undermined its effort.29
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Deficiencies in the ICJ
Restricted Definition of Genocide
The ICJ was much older than the ICTY and it is a permanent, not an ad hoc, body.
Nevertheless, part of the reason why Bosnia lost its case against Serbia has its
roots in the political origins of the 1948 UN Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Rafael Lemkin, the man who coined the term
‘‘genocide’’ and who was responsible for its insertion into international law, had
originally favored a broader definition of genocide to the one that was ultimately
adopted. According to the Convention:
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.30
As Mark Levene has written, Lemkin wanted to include forced exile and population
displacement—i.e., ethnic cleansing—and the deliberate destruction of a cultural
heritage in the list of genocidal acts, but these were vetoed by some of the UN
member states that were involved in the drafting process.31 Since Bosnia proved
that both ethnic cleansing and systematic cultural destruction had occurred in its
case against Serbia, there is no doubt that had Lemkin’s original, broader definition
of genocide been adopted, Bosnia would have won its case.

The Censoring of the Supreme Defence Council Minutes
A second political factor that negatively influenced Bosnia’s chances was the result of
decisions taken by the judges at both the ICTY and the ICJ. Serbia was required to
submit to the ICTY judges in the Milošević case the minutes of the Supreme Defence
Council of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—the body made up of the presidents
of Serbia, Montenegro, and Yugoslavia (i.e., of Milošević and two of his allies). This
body initially had command over all Bosnian Serb forces, up until 19 May 1992, and
subsequently remained in command of the Yugoslav Army up to and after the time
of the Srebrenica massacre, during which time it collaborated with the Bosnian Serb
forces. The judges at the ICTY, however, allowed Serbia to withhold certain passages
from this set of documents in the version seen by the public and by the ICJ.32 Bosnia
could not, therefore, use these crucial documents for its case against Serbia. Bosnia
requested the ICJ to subpoena Serbia to hand over the uncensored minutes of the
Supreme Defence Council, but the judges refused, claiming that there was already
sufficient evidence in the public domain. Serbia’s unwillingness to allow the uncensored
minutes of the Supreme Defence Council to be made public arose precisely out of its
fear that they would prejudice its case at the ICJ. Phon van den Biesen, a member of
the Bosnian team, has gone on record to say that the full documents would probably
have demonstrated that the Bosnian Serb forces were under Serbia’s control during
the Srebrenica massacre.33
Bosnia’s case against Serbia was a civil case, meaning that if Bosnia had won,
Serbia would have been liable to pay damages to Bosnia. Nevertheless, Bosnia was
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required to prove genocide beyond all reasonable doubt, without having any means of
obtaining confidential documents—no subpoena and no police force. So, on the one
hand, the ICJ expected the Bosnian legal team to prove beyond all reasonable doubt
that Serbia was guilty, as if this were a criminal case, but on the other hand, it
refused to make Serbia hand over key items of evidence and forced Bosnia to rely
on the evidence it had available to it—a policy that would be more appropriate to a
civil case.34

Genocidal Intent
The ICJ judges nevertheless accepted that Serb forces in 1992 were guilty of systematic massive killings and massive mistreatment of the Bosnian Muslims that
bore all the characteristics of genocide, except that genocidal intent had not been
proven. A pattern of killing across Bosnia was shown but was not considered proof
of genocide; ethnic cleansing and cultural destruction were likewise not considered
proof of genocide. Still, the Bosnian legal team succeeded in proving to the judges’
satisfaction that genocide had occurred at Srebrenica in 1995.35 And this peculiarity,
that genocide was proven to have occurred in one place and at one time in Bosnia
but not in any other place or at any other time, raises to some interesting paradoxes.
The Bosnian Serb armed forces were created by the regime in Belgrade and
remained under its formal control up until 19 May 1992. Bosnian Serb commander
Mladić was handpicked by Belgrade for the post. Bosnian Serb forces under Belgrade’s
control were found guilty of systematic mass killings and mistreatment of Bosnian
Muslims across Bosnia, but these systematic mass killings nevertheless fell short of
genocide in the eyes of the judges. However, after this Bosnian Serb commander and
these Bosnian Serb armed forces had become formally independent of Belgrade, they
went on to commit genocide at Srebrenica. It is important to recall, at this point,
the principle of command responsibility. Since Radislav Krstić was successfully
convicted of aiding and abetting genocide, Mladić, as his commanding officer, could
straightforwardly have been prosecuted for the same crime—unless he could show
that he had taken steps to prevent what Krstić was doing or to punish him afterwards, which he evidently did not. Furthermore, Mladić’s direction of the events at
Srebrenica was very public and prominent.36 So according to the ICJ’s reasoning,
Mladić acquired a genocidal intent at some point after he gained his independence
from Belgrade. His forces continued to be armed and supplied from Belgrade, his
officers’ salaries continued to be paid by Belgrade, and the regular Yugoslav Army
continued to provide his forces with logistical support. But, according to the ICJ, by
the time of Srebrenica there was apparently a split between Belgrade, which aimed
to carry out the systematic massive killings, torture, rape, and ethnic cleansing of
Muslims but without genocidal intent, and Mladić’s Bosnian Serbs, who aimed to
massacre the Muslims of Srebrenica, with genocidal intent.
The ICJ’s conviction of Serbia for failing to prevent genocide rested on its
argument that Belgrade should have been aware of the risk that Mladić would not
simply carry out massive killings, torture, and ethnic cleansing at Srebrenica, but
that he had acquired a genocidal intent. The ICJ did not say that Belgrade should
have been aware of this newly acquired genocidal intent on the basis of any documentary evidence or any past behavior. The ICJ said that Belgrade should have
been aware of the risk of genocide purely on the basis of the supposed degree of
popular hatred on the part of local Serbs toward local Muslims in the region around
Srebrenica and on the indications given by Mladić and by international observers
that some sort of massacre was going to happen. The judges ruled:
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The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia leadership, and President Milošević above all,
were fully aware of the climate of deep-seated hatred which reigned between the
Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims in the Srebrenica region. As the Court has noted in
paragraph 423 above, it has not been shown that the decision to eliminate physically
the whole of the adult male population of the Muslim community of Srebrenica was
brought to the attention of the Belgrade authorities. Nevertheless, given all the international concern about what looked likely to happen at Srebrenica, given Milošević’s
own observations to Mladić, which made it clear that the dangers were known and
that these dangers seemed to be of an order that could suggest intent to commit
genocide, unless brought under control, it must have been clear that there was a
serious risk of genocide at Srebrenica. Yet the Respondent has not shown that it
took any initiative to prevent what happened, or any action on its part to avert the
atrocities which were committed.37

So the judges are saying that it was the hatred that was the root cause of the
genocide, and that Belgrade should have been aware of the hatred and of the risk
that it might cause genocide at Srebrenica.
This is plainly nonsensical. Even if one were to accept the highly dubious proposition that it was the local Serb hatred of Muslims that gave rise to a genocidal
intent, there is absolutely no way of showing that Serbs at Srebrenica hated Muslims
more than Bosnian Serbs elsewhere hated Muslims. In other parts of Bosnia, there
were mass killings, incredible acts of cruelty and torture, and the mass rape and
humiliation of women. There is no reason why such things should be evidence of
a lesser degree of hatred than that shown by the Serbs of Srebrenica. If anything,
the Srebrenica massacre indicates more cold-bloodedness than some other Bosnian
Serb war crimes. Furthermore, the systematic massacre of 8,000 people does not
occur spontaneously, but requires a lot of planning and logistical support. It is
difficult to see how Mladić, who presided over this process and who was not even
from Srebrenica, could have imbibed enough of this local hatred to have been moved
to organize such a massacre. And it is doubly difficult to see how Belgrade could
have been aware that Mladić’s Bosnian Serbs hated the Srebrenica Muslims more
than they hated the Muslims they had murdered, tortured, and raped in other parts
of Bosnia. This indicates that the ICJ’s decision to acquit Serbia of genocide and
other genocide-related charges but to find it guilty of failing to prevent genocide at
Srebrenica is a form of practical compromise rather than a decision based on strict
legal principles.

Great Serbia as Alibi
There follows the question of precisely what was the intention of Serbia’s leadership
when it presided over the mass killings in 1992, if it was not genocide. According to
the judges:
The Applicant’s [i.e. Bosnia’s] argument does not come to terms with the fact that an
essential motive of much of the Bosnian Serb leadership—to create a larger Serb
State, by a war of conquest if necessary—did not necessarily require the destruction
of the Bosnian Muslims and other communities, but their expulsion.38

This appears to be a case of honing the definition of genocide down so far that it
disappears altogether. The same logic could be used to argue that even the Nazi
Holocaust, or at least large parts of it, was not genocide. The equivalent would be,
. . . an essential motive of much of the Nazi leadership—to create a larger German
State, by a war of conquest if necessary—did not necessarily require the destruction
of the Jews and other communities, but their expulsion.
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Indeed, the Nazis initially tried to solve the Jewish problem, as they saw it, through
forced emigration. The emigration of Jews from the Reich was not banned until
October 1941, by which time the mass execution of Jewish men, women, and
children was already well underway. The ICJ’s logic would seem to imply that
the Jews murdered by the Nazis, at least up until October 1941, were not genocide
victims.
By acquitting Serbia of genocide on the grounds that its motive was merely to
create an ethnically pure, enlarged state through mass killings and ethnic cleansing,
the ICJ has made mass killings and ethnic cleansing into an alibi for those committing genocide. Indeed, by arguing that genocide ceases to be genocide when the
killers have additional or higher motives for their killings, such as creating a larger
state, the ICJ judges have opened up whole new vistas for the acquittal of states and
individuals accused of genocide. If the creation of a larger state through killings and
expulsions is not genocide, because the goal is the larger state rather than the killing
as an end in itself, what then is genocide? Was the Nazi mass murder of Jewish
hostages in reprisal for guerrilla actions in occupied Eastern Europe genocide?
Was the working to death of Jewish slave laborers to produce armaments for the
Wehrmacht genocide? Or the killing of Jews in Dr. Mengele’s scientific experiments?
After all, in all of these cases, the killings were for the purpose of goals that could
technically have been achieved without them. If you want to be sufficiently pedantic,
then you can make genocide disappear altogether. And this is effectively what the
ICJ judges did.
Indeed, some of the judges themselves did not accept the acquittal. Two of
the fifteen judges, including the ICJ’s vice president, felt that Serbia was guilty of
genocide. Four of the fifteen judges felt that Serbia was guilty of the lesser charge
of complicity in genocide. In the words of Vice President al-Khasawneh:
The Court further notes that the motive of creating a Greater Serbia ‘‘did not
necessarily require the destruction of the Bosnian Muslims and other communities,
but their expulsion.’’ The Court essentially ignores the facts and substitutes its own
assessment of how the Bosnian Serbs could have hypothetically best achieved their
macabre Strategic Goals. . . . Coupled with population transfers, what other inference
is there to draw from the overwhelming evidence of massive killings systematically
targeting the Bosnian Muslims than genocidal intent? If the only objective was to
move the Muslim population, and the Court is willing to assume that the Bosnian
Serbs did only that which is strictly necessary in order to achieve this objective, then
what to make of the mass murder? If the Court cannot ignore that population transfer
was one way of achieving the Strategic Goals, then why should it ignore that, in fact,
the Bosnian Serbs used this method as one of many—including massive killings of
members of the protected group.39

Summing up, al-Khasawneh said,
The Court has absolved Serbia from responsibility for genocide in Bosnia and
Herzegovina—save for responsibility for failure to prevent genocide in Srebrenica. It
achieved this extraordinary result in the face of vast and compelling evidence to the
contrary.40

I am not going to speculate on the motives of the judges. But it does appear that
to acquit Serbia of genocide, while finding the Bosnian Serbs guilty of genocide
at Srebrenica, is more in the nature of a compromise than a genuinely principled
verdict.
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This may reflect a structural flaw in the ICJ as an instrument of justice. If the
judges that make up the panel in a particular case come from different nations,
then there may be pressure on them to uphold their particular national viewpoint
when they deal with a case. So a verdict will reflect, to some extent, a compromise
between different national viewpoints rather than a genuinely objective legal decision. Thus, for example, in each of the nine decisions of the ICJ panel of judges
in the case of Bosnia vs. Serbia, the ad hoc judges appointed by Bosnia and Serbia
each voted in favor of their respective states in every instance, while the judge from
Serbia’s ally Russia voted in Serbia’s favor seven times out of the nine.41 Five out of
the fifteen judges believed that the ICJ did not even have any jurisdiction to try
Serbia for genocide in the first place, an issue which makes the final verdict seem
even more like a compromise representing the middle ground.42

Do the People of the Former Yugoslavia Feel that Justice
Has Been Served?
For these reasons and others, there is a widespread perception among many experts
and commentators on the former Yugoslavia and the international courts that justice
has not been served. The next question is how the working of the international
courts is perceived among the former Yugoslav peoples. The work of the ICTY has
been justified by its supporters as a necessary part of the process of reconciliation
among the nations of the former Yugoslavia. The argument is that it is necessary to
show that particular individuals are responsible for the war crimes, and to punish
them legally and publicly, in order to absolve the nations as a whole of blame. There
is, however, no evidence that this strategy has produced the desired effect. According to a recent study conducted by an international team of scholars led by Vojin
Dimitrijević and Julie Mertus, ‘‘The hope that it [the ICTY] might promote reconciliation between the peoples of the region does not appear to have been realised.’’ 43
The scholars reached this verdict on the basis of an extensive study of opinion polls
carried out in the former Yugoslavia.
This conclusion appears valid. The reasons why ordinary people in Serbia,
Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo tend to feel that justice has not been done are, on the
one hand, a tendency to see the indictment of their own war criminals as evidence
of bias against their own nations and, on the other hand, a disappointment in the
failure of the Tribunal to indict or convict certain notorious individuals. Such a sense
of injustice is, of course, encouraged by nationalists among the former Yugoslavs and
often by the governments themselves. Thus, for example, the indictment of prominent Croats and Serbs by the Tribunal has widely been presented as evidence
of anti-Croat or anti-Serb bias. Conversely, the sense of hostile bias has been
strengthened by prominent acquittals. Among Serbs, the effective acquittal of the
Bosnian Army commander in Srebrenica, Naser Orić, for crimes carried out against
Serb civilians at Bratunac is frequently cited as evidence of the Tribunal’s anti-Serb
bias.44 Among Croats, the acquittal of one member of the Vukovar Three and the
initial sentencing of a second member to only a short prison term are likewise widely
viewed as evidence of anti-Croat bias, and have even provoked a complaint from
the Croatian parliament itself.45 Finally, Muslims are widely dissatisfied by the failure
to arrest Mladić. Their sense of injustice, of course, increased by the ICJ’s acquittal
of Serbia for genocide. But the ICJ’s affirmation that genocide occurred at Srebrenica
was immediately rejected by Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, who
claimed that the Srebrenica massacre ‘‘was not a genocide, although it was a terrible
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crime.’’ 46 In Serbia, the ICJ’s ruling is widely viewed as a vindication of Serbia’s role
in the war. The fact that the ICJ presented Serbia as guilty of systematic massive
killings of Bosnian Muslims has generally been overlooked.
This failure of the international courts to achieve general acceptance and
legitimacy in the eyes of the former Yugoslav peoples is not entirely their fault. As
far as the ICTY is concerned, for it to have overcome all accusations of bias it would
have had to operate on a much larger scale, to have indicted and sentenced much
larger numbers of war criminals, and to have countered the bad impression created
by the failure to indict certain notorious individuals and by the failure to convict
some of those who were indicted. More importantly, however, the actions of the
international courts, and particularly of the ICTY, were unlikely to promote reconciliation given the low level of public consciousness among different parties about
their own sides’ responsibility for the bloodshed and the unwillingness of the governments to raise this consciousness, by making, for example, public statements of
responsibility or campaigns in the media. For example, because of the widespread
belief in Serbia that Serbs were the least guilty for the war and that the international community is biased against them, and with nationalist politicians such as
former Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica unwilling to challenge this perception,
any indictment or conviction of Serbs for war crimes is readily perceived as evidence
of this alleged anti-Serb bias. The irony is that, as shown here, Serbia and Serb war
criminals have been treated extremely leniently. Yet the ICTY is nevertheless widely
perceived as anti-Serb by the Serbian public.

Liberating Bosnia of War Criminals
There are some partial qualifications that can be made to this largely negative
evaluation of the record of the international courts. Firstly, the ICTY has at least
succeeded in ridding Bosnia of some of the worst war criminals, who might otherwise
have seriously obstructed the reform and reconstruction of the country that has
occurred since Dayton. In this respect, it does not matter so much that Mladić has
not been arrested or that Karadžić evaded arrest for thirteen years because they
were at least driven underground and removed from the political scene. Among the
Bosnian Croats, for example, Mladen Naletilić and Ivica Rajić have been convicted
and sentenced. Had this not occurred, these two former warlords would in all likelihood have become criminal chiefs in post-war Bosnia, and would have terrorized
local Muslims and moderate Croat politicians and corrupted or intimidated state
officials. The fact that a vastly disproportionate number of Bosnian Serbs and
Bosnian Croats have been indicted—as opposed to Serbs from Serbia and Croats
from Croatia—has worked to the advantage of democracy and reform in Bosnia.
Even simply removing those with blood on their hands from power counts for
something. Nevertheless, if today’s Bosnian political leaders are less murderous
and overtly criminal, this does not mean that they are less nationalistic or more
favorable to the spirit of reconciliation. The repeated threats by the current Bosnian
Serb president and former prime minister, Milorad Dodik, to secede from Bosnia; his
attendance at the nationalist anti-Western rally in Belgrade on 21 February 2008;
his extension of a warm welcome to Bosnian Serb convicted war criminal Biljana
Plavšić following her early release from prison in October 2009; and his claim that
the Srebrenica massacre was not genocide and involved only 3,500 Muslim victims47
are evidence of this.
The second partial achievement of the ICTY is that forced the more moderate
elements in Serbian and Croatian politics to confront the hard-line nationalists
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and to challenge the nationalist taboos. This has undoubtedly catalyzed the development of a more healthy pluralism and post-nationalist governing ethos in Croatia,
although less so in Serbia. Overall, therefore, the international courts have made
a positive contribution to regional progress. But if one ignores pragmatic political
factors and evaluates the international courts simply by the extent to which they
have delivered justice, then they must be judged to have greatly underachieved.
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The article by Marko Attila Hoare, ‘‘A Case Study in Underachievement: The International Courts and Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina,’’ GSP 6, 1 (April 2011): 81–97,
was published with the following errors:
On p. 81, for ‘‘Only one middle-ranking individual has been convicted of a genociderelated charge by the ICTY’’ read ‘‘Only one middle-ranking individual has been
definitely convicted of a genocide-related charge by the ICTY’’; for ‘‘So far, the ICTY
has successfully prosecuted one individual for genocide’’ read ‘‘’So far, the ICTY has
definitely successfully prosecuted one individual for genocide’’.
On p. 83, for ‘‘Only one individual—a lowly deputy corps commander—has been
convicted of a genocide-related charge by an international court’’ read ‘‘Only one
individual—a lowly deputy corps commander—has definitely been convicted of a
genocide-related charge by a fully international court’’.
On p. 93, for ‘‘Among Croats, the acquittal of one member of the Vukovar Three and
the initial sentencing of a second member to only a short prison term are likewise
widely viewed as evidence of anti-Croat bias, and have even provoked a complaint
from the Croatian parliament itself ’’ read ‘‘Among Croats, the acquittal of one
member of the Vukovar Three and the initial sentencing of a second member to
only a short prison term were likewise widely viewed as evidence of anti-Croat bias,
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Introduction
In September 1922, after more than three years of war in Asia Minor, the Greek
army was defeated by the Nationalist Turkish powers led by Mustafa Kemal. The
atrocities from the part of the Turkish armed forces against the Christian populations of Asia Minor that followed the retreat of the Greek Army resulted in the death
of hundreds of thousands of people1 as well as the destruction of much Christian
property. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of Greeks from Asia Minor, Pontus, and
Eastern Thrace were forced to leave their birthplaces and fled to Greece to find a
safe shelter in order to protect themselves from the advancing Nationalist army of
Mustafa Kemal.2
This article focuses on the various initiatives undertaken by the United States
government and American charitable organizations, mainly the American Red Cross
and Near East Relief, in order to relieve the victims of the Asia Minor Disaster. In
this context, it will be underlined that the United States showed the most tangible
interest in that direction and that the American assistance during the first year after
the Disaster helped save the lives of literally thousands of refugees. This of course is
not a detailed account of the splendid help given by American institutions to Greek
refugees from September 1922 until the summer of the following year; it can be seen
however as a first frame that gives an overall impression of the subject which is yet
to be further and more deeply investigated.
Antonis Klapsis, ‘‘American Initiatives for the Relief of Greek Refugees, 1922–1923,’’ Genocide
Studies and Prevention 6, 1 (April 2011): 98–106. 6 2011 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
doi:10.3138/gsp.6.1.98
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The Refugee Problem and Early American Initiatives to Confront It
The massive exodus of the Greek population created a huge refugee problem with
which Greece was unable to deal all by itself. More than a million people poured
into Greece,3 most of whom had no practical means of sustenance while at the same
time they faced several fatal epidemics. The problem became even worse as a result of
the fact that, since much of the able-bodied male Greek population of Anatolia
between the productive ages of 18 and 45 were killed or taken prisoners, the refugees
from Asia Minor and Pontus consisted principally of women, children, and old men,4
which meant that many refugee families lacked their natural protectors and were in
even greater difficulty to make a living on their own. The urgent need to relieve the
refugees, which indeed exceeded the capability of the Greek government, meant that
the contribution of the international community was absolutely essential. Thus, in
October 1922, the former Prime Minister and a leading political figure of Greece,
Eleftherios Venizelos, made a public appeal, asking for the active assistance of
the whole world; however, given the fact Europe was recovering from World War I,
Venizelos pointed out that any substantial assistance would have to come from the
United States.5
Venizelos’s appeal to the United States was based on the fact that the American
authorities had already—from the first days of September 1922—shown tangible
interest in the tragic fate of the Greek refugees from Anatolia. As early as September
6 the Unites States High Commissioner at Constantinople, Admiral Mark Lambert
Bristol, in close collaboration with representatives of American relief and benevolent
institutions in Constantinople, had organized a disaster relief committee for Smyrna,6
the biggest city on the west coast of Asia Minor where thousands of refugees from
the Anatolian interior had already poured. At the same time, the American Red
Cross and the Near East Relief, the most prominent American charitable institutions
operating in the region, had, as a first practical measure, made available $25,000 for
the assistance of refugees.7
As the situation worsened from day to day, on September 8 the Greek government made an urgent appeal to the American Chargé d’Affaires at Athens, Jefferson
Caffery, asking for the immediate assistance of the US government to help save the
hundreds of thousands of refugees that were assembled in Asia Minor ports. Greece
appeared willing to receive these refugees, but as Greek vessels were employed in
evacuating the retreating Greek troops from Asia Minor, there were no available
means to bring the refugees to Greece. As a result, Athens asked Washington to
provide ships for the safe transportation of the refugees as well as food and tents
for their relief when they would arrive in Greece.8 The fact that on September 9 the
Turkish Army took control of Smyrna meant that the issue had to be solved without
any further delay.9
The problem of food shortage had been immediately understood by the members
of the representatives of US humanitarian organizations, such as the American Red
Cross and the Near East Relief, which were engaged with the relief of refugees at
Smyrna. In fact, the institutions of this kind were in practice the only institutions
working on the spot for the relief of refugees.10 In this context, Admiral Bristol was
pointing out ‘‘ the extreme gravity of the condition of refugees at Smyrna and elsewhere,’’ about 300,000 of whom were entirely destitute—there was practically no
hope that they would be able to return to their homes as their personal safety could
not be secured; moreover, the situation was predicted to become even worse owing to
the approach of winter.11
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The gravity of the problem made the representatives of the American Red Cross
and the Near East Relief hesitant as to whether private charity alone would be
adequate for the relief of the hundreds of thousands of Greek refugees. According to
these two organizations, all money available would be used up within two or three
weeks and the situation would still be as pressing at the end of that time ‘‘ unless
this breathing spell were used to put into action some comprehensive scheme to
reduce and ultimately solve the problem.’’ Thus, the American Red Cross and the
Near East Relief pointed out that government action by the Western Allies was
absolutely essential.12 Admiral Bristol was also entirely in accord with the view
that private charity alone was quite unequal to the situation. Moreover, he suggested that American relief activities should be restricted to Anatolia in giving aid
to refugees who were awaiting evacuation, and that ‘‘ the task of evacuating these
refugees and providing for them at their ultimate destinations should be urged
upon Greek and Allied Governments’’.13
However, as the rest of the Allied governments (namely those of Great Britain,
France, and Italy) were reluctant to take any practical measure for the assistance of
the refugees, the US government decided to act by itself. By September 20 neither
the Italian nor the British High Commissioners at Constantinople had received any
instructions from their respective governments and as a result no action for the
assistance of the refugees had been taken.14 According to press reports, the only
relief work being carried out in Smyrna was conducted by the American Red Cross,
the Near East Relief, and United States Navy Destroyers in the region and the
only foreign forces ashore were American sailors.15 Furthermore, Admiral Bristol
instructed the dispatch of yet another destroyer at Smyrna to assist with the evacuation of the refugees whose lives were in great danger:
Without waiting for the allies to act and in view of the unexpected evacuation of
refugees to the interior from Smyrna, we will take all possible steps to meet the
present emergency and the latter facts induced me to give orders to use the limited
number of destroyers I have available to assist in the evacuation.16

The situation for the refugees continued to deteriorate rapidly. Those who were
still trying to find a means to leave Asia Minor and find shelter in Greece were facing
the immediate danger of dying either because of the massacres by the Kemalist forces
or because of hunger and diseases. Things were not much better for the refugees who
had managed to escape the slaughter as they were almost equally exposed to the
danger of hunger and diseases. Caffery from Athens reported that the Greek government was in fact unable to undertake the extremely difficult task of housing and
feeding the refugees. As money and food were badly needed, Caffery recommended
that American relief organizations should urgently send assistance to Greece.17
Caffery’s appeal was in accordance with the initiatives of his government. In a
telegram sent on September 21 to Admiral Bristol, the Under Secretary of State,
William Phillips, described in detail the steps which had been taken by the United
States to prepare for extended relief work. Among these were the following: President Warren G. Harding had asked Congress to appropriate $200,000 for the relief
and possible repatriation of destitute American citizens living in Asia Minor; in
addition to the $25,000 already advanced, the American Red Cross had informally
indicated willingness to make a further advance for a possible total of $100,000;
the Near East Relief had addressed a general appeal throughout the United States
for an emergency fund and in addition to funds resulting from this appeal it was
estimated that it would be able to make advances for a possible total of $200,000;
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finally, the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) had advanced $10,000 and
there was a possibility of further advances.18
For his part, Admiral Bristol suggested that the only practical means that the
Greek government could use to undertake the enormous task of refugee relief was
by immediately demobilizing the Greek army. This would mean that the Greek
government could handle all the relief work in Greece and that American relief
organizations would not be drawn into operations in Greece that would involve large
expenditures of money and more or less permanent activities. In the meantime,
Admiral Bristol, in close coordination with members of various American charitable
organizations, had taken certain measures to facilitate the safe evacuation and relief
of refugees in Smyrna, Moudania, Bursa, and Rodosto.19
The gravity and the urgency of the situation were so overwhelming that the need
for immediate action was essential. Thus, despite the fact that the US government
agreed with Admiral Bristol that the responsibility for the evacuation and the relief
of Greek refugees rested primarily with Greece and the Allied governments, the
Greek Red Cross had already made a direct appeal for help to the American Red
Cross and the Near East Relief was contemplating a possible extension of its work
to Greece.20 At the same time, the Disaster Relief Committee in Smyrna, which in
fact represented all of the American relief organizations in the wider region, was
issuing no less than 20,000 rations of food per day in Smyrna, US destroyers were
helping with the evacuation of Greeks from the city, and flour was sent to various
places (such as Smyrna, Rodosto, and Mytilene) where many refugees were located.
Moreover, contributions from different associations collected by the Disaster Relief
Committee amounted to $85,000.21

Private Charity in Action
By the end of September 1922, through the instrumentality of various American
relief associations, funds and supplies summing approximately $300,000 had been
made available for the relief of Greek refugees. Meanwhile, American emergency
relief units continued to work on the ground, mainly in places where huge numbers
of refugees had poured in on their way to Greece, such as Smyrna, Moudania, Bursa,
and Rodosto, and US war vessels continued to help in the difficult task of the evacuation of refugees.22 Nevertheless, no matter how great American help was, there were
still many things to be done so that the lives of hundreds of thousands of refugees
could be saved. Thus, in his statement issued on 9 October 1922 regarding relief
work in the Near East, President Harding announced that due to an emergency
appeal the American Red Cross and the Near East Relief would jointly continue
their relief efforts and that a special fund under the name Near East Emergency
Fund would be created and collect donations from every part of the United States.23
The American Red Cross was to be in charge of the operations in Greece while the
Near East Relief would concentrate its activities in Turkey where thousands of
Greeks, among whom there were many orphans, were still trying to find a safe way
to Greece.
In fact, the American Red Cross was immediately prepared to send a mission
to Athens to assist in the administration of relief measures to the numerous Greek
refugees, provided that (1) this mission would be approved by the Greek authorities
and (2) these authorities would be prepared to offer full protection for personnel and
provide storage and transportation facilities for the necessary supplies.24 This was
an offer that Athens could not refuse. Thus, the Greek government was delighted
to express its deep gratitude to the American Red Cross for its generous offer and
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promised to provide all the desired facilities25 to help with the relief work. In
fact, the situation in Greece was so critical and the means available to the Greek
authorities for the relief of refugees were so insufficient that, when the first representatives of the American Red Cross arrived in Athens, the Greek government was
actually considering handing over to the American Red Cross the entire charge of
the Ministry of Public Assistance.26 Of course, the American Red Cross was in no
position to undertake such a responsibility; however, the help provided by this as
well as other American charitable organizations was so significant that in January
1923 the newly crowned King of the Greeks George II expressed his personal thanks
to President Harding for America’s generous assistance.27
Indeed, the Relief Commission of the American Red Cross established in Greece
since October 1922 did marvelous work as far as the relief of Greek refugees was
concerned. The degree of its contribution is evident in the fact that in March 1923
more than 533,000 refugees received food supplies daily and about 291,000 had been
inoculated against diseases such as typhus and cholera by agents of the American Red
Cross,28 not to mention the clothes and other necessary supplies that were distributed
among refugees. However, it was evident that the American charitable organizations,
mainly the American Red Cross, could not carry out the extremely difficult task of
relieving the hundreds of thousands of Greek refugees who had found shelter on
Greek soil for much longer. As a result, in late January 1923 the American Red
Cross Commissioner for Greece, Colonel William N. Haskell, suggested that the
American Red Cross should cease its operations in June of the same year and make
an early announcement of its intention so that plenty of time would be given ‘‘ to the
Greek government and all others concerned to make their arrangements properly.’’ 29
In accordance with Colonel Haskell’s suggestions, the American Red Cross
decided to terminate its emergency work in Greece by 30 June 1923. This decision
was taken not only because it was difficult to find further resources, but also on the
ground that the solution of the refugee problem in Greece could not lie in measures
of temporary relief alone but rather in measures of a permanent character that
would enable the refugees to be absorbed as promptly as possible into the normal
economic life of Greece. In other words, it would be advisable for the refugees not to
depend for much longer on charity but rather to become self-sufficient. For the same
reasons, the Near East Relief had also decided to terminate its emergency relief for
adult refugees and concentrate its efforts mainly on orphans and children in need.30
The Greek government wished to persuade the American Red Cross to continue
its relief operations after 30 June 1923. In fact, in late May 1923 the Greek government made a formal request of the kind to the American Red Cross, stating that
Greece would not be able to undertake the care of refugees until six months after
the signature of the peace treaty with Turkey which, at the time of the submission
of the request, had not yet been concluded.31 The American Red Cross, however,
was not willing to change its decision and the Vice President of the Central Committee in Charge of International Relations of the American Red Cross, Ernest P.
Bichnell, explained why:
I feel that it is important to make it necessary that Greece shall be made to feel her
full responsibility in the circumstances. Our withdrawal should have a tendency to
compel the breaking up of the concentration camps and a wider distribution of the
refugees throughout the country. Without the breaking up no progress can be made
toward the absorption of the refugees into the normal population or their establishment on self support. Possibly, too, the pressure of the full burden of responsibility
for the refugees will have a wholesome effect on governmental policies.32
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In this context, the US government had already asked the governments of Great
Britain, France, and Italy to provide substantial help to Greece so that the latter
could cope with the relief of refugees.33 This American initiative was additional proof
that the American officials were justly convinced that the solution of the refugee
problem did not lie in measures of temporary relief, but in measures of a more
permanent character.
As it had in good time been announced, the American Red Cross officially terminated its relief work in Greece on 30 June 1923. Four days earlier the Municipality
of Athens had organized an official ceremony in which King George II, the Greek
Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, and other officials thanked the members
of the American Red Cross for their invaluable help.34 Moreover, by mid-August of
the same year the Near East Relief ended its relief work for adults35 and continued
its actions only for orphans and children in need. However, before closing its operations, the American Red Cross had distributed rations of food to the refugees that
would be sufficient for one month or, in some cases, even for two months, while a
small amount of clothing and child-feeding supplies were left to be distributed by
the local Greek authorities. As a result, even as it withdrew from Greece, the
American Red Cross provided relief for at least one month longer.36 Moreover, with
the American stocks left over and given the excellent crop prospects, American
officials estimated that the Greek authorities could meet the needs of refugees until
November 1923.37

Conclusion
It is not easy to sufficiently underline the importance of the American charitable
initiatives from September 1922 until the summer of the following year. Indeed, the
lives of hundreds of thousands of Greek refugees from Asia Minor, Pontus, and
Eastern Thrace were saved thanks to the humanitarian initiatives of American
charitable organizations, mainly the American Red Cross and the Near East Relief.
These two organizations practically single-handedly undertook the extremely difficult
task of providing aid on the spot to Greek refugees who otherwise would have likely
been condemned to death by diseases, malnutrition, and other hardships. The
gravity of the situation demanded immediate and effective action and the United
States was by far the first to respond to the Greek appeals for help.
Sometimes the numbers speak for themselves even though they cannot always
describe the splendor of philanthropy. The total cost of the relief work undertaken by
the American Red Cross for the period from October 1922 to 30 June 1923 amounted
to the astonishing $2,605,696.09.38 During that period of time, the American Red
Cross took care of the feeding and nursing of more than 500,000 Greek refugees,
and the Near East Relief helped in the relief of several thousand Greeks, including
many orphans, who had not yet left Asia Minor and were trying to find a safe way of
going to Greece. After the withdrawal of the American Red Cross from Greece, it was
estimated that the Greek government would need about 12 to 15 million drachmas
(that is approximately $375,000 to $470,000) per month in order to only feed the
refugees who were in no position to sustain themselves.39 It is quite obvious that,
without this assistance, the Greek government would not have been able to cope
with the extremely heavy burden of providing the means of survival to hundreds of
thousands of Greek refugees and it is easy to imagine what the fate of many of them
would have been if in the critical first months after the Asia Minor Disaster the
United States had not offered its generous help to Greece.
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‘‘ The Chargé in Greece (Caffery) to the Secretary of State,’’ Athens, 31 October 1922,
FRUS, 1922, vol. II, 443.
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Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Worse than War: Genocide, Eliminationism,
and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity. New York: Public Affairs, 2009.
Pp. 672, paper. $29.95 US.
Reviewed by Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, Department of Politics and
International Relations, University of Aberdeen

For many decades, scholars and practitioners have been preoccupied with whether or
not genocide and systematic human destruction can be contained and subsequently
eliminated from the future narrative of humanity. With indelible imagery and exploration, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen has compiled an impassioned study of mass murder
and the systematic slaughter of human beings in his 2009 book, Worse than War:
Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity.
Goldhagen establishes a clear argument that human destruction is not beyond
our control, and he maintains that the perpetrators of atrocities are not natural killers.
While exploring why some people choose to become cold-blooded killers while others
do not, Goldhagen presciently shifts the focus of the ongoing debate about genocide
and mass slaughter to ‘‘understand[ing] its causes, its nature and complexity, and
its scope and systematic quality’’ (xi–xii). Goldhagen applies his theory that perpetrators of recent massacres are not just ‘‘normal’’ individuals but rather people who
are all too eager and willing to perform the heinous task of killing their own.
The premise of Goldhagen’s theory is applied to the 1994 Rwandan massacre by
Hutu of Tutsi, the Serbian-sanctioned genocide of Muslims and Croats in the aftermath of the state dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the Indonesian slaughter of
Communists during the 1960s, the murderous campaign undertaken by the Khmer
Rouge in Cambodia, the extermination of some 200,000 indigenous Maya and leftists
in Guatemala between 1978 and 1984, the massacre of Marsh Arabs and Kurds
during the 1980s in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and to a corpus of ‘‘eliminationist’’ and
genocidal campaigns across the African continent to the present day.
Divided into eleven chapters, and dealing with the multifaceted phenomenon of
new perspectives on arcane preconceptions and debates about eliminationist politics,
actions, and discourse, Goldhagen’s study centrally explores the notion that the
expression of hatred toward the symbol of one’s putative enemies leads to a struggle
to establish not only physical mastery, but also emotional and moral mastery that
breeds a cycle of fury and, ultimately, destructive rage. His examples demonstrate
how individuals and groups establish and subsequently surpass previously established
baselines for brutality and murderousness.
As part of his case studies, Goldhagen conducts interviews with Madeleine
Albright, former US Secretary of State; Francis Deng, UN Special Advisor for the
Prevention of Genocide, and Clint Williamson, US Ambassador-at-Large for War
Crimes Issues. His consultations reveal the political, social, and cultural impasses
associated with the task of preventing genocide at the same time that he attempts
to apply the difficult lessons learned from past atrocities around the world.
Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, review of Worse than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity, by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen. Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, 1
(April 2011): 107–110. 6 2011 Genocide Studies and Prevention. doi:10.3138/gsp.6.1.107
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In Africa, Goldhagen interacts with perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide
to discuss their willful participation in acts of extreme violence that left thousands
brutally killed and thousands more emotionally brutalized. Minister of Justice
Tharcisse Karugarama discusses not only perpetrator motivation and willingness,
but also the international community’s inability and unwillingness to prevent other
governments around the world from undertaking genocide as a domestic policy that
seeks to quell civil discontent and political rivalry. One highly significant question
thus posed is ‘‘how can we prevent other countries from suffering the same or a
similar fate?’’
In another country, thousands of miles from Rwanda, Goldhagen explores the
concept of ‘‘overkill’’ with one of Guatemala’s leading forensic pathologists. Those
interviewed demonstrate that many cases of excessive violence are readily discoverable
among the remains of the country’s genocide victims. Their examinations expose the
harsh reality of how hatred is channeled to inflict offensive and often lethal wounds
against even the most helpless of victims, including children and pregnant women.
Commenting on Guatemala’s genocidal history is former President José Efrain Rı́os
Montt, who held power during the barbarous events that took place during the
1980s.
While in Bosnia and attending the annual commemoration of the Srebrenica
genocide (which took place in 1995 and resulted in the slaughter of more than
8,000 Bosniak men and boys—the greatest example of mass killing in European
history since those enacted by the Nazis and Soviets during the Second World War),
Goldhagen talks with Haris Silajdžić, a member of Bosnia’s tripartite presidency,
about the issue of pressuring external actors to involve themselves in the veritable
genocide and sociocide that ravaged Bosnia’s social landscape.
Asserting that each and every individual, institution, and government in all
corridors of the globe has the capacity to make choices, Goldhagen explains,
We can persist in our malign neglect that consists of three parts: failing to face the
problem squarely and to understand the real nature of genocide; failing to recognize
we can far more effectively protect hundreds of millions of people and radically reduce
mass murder’s incidence; and failing to choose to act on this knowledge. (xi)

Through his extraordinary encounters and case studies, Goldhagen demonstrates
that the world’s most egregious atrocities, mass murders, and acts of evil are products
of acceptance by average people and leaders alike who allow such profligacy to occur
and continue unabated. To exclude the motivations of mass murderers and eliminationists is to commit a most serious oversight that allows for the continuation of
heinous crimes against humanity. ‘‘Until recently, the rare analysis of mass-murder
that focuses on the perpetrators’ conduct addressed only the killing itself,’’ Goldhagen
writes (145). ‘‘Such omissions,’’ according to the author, ‘‘produce faulty depictions,
conclusions, and explanations of the perpetrators’ actions, and false understandings
of the broader events—renderings that bear only a caricatured relationship to the
actual horrors and their commission’’ (145). Accordingly, greater attention, it is
argued, should be paid to the perpetrators and their actions and not solely to the
victims’ experiences. Through his investigation of why perpetrators act, Goldhagen
demonstrates that widespread reflexive assumptions have been the primary force
behind the portrait that we have produced about the topic of genocide and systematic
human destruction. In other words, as Goldhagen puts it, ‘‘there is no pressing reason
to investigate something that seemed so obvious,’’ (145).
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Goldhagen also sets the Holocaust within the larger context of genocidal massacres
recurring across the globe and throughout history. Though he underscores the
intensive murderousness toward Jews and other human targets of the Nazi system,
Goldhagen demonstrates that the Germans’ mass annihilation and eliminationist
system prefigure subsequent systems of human destruction. He argues that ‘‘because
[such acts] are purposeful and discretionary political acts, such systems’ variable
overall destructiveness needs to be explained rather than ignored’’ (376). The institutions associated with the Holocaust and the distributive killing enacted by the Nazi
regime represent a model of further eliminationist political systems in world history,
not a progenitor of newer systems of destruction and annihilation but a microcosm
per se.
By looking at five systems with sustained eliminationist orientation and programs, Goldhagen makes an unearthing exploration of their techniques and degrees
of lethal acts. Goldhagen concludes that regimes’—that is, Communist China, Soviet
Union, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and Khmer Rouge’s—‘‘murderousness [is no
less] murderous than the murderousness of others, or their victims’ deaths [are not]
any less morally condemnable, significant, or meaningful’’ (379). While each atrocity
resembles the others, the underlying difference is in the application of ideology.
Looking at both the merciless acts of the perpetrators as well as the abject
outcome for their victims, Goldhagen’s study itself falls victim to generalizations,
abstractions, and discriminatory analysis. For example, he characterizes Nazi brutality
toward Jews and other so-called Unternmenschen, as, ‘‘the Germans’ hallucinatory
sense of endangerment’’ (473). Goldhagen thus fails to discriminate appropriately
between those consciously involved in heinous killings and those operating willingly
as ideological persons carrying out the policies of an elite few. From academic cherrypicking, and practicing poor history, to his disingenuous approach to such issues
as the Israeli treatment of Palestinian Arabs, Goldhagen’s work requires cautious
consideration from a great many angles. In spite of its well-deserved praise, Worse
than War is a highly repetitive and verbose piece of literature that, while posing
some most crucial questions that address genocide and human annihilation, fails to
produce solutions or provide answers to the questions so readily preached in this
work. Some may find this scholarly inquiry more akin to a tedious moralizing lecture
or admonition. Notwithstanding Goldhagen’s inadequate solutions, the author deserves
accolades in good measure for providing another source of support for the need to
remain cognizant about the glaring acts of genocide that many so sightlessly dismiss
or fail to acknowledge.
The penultimate section of Goldhagen’s book outlines and presents measures,
short of war, to which societies around the world can resort that will help abolish
genocide from our global society. Highly platitudinal, Goldhagen’s recommendations
are ultimately, if regrettably, exalted and self-evident. The question of competency
thus falls on the concept of international law as a mechanism through which
genocide may conceivably be stopped. For as much repute as is placed in the force
of international law, an equally measurable degree of discredit must also be cast
against it. Goldhagen calls for the formulation of an international anti-eliminationist
organization that would dispense preference to ‘‘real’’ democratic states in an effort
to buttress the reforms needed in international law to achieve the desired means
against genocide and mass killing.
Goldhagen’s sense of urgency leads to the assertion that genocides and genocidal
massacres are not unavoidable, nor do they exemplify themselves as inexplicable
phenomena. To the contrary, Goldhagen repeatedly emphasizes the point that such
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atrocities are events that never occur ex tempora. He contends that the international
community possesses the capacity to do something about them and, if not to
eliminate the impetus of eliminationism, then at least to make the world a relatively
harmonious place. In this vein, Goldhagen does not recognize the international community’s progress and positive steps in facing genocide.
Indeed, the United Nations assails itself of the unfair judgments cast against it
by Goldhagen in his work, particularly through the set of principles adopted by the
Organization’s Security Council known as the Responsibility to Protect, or R2P. This
document states that the international community has the responsibility to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.
Though the praxis of the doctrine has yet to be measurably visible, nations’ inaction
on this front speaks clearly to the feasibility of the establishment of an organization
of democracies dedicated to an interventionist modus operandi.
Far from being the most important political book published or even a highly
necessary read for either politicians or political leaders, Worse than War exemplifies
the idea that in spite of our effort—or our worst efforts, or no effort at all—the
occurrence and intensity of genocide has exponentially heightened beyond imaginable bounds. Nevertheless, Goldhagen’s work contributes to the corpus of genocide
literature and should compel us to act in the best interest of ‘‘Never Again,’’ lest
we continue as complacent and apathetic beings content to live out genocide after
genocide after genocide.
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Rowman and Littlefield, 2010. Pp. 258, cloth. $59.95 US.
Reviewed by Steven Leonard Jacobs, Aaron Aronov Endowed Chair of Judaic Studies,
University of Alabama

Richard L. Rubenstein, President Emeritus of the University of Bridgeport, CT, and
Distinguished Professor of Religion has long been at the forefront of the nexus
between religion and history, especially the Holocaust/Shoah, and over time has
authored such important and provocative works as After Auschwitz: Radical Theology
and Contemporary Judaism (1966), Morality and Eros (1970), Power Struggle: An
Autobiographical Confession (1974), The Cunning of History: Mass Death and the
American Future (1975), The Age of Triage: Fear and Hope in an Overcrowded World
(1983), and (with John K. Roth), Approaches to Auschwitz: The Holocaust and Its
Legacy (1987). Jihad and Genocide is no exception.
Mincing no words, Rubenstein informs us that he has written this relatively
slender volume as ‘‘an inquiry into the genocidal possibilities of jihad’’ (vii) by
examining the domain of Islam, dar al-Islam, and the domain of war, dar al-Harb
(chapter 1), the case of the Armenian Genocide at the hands of the Turks (chapter
2), the Nazi-Muslim connection of which ‘‘there is more than a little affinity’’ (p. 2,
chapter 3), the relationship between oil and anti-Semitism (chapter 4), the case of
Iran and the possibilities of nuclear genocide (chapter 5), and the fruits of what he
contends is Muslim/Islamic long-standing rage toward the West (chapter 6).
Rubenstein argues that today’s radical Islamist reading of the concept of jihad is
that of a ‘‘defensive jihad against the infidels who raid the abode of Islam’’ (5). Thus,
his reading of their reading of the Qur’an and other texts, most importantly the
works of Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) among others, leads him to three conclusions
when examining the religious traditions of Islam: (1) Muslims are under an unconditional obligation to undertake jihad against the inhabitants resident in their lands
(particularly Turkey historically and Israel today), (2) ‘‘no matter how terrible the
acts perpetrated by Islamic extremists, they have been without exception associated
with appeals to Islam’’ (39), and (3) those engaged in such practices are continuing
such acts begun more than 1,400 years ago with the birth of Islam itself. In so doing,
as a scholar of religion, Rubenstein forcefully argues for a seat at the table of conversation partners about genocide with historians, political scientists, lawyers,
sociologists, and psychologists, and he concludes that ‘‘a fundamental flaw in all
such efforts [to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and applicable to the wider arena] is
the failing of both Western and Israeli policy makers to take into account the religious
dimension of the conflict’’ (165; emphasis in original).
Turning to the first major genocide of the twentieth century, that of the
Armenian Christians at the hands of both secular and Muslim Turks, he posits that
the ongoing denial of this genocide ‘‘has been due, at least in part, to the Turkish
belief that they did no wrong in exterminating the Armenians, a belief that rests
ultimately on the tradition of jihad and the dhimma’’ (54). By implication, therefore,
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‘‘today’s radical Islamists regard genocide as a legitimate weapon against those
whom they regard as enemies of Islam. Holding that Islam is now under attack,
they see unremitting jihad as both defensive in character and the single most important Muslim religious obligation’’ (57).
Turning his attention next to the ongoing Israeli—Palestinian conflict, he first
examines the career of Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem (1921–1948),
a virulent anti-Semite who attempted to partner with the Nazi regime, broadcasting
his calls for jihad against the Zionists and the Jews of Palestine from a Berlin radio
during the Second World War, and who provided the foundational underpinnings for
today’s radical Islamists who ‘‘consider all of Palestine to be an inalienable part
of dar al-Islam and are therefore ‘obliged,’ at least in theory, to wage defensive
jihad against the Zionists whom they regard as having forcibly ‘invaded’ the land.
According to a strict interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence, the obligation to expel
the Jews was and remains a non-negotiable religious imperative’’ (97). Rubenstein
further rejects any notion that Nazism itself died with the death of Hitler in 1945
and the Nuremberg Trials of 1945–1946:
If anything, the mutual feeling of affinity between radical Islam and contemporary
Nazism is stronger than ever, for contemporary Islam is the one movement that has
the numbers and the power seriously to offer an alternative to Western civilization
that both the extreme right and left despise. (102)

Indeed, in the face of growing Islamic radicalism in Britain, France, Sweden,
Switzerland, and so forth, which is directed primarily toward both the Jews on the
continent and in the State of Israel as the twin sources of all that imperils the planet
today, Europe and the West’s thirst for oil and seeming willingness to continue to act
submissively is a holdover, he argues, from ‘‘a reading of Christian theology that
remains deeply rooted in the hearts and minds of many clergy and laity, namely
that the Jews have been punitively exiled from their land for rejecting Christ’’
(113). While many in the secular academy today would reject heilsgeschichte (German,
‘‘holy history,’’ that is, reading the past through the lens of one’s own religious tradition) as an understanding of either historical or contemporary events, for Rubenstein
and other scholars of religion such perspectives must be taken into consideration
when analyzing these events.
With regard to Iran and its nuclear agenda, at least according to its President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his stated goal of ‘‘wiping Israel off the map,’’ 1 he
further insists that ‘‘Iran’s hostility to Israel is very largely grounded in religion’’
(124), largely because ‘‘the Ayatollahs dwell in an entirely different moral universe
than any we in the West have had to deal with’’ (145). If Rubenstein is correct, then
such a culture and religious climate which fosters death as a viable option for its
citizens rather than life will, for the foreseeable future, see itself on a cataclysmic
confrontational course with the West. Rubenstein is not saying that such, indeed, is
the very essence of either the Qur’an or Islamic religion; rather he is arguing that
today’s radical Islamists and their ilk are loudly presenting to the uninitiated and
unknowing, the disaffected and the disenfranchised—particularly the young in
many Arab countries (and even, to some degree, in the West itself ) where access to
a positive economic future and social services are severely limited—a terribly viable
alternative to their present existence. And the fact is that the present state of
disillusionment on the part of many throughout the Arab world continues to fuel
the increasing rage toward the West, toward Jews, and toward Israel, leading to
frustration and manifesting itself in increasing jihadist violence.
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Rubenstein has written an important and significant book regardless of how
depressing and negative his conclusions are. His reading of the past, the present,
and the future is such that we ignore his insights to our detriment. As a scholar of
religion, his voice deserves to be taken seriously not only by those in other academic
disciplines but by the general public as well.

Note
1.

Spoken to 4,000 students in Tehran at a program called ‘‘The World without Zionism’’ in
2005. Nazila Fathi, ‘‘Iran’s New President Says Israel ‘Must Be Wiped Off the Map,’ ’’
New York Times, 27 October 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26.world/africa/26iht-iran.html
(accessed 18 May 2010).
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